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1973




BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

12 February 1973

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO



Dear Graham

Code 7.29.

1. From time to time the press here send reporters up to Baghdad to survey the local scene. We do not usually bother to include extracts in our daily press summary, or to report them, unless they contain something of direct concern to us in Kuwait. They may, however, contain the odd snippets of interest to you.

2. I enclose the latest example, an article datelined Baghdad, written by Mustafa Abu Libdah, the Chief Economic Editor of Siyasa, which appeared in the paper on 8 February. If you find this sort of thing useful, perhaps you could let me know and we can arrange to send you further examples as and when they appear. We would obviously prefer to send them as cuttings, rather than add to the burden of our translators.

BU 7/3/10
Ph Burton
Yours ever
Paddy

P G de Courcy-Ireland

cc: I McCluney Esq
BSI
Baghdad

2/10
14/3
1/2

عراقي اجتاز مرحلة الخطر

كولنسون اليوم جديد من الشركات تتولى لتسويق

تسويق ٧٥٪ من نفط كركوك المؤمم وكل نفط البرميلة الشمالي لمدة عشر سنوات في الشركات ٤٠٪ من كركوك والبرميلة ولاجال قصيرة، ورفضت بغداد شراء شركة الموصل لأنها غير تجارية لعراق على ٢٠٣ سنت للبرميل نتيجة التأمين أخذت سورية منها ١١ سنناً

حسين مع أربعين من القوميين القياديين وحودة وافراج المتاهرة عن العراقيين المعتقلين

بغداد — من مصطفى أبو لبدة
لطفه البلد الوحيد من نوعه في العالم ،
والذي تترابط فيه القضايا النفطية
بالقضايا السياسية — المحلية منها
والإقليمية — ترابطاً لا يمكن فهم أي
منها على حدة وفي معزل عن الأخرى ،
أو بالأحرى يصعب حل أي من هذه
القضايا المتشابكة تشابكاً عضوياً ،
دون أن يكون الحل متضمناً صورة
مستقبلية ناجزة من بقية القضايا .
فاجتاز المباني الوطني في العراق بين
القوى السياسية الرئيسية ، يعتمد
إلى حد كبير على الطريقة التي يتفرغ
أن يفرج بها الصراع من محاذاته
النفطية الراهنة . وهي محاذات
تتخلل فيها العلاقات بين عربي البعث
والديمقراطي الكردي ، بدرجة قد
تقل أو تزيد عن مدى تداخل العلاقات
بين العراق وسوريا ، أو بين العراق
ولبنان باعتبارهما بلدين تسير فيهما
شحنات نفط كركوك المؤمم لتصدر من
مينائي بانياس وطرابلس .

● التأميم اجتاز مرحلة الخطر
الامر الوحيد تقريباً والذي لم يصعد
هناك مجال للشك فيه ، هو أن تأميم
العراق لمصالحات شركة الاي. بي. سي
في حقول كركوك — الواقعة في الشمال
الكردي ، هذا التأميم كخطوة سياسية
اجتاز مرحلة الخطر .

فإذا كان الاثلا مصطفى البرزاني لم
يبحث في حينه بوقية نايب للرئيس البكر
بشأن التأميم ، وإذا كان الصراع
رسمياً قد شكاً من أن سوريا انطلت
نفسها كشريك سياسي واقتصادي في
خطوة التأميم ، بعد اعلان تأميمها
لخطوط الشركة في أراضيها ، وإذا كان
لبنان ما زال يبحث عن صيغة معينة
بشأن ادارة وتشغيل خطوط الشركة
المؤممة — عراقياً — في أراضيها ، ...
إذا كانت هذه القضايا الجزئية قد
غادرتها المرحلة الراهنة ، فإن الشركة
المؤممة قد اثبتت في العرض الذي قدمته
للحكومة العراقية في أواخر العام
الماضي ، أنها — أي الشركة — قد
أقرت بخطوة التأميم أساساً ، لينتقل
البحث بعد ذلك إلى الترتيبات ، وهي
مترتبة كثيرة ومتشعبة بشكل محدد ،
حيث أنها تتضمن مرفهاً من الشركات
ورداً رسمياً مقابلاً ، لجهة قضائياً
التسويق — تسويق مجمل نفط
الشركات الثلاث العاملة في الأراضي
العراقية ، وهو تسويق مرفهون بكل
عدة قضايا مطقة كتنفيذ الربيع وهجم
التعويض بالنسبة للممتلكات المؤممة .

● عرض الشركات ورد الحكومة
حتى توضع العروض التي قدمتها
الشركة المؤممة — وهي عروض عدة —
وكل ذلك الردود الرسمية على هذه

العروض ، في مرفهاً الصحيح لا بد
من الإشارة سلفاً إلى حجم الخطوط
الهائلة التي تعرض لها العراق من
مختلف الاطراف ، المحلية والعربية
والعولية .
من الداخل مرت شكايات عدة ،
بعضها يقول بأن الشركة نفسها تتبع
وراء خطوة التأميم ، وبعضها يقول
أن الخطط القومية هو الذي تعرض
على الحكومة أن تقدم على هذه الخطوة
وقد وصل جهد الزيادة ببعض
الاطراف لنظر في بيان — لم
يوزع الا في بعض مناسبات
الشمال وقيل أنه صدر في لندن — أن
من العروض على الحكومة أن تطلع
الخلافات مع الشركات وتلقي البحث
كلها بطريقة بغيرية بعض كفاءة
القضايا المطقة . وقد كانت القيادة
المركزية للحزب الشيوعي بقيادة برزاني
علاوي الموجود في الشمال — مجرمة
عزيز الحاج سابقاً — هي التي اصطلت
لكل البيان بالتعاون مع بعض القوى
خارج العراق وبالذات مجموعة صلاح
جديد .
يضاف إلى ذلك أن حالة التفتش ومنع
السير للخارج ، وهي ظروف يستحيل
على أية دولة أن تستمر فيها طويلاً .
هذه الظروف يجعلها يشكك البعض
لوقت الأتمة مع سوريا ، وموقف
— البقية على ص ١١ —

التأمين العراقي اجتاز مرح

هل يقوم الآن كونسورتيوم جديد هل

○ طلبت الشركات تسويق ٧٥٪ من نفط كركوك المؤمم وكل نفط
فقبلت الحكومة أن تسوق الشركات ٤٠٪ من كركوك والرميلة ولأجل قصيرة، ورفع
○ فتدوري: حصل العراق على ٢٠٣ سنت للبرميل نتيجة التأمين

اجتماع صدام حسين مع أربعين من القوم اللاجئين في مصر وافراج المتأهرة

العروض، في موقعها الصحيح لا بد
من الإشارة سلفاً إلى حجم الضغوط
الهائلة التي تعرض لها العراق من
مختلف الأطراف، المحلية والعربية
والدولية.
فمن الداخل مرت شائعات عدة،
بعضها يقول بأن الشركة نفسها تتبع
وراء خطوة التأمين، وبعضها يقول
أن الضغط الشعبي هو الذي فرض
على الحكومة أن تقدم على هذه الخطوة
وقد وصل حد الزيادة ببعض
الأطراف لتفكر في بيان - لم
يوزع إلا في بعض مناسبات
الشمال وقيل أنه صدر في لندن - أن
من القروض على الحكومة أن ترفع
المفاوضات مع الشركات وتطفي البحث
كليا مؤقتة بتفويض شخص كفاء
القضايا المطلة. وقد كانت القيادة
الحزبية للحزب الشيوعي بقيادة إبراهيم
علاوي الموجود في الشمال - مجرمة
عزيز الحاج سابقاً - هي التي أصدرت
لكل البيان بالتعاون مع بعض القوى
خارج العراق وبالذات مجموعة صلاح
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يضاف إلى ذلك أن حالة النقش ومنع
السير للخارج، وهي ظروف يستحيل
على أية دولة أن تستمر فيها طويلاً...
هذه الظروف بجملها يضاف إليها
توقيت الأزمة مع سوريا، وموقف
- البقية على ص ١١ -

فلما كان الملا مصطفى البرزاني لم
يبحث في حينه برتبة نايب للرئيس البكر
بشأن التأمين، وإذا كان العراق
رسمياً قد شكك من أن سوريا أدخلت
نفسها كشريك سياسي واقتصادي في
خطوة التأمين، بعد إعلان تأميمها
لخطوط الشركة في أراضيها، وإذا كان
لبنان ما زال يبحث عن صيغة معينة
بشأن إدارة وتشغيل خطوط الشركة
المؤممة - عراقياً - في أراضيها،...
إذا كانت هذه القضايا الجزئية قد
غارتها المرحلة الراهنة، فإن الشركة
المؤممة قد أثبتت في العرض الذي قدمته
للحكومة العراقية في أواخر الصدام
الماضي، أنها - أي الشركة - قد
أقرت بخطوة التأمين أساساً، لينتقل
البحث بعد ذلك إلى المراحل... وهي
مراحل كثيرة ومتشعبة بشكل معقد،
حيث أنها تضمين عرضاً من الشركات
ورداً رسمياً مقابلاً، لجهة القضايا
التسويق - تسويق مجمل نفط
الشركات الثلاث العاملة في الأراضي
العراقية، وهو تسويق مرهون بعمل
عدة قضايا مطلة كتنفيذ الربيع وهجم
التعويض بالنسبة للممتلكات المؤممة.

● عرض الشركات ورد الحكومة

حتى توضع العروض التي قدمتها
الشركة المؤممة - وهي عروض عدة -
وكذلك الردود الرسمية على هذه

بغداد - من مصطفى أبو أبدة
لعله البلد الوحيد من نوعه في العالم،
والذي تترابط فيه القضايا النفطية
بالقضايا السياسية - المحلية منها
والإقليمية - ترابطاً لا يمكن فهم أي
منها على حدة وفي معزل عن الأخرى،
أو بالأحرى يصعب حل أي من هذه
القضايا المتشابكة تشابكاً عضوياً،
دون أن يكون العمل متفهماً بصورة
مستقبلية ناجزة عن بقية القضايا.
فاجتاز الجنان الوطني في العراق بين
القوى السياسية الرئيسية، ويضد
إلى حد كبير على الطريقة التي يتفكر
أن يخرج بها العراق من محاذاته
النفطية الراهنة. وهي محاذيات
تتخلل فيها العلاقات بين عزبي البحث
والتيقراطي الكردي، بدرجة قد
نقل إلى حد بعيد عن تداخل العلاقات
بين العراق وسوريا، أو بين العراق
ولبنان باعتبارهما طرفين متضادين
شحنات نفط كركوك المؤمم لتصدر من
مينائي باتيبي وطرابلس.
● التأمين اجتاز مرحلة الخطر
الأمر الوحيد تقريباً والذي لم يصعد
هناك مجال للشك فيه، هو أن تأمين
العراق لعمليات شركة الآي. بي. سي.
في حقول كركوك - الواقعة في الشمال
الكردي، هذا التأمين كخطوة سياسية
اجتاز مرحلة الخطر.

تأميم النفط العراقي اجتاز مرحلة الخطر

— تتمة المنشور ص ١ —

بعض الدول المصرية التي تعهدت بالعدم المالي ولم تف بذلك .
يضاف الى ذلك حجم الحصار العالمي الذي تلوح به الشركات ، وصعوبة ان يقوم الاتحاد السوفيتي باستيعاب كميات اكبر من النفط العراقي بصيغة المقايضة ...

● الباجه جي يستمر في الوساطة رغم خروجه من الاوبك
هذه الظروف لم تجعلها لا بد وان تلحق بعين الاعتبار أثناء استعراض العرض الذي قدمته الشركات والذي قبله العراقي مناقشته .

فقد كان يفترض بالسيد نديم الباجه جي مكرمه عام الاوبك ان يعود للعراق وبصحبته ممثل شركة النفط الفرنسية (م. ا. ف. بي) لاستئناف المفاوضات ، وذلك في نفس اليوم الذي شرعت فيه سوريا قانون جباية موانئها من مرور النفط العراقي . ولذلك تأجل وصول الوفد العراقي وانقضت مهلة الشهر المجدد والتمتية في نهاية يناير الماضي ، لتجدد هذه المهلة شهرا اخر لتمدد بموجب الشركة المزممة ان لا تمارس خطوطها القانونية على النفط المسوق . وتجدر الإشارة الى ان السيد نديم الباجه جي سيظل يقوم ب مهمة الوساطة التي كلفته بها منظمة الاوبك رغم انتهاء مدته في الامانة العامة للمنظمة .

ويأتي توقيع العراق مع شركة البترول الفرنسية على عقد التسويق الجزئي للسنوات العشر — وقد وقع امس — بمثابة اقرار اساسي من الطرفين — الحكومة والشركات — بان المفاوضات قد تخطت الاساسيات لتدخل في الترميمات .

وهنا لا بد من الإشارة الى ان شركة البترول الفرنسية التي كانت — منذ زيارة السيد صدام حسين لباريس في حزيران الماضي — تحصل على نفس حصتها من النفط المزمم — نفس الحصة قبل التأميم — هذه الشركة لم تكن تدفع الترتيبات المالية للعراق وذلك بانتظار الوصول الى صيغة ترضى عنها بقية الشركات المشغولة في شركة ال.بي. سي المزممة ، ويانتظر تصديق سعر ثابت جديد للنفط المزمم المشعور من السجل الشرقي للبحر المتوسط ، وقد تم التوصل الى هاتين التظلمات هني اول امس — الاثنين — كانت شروط تعميل الشركة الفرنسية لحصتها من النفط المزمم كالتالي :

١ — العقد شعري بينها وبين الحكومة العراقية .

٢ — السعر المبدئي للبرميل — ولم اتفق طرفا من الطرفين برئيس الإشارة رسميا لذلك — والتي في حدود ٢.٢٥ دولار للبرميل .

٣ — المصروفات جديدة بانتظار الوصول الى حل بشأن امس التسويقي على الشبكات المزممة .

وقد تأكد هنا ان المرحلة التي وصلت اليها المفاوضات ، قد اقتضت الشركات بجدية الحكومة العراقية في الوصول الى حل عاجل وسريع . الامر الذي

منشآت كركوك فالتحق بين عرض الشركات وعرض الحكومة ، ليس صعبا تجاوزه ، اما بالنسبة لشركة نفط الموصل فقد رفضت الحكومة ان تشتريها لان عملياتها لسيولة وفي تجارية وبذلك ستكون خاسرة بالنسبة لها .

ويتألف وفد الحكومة العراقي من السيدات مرتضى سعيد عبدالقادر رئيسا (ممثلا لحزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي) وعامر عبدالله عضوا ممثلا للحزب الشيوعي العراقي والسيد محمد محمود عضوا ممثلا للحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني .

ويأتي نائب الوفد على هذا النحو ، بمثابة إشارة الى ان اي اتفاق يتم التوصل اليه ، منطلقا من شرعية التأميم والاصرار على هذه الشرعية ، انما هو اتفاق يعطي بتأييد القوى السياسية الرئيسية في العراق .

● اجتماع صدام حسين مع العناصر القومية القبلية

في منتصف ديسمبر الماضي ، عقد في مبنى المجلس الوطني اجتماع دام حوالي أربع ساعات حضره حوالي اربعون شخصا من وجوه الحركة القومية . وقد عرض السيد صدام حسين في ذلك الاجتماع كيف ان الجبهة الوطنية مطلب استراتيجي بالنسبة لحزب البعث الحاكم ، وكيف ان البعث لا يمكن ان لا يستطيع ان يحكم العراق في محزل من المشاركة الفعلية للقوى الاخرى الموجودة وجودا حقيقيا . وقد قيل ان الشخصيات القومية هذه امرت في ذلك الاجتماع من قاعاتها بلن التأميم يعتبر تأكيدا لجبهة حزب البعث في الالتزام بشعاراته بالنسبة للجبهة والجنال الوطني . الامر الذي تبصه عودة الكثير من العناصر القومية التي كانت مطلوبة لمر وبالات الضامر العسكرية . وقد ساهمت مصر في تلك الخطوة بان قامت من طرفها بالاتراج من العراقيين المعتقلين بالقاهرة بتهمة التشكيل العرقي او العنصرية الانتقالية .

● ترميمات جهود التسويق

الوفد الاقتصادي الذي عاد من تركيا امس والذي كان يفترض به ان يبحث مشروع خط الانابيب من كركوك الى السواحل التركية على المتوسط ، هذا الوفد لم يشر بشيء لذلك المشروع . دون ان يصر ذلك — كما قيل — اي تأثير على الدراسات الخاصة بالفكرة . فهناك مشروعان الان بشأن الخطوط يصران بشكل نظري متوازي . الاول خط كركوك تركيا والثاني خط مدينة — الخليج والذي يرأس لجنته السيد صدام حسين . وتخطط امس لاجتماع بين هاتين المجموعتين في هذا الخصوص . ٥. يكون هن ، ويكون الشخ نفسه باتجاهين ، بحيث يمكن فتح نفط الرحلة الى مدينة ثم مواصلة المتوسط ، او فتح خط كركوك الى مدينة ثم ام مصر والقار .

نبا يتصل بأسعار التسويق العالمي للنفط العراقي ، يصب المصنوع على سعر رسمي مسبق من الحكومة . مثل مصر رسمي عن مدى صحة الشبكات القائمة بلن النفط العراقي

حصنها من النفط المزمع - نفس
الحصة قبل التأميم - هذه الشركة لم
تكن تدفع المرتبات المالية للعراق وذلك
بانتظار الوصول الى صيغة ترضى عنها
بقية الشركات المشمولة في شركة ال.بي.
بي. في المزمع ، وبانتظار تحديد
سعر ثابت جديد للنفط المزمع المستورد
من الساحل الشرقي للبحر المتوسط ،
وقد تم التوصل الى هاتين التظلماتين
حتى اول امس - الاثنين - كانت شروط
تحميل الشركة الفرنسية لحصنها من
النفط المزمع كالآتي :

١ - العقد شهري بينها وبين الحكومة
العراقية .
٢ - السعر المحلي للتحميل - ولم
انه طرفا من الطرفين يرفض الإشارة
رسميا لذلك - يأتي في حدود ٢٢٥
دولار للبرميل .

٣ - المدفوعات مجدية بانتظار الوصول
الى حل بشأن اساس التعويض على
المنشآت المزمعة .

وقد تأكد هنا ان المرحلة التي وصلت
اليها المفاوضات ، قد اقيمت الشركات
بجدية الحكومة العراقية في الوصول
الى حل عادل وسريع . الامر الذي
جعل بقية الشركات المشمولة في ال.بي.
بي. في ، توافق على ان تبرم شركة
البتروال الفرنسية هذا العقد الطويل
الاجل مع الحكومة العراقية . الامر
الذي يعني ان الشركة الفرنسية ستدفع
للعراق الان كافة المبالغ الآيلة له منذ
هزيران الماضي ، وستوالي الدفع
شهريا بموجب الاسعار التي كان معمولاً
بها قبل التأميم . ولما كانت اتفاقية طهران
التي حددت اسعار الخليج والبحر
المتوسط تنهي في مطلع ١٩٧٥ لذلك
تضمنت اتفاقية العراق مع الشركة
الفرنسية بندا ينص على ان الاسعار
الراخنة سيحمل بها نقط حتى ١٩٧٥ .

● الاتفاق على صيغة عقد جديدة في
الرميلة بين ايراب والحكومة

عندما زار السيد صدام حسين باريس
في حزيران الماضي ، كانت هناك قضية
نقطية اخرى قائمة بين البلدين وهي
صيغة العقد المبرم قبل بين الحكومة
وبين شركة ايراب الفرنسية . وهي
لا ينسحب الكلام بالتخصيبات ، يكفي
بالإشارة الى ان شركة ايراب كانت
تشكو في حينه ان عقد المراقبة الذي كانت
تعمل بموجب في حق الرميطة ، كان مقدراً
غير تجاري بالنسبة لها . الامر الذي
كانت تلوح معه بالتوقف عن العمل .
وقد انضج الآن رسميا ان اتفاقاً جديداً
قد تم بين الطرفين ، ربما تم الاعلان عنه
في وقت قريب .

● الحكومة ترفض شراء شركة
نفط الموصل

الوند المتفاوض من طرف الشركة المزمعة
قدم حتى الان عدة عروض يمكن ايجازها ،
بشكل مختصر كالآتي :

١ - ان تقوم الشركات بالمصنوع
- وعلى امداد طويلة - بحقوق تسويق
X٧٥ من انتاج شركة نفط كركوك
المزمعة ، وكذلك كامل نفط الرميطة
الشمالي لمدة عشر سنوات .

٢ - توسيع منطقة امتياز شركة نفط
البصرة .

٣ - ان تشتري الحكومة شركة نفط
الموصل .

٤ - تدفع الشركات حقوق تنفيذ البيع
بالتزجيج .

٥ - ان تعرض الحكومة من منشآت
شركة نفط كركوك بحدود ٤٧٥ مليون
دولار .

وقد فهم هنا ان رد الحكومة على هذا
العرض من الشركاء جاء كالآتي :

١ - اذا كان لا بد من التعامل مع
الشركات ، في ضوء هذا الحجم الهائل
والمتشعب من الشروط فينبغي ان يكون
التعامل على اساس تجاري تقوم فيه
الشركات بالتسويق لاجل نصرة بحيث
لا تتجاوز حصة الشركات ٤٠ ٪ من
انتاج شركة كركوك المزمعة ، و ٤٠ ٪
من انتاج الرميطة .

اما بالنسبة لحجم التعويضات

الاقتيالية .

● ترميمات جهود التسويق

الوند الاقتصادي الذي عاد من تركيا
امس والذي كان يفترض به ان يبحث
مشروع خط الانابيب من كركوك الى
السواحل التركية على المتوسط ،
هذا الوند لم يثر بشيء لذلك المشروع .
دون ان يصي ذلك - كما قيل - اي
تأثير على الدراسات الخاصة بالفكرة .
فهناك مشروعان الان بشأن الخطوط
يسيران بشكل نظري متوازي . الاول
خط كركوك تركيا والثاني خط مدينة -
الخليج والذي يراس لجنته السيد
صدام حسين بتخطيط اساسي تكون
معدة للخروج في هذا الاتجاه .
٢ - يكون من ، ويكون الضخ فيه
باتجاهين ، بحيث يمكن ضخ نفط
الرميلة الى مدينة ثم مواصلة
المتوسط ، او ضخ نفط كركوك الى
مدينة ثم ام قصر والفار .

فيما يتعلق باسعار التسويق الحالي
للنفط العراقي ، يصعب الحصول
على سعر رسمي مسبق من الحكومة .
مثل مصدر رسمي من مدى صحة
الشائعات القائلة بان النفط العراقي
معروض في الخارج بسعر منخفض يصل
حدود ٢٢٢ دولار للبرميل فكان
الجواب بالنفي القاطع .

مثل نفس المصدر ان كان الاتحاد
السوفيتي او بعض الاطراف الاخرى
التي تشتري النفط العراقي بالمقايضة
تقوم من طرفها باعادة بيع هذا النفط
لبعض الاطراف الغربية ، فكان الجواب
ان لا علم لنا بذلك . حيث يفترض
بأي طرف يشتري نفطنا لم يرغب باعادة
بيعه ان يخبرنا سلفاً بذلك .

وكان الدكتور فكري قزويني مدير
الشؤون الاقتصادية في مجلس قيادة
الثورة قد ذكر في وقت سابق ان
العراق يبيع نفطه الخام بسعر تقاسمي
وهو ٢٤٠ سنت للبرميل . وجاء قوله
ذلك في معرض الإشارة الى هجوم
الضغط الذي فرضه سوريا على
العراق أثناء الأزمة الأخيرة ، حيث
كانت سوريا تتصرف على اساس
تعامتها بان العراق يسوق نفطه بسعر
٢٧٠ سنت .

وقال الدكتور قزويني في تذييله لعجم
التضحية التي قدمها العراق لسوريا ،
ان مردود التأميم بالنسبة للعراق
كان ٢.٢٠٢ سنت لكل برميل . فبالا
كانت سوريا قد حصلت على ١١ سنتاً
بموجب اتفاقية الترانزيت الأخيرة فان
ما تبقى للعراق من عوائد النفط المزمع
هو ١.٩٠٢ سنت لكل برميل .

مصدر اقتصادي مثل من طبعته
العرض الذي تلقاه العراق من شركة
طائرات « البوينغ ٧٠٧ » ، لتغطية
بعضها بالنفط الخام ، فقال ان العراق
قد تلقى عرضاً من خلال امم
مؤسسات التمويل التي سبق لها وموت
شراء مصر لربع طائرات بوينغ ،
وبموجب ذلك العرض نتاج للصراع
فرصة شراء خمس او ست طائرات
بوينغ مبنية ٧٠٧ ، مقابل ضمانات
سنوية من النفط الخام باسعار
عالية .

هذا وكان مندوب شركة البوينغ قد زار
بغداد في الشهر الماضي لكن يبدو انه
لم يوفق بمقابلة اي من كبار المسؤولين
الاقتصاديين .

● هل ينشأ كونسورتيوم جديد
في العراق

السؤال الذي يصعب الحصول على
جواب قاطع بشأنه هو : ما مصير
الصيغة التي تعمل بها الشركات حالياً
في العراق ، فيما يتعلق بشركتي
نفط البصرة والموصل . هل ستدخل
شركة البترول الوطنية العراقية
في صيغة معينة للمشاركة وبنسبة معينة
في هاتين الشركتين ، ام ان كونسورتيوم
جديد برئاسة البترول الوطنية او
برئاسة شركة البترول الفرنسية سينشأ
في العراق لتسويق كامل نفطه ؟

الفيون العراقيون والسوفيت يواصلون انجاز المرحلة الثانية من حقل الرميلا الشمالي

بغداد - ٧ - و.ع. - يواصل الفيون العراقيون والسوفيت العمل لتجسير المرحلة الثانية من حقل نفط الرميلا الشمالي وبدء الانتاج فيه بطاقة سنوية تبلغ ١٨ مليون طن في السابع من نيسان عام ١٩٧٤ المقبل .

وقال مصدر في الشركة العامة للتخطيط والانشاءات والمشاريع النفطية انه تم منذ بدء تنفيذ اعمال المرحلة الثانية في ايلول الماضي انجاز اعمال الخنية لوضع العمل وبوشر في الخامس من الشهر الجاري بالاعمال الميكانيكية الخاصة بالمرحلة .

واضاف ان الخزانات والآلات والمعدات تصل من الاتحاد السوفيتي بصورة منتظمة وان تنفيذ المرحلة الثانية سيتم في موعده ويلزم ان المرحلة الاولى من استثمار حقل الرميلا الشمالي كانت قد بدأت في السابع من نيسان الماضي بطاقة انتاجية سنوية تبلغ خمسة ملايين طن . ونصت الاتفاقية الموقعة بين العراق والاتحاد السوفيتي في تموز من عام ١٩٦٩ على مضاعفة انتاج الحقل الى ثمانية عشر مليون طن يبدأ بعد عامين من تنفيذ المرحلة الثانية .

ومن جهة اخرى عاد الى بغداد اليلة الماضية وفد نفطي عراقي بعد زيارة للاتحاد السوفيتي استغرقت شهرين ونصف الشهر .

وانهى الوفد خلال هذه الزيارة تنفيذ تصاميم مبنى النفط المقرر انشاؤه في الموصل شمال العراق والتي اعتمدها مؤسسة « نفت كيم بروم اكسپورت » السوفيتية .

وتبلغ سعة التصفية في هذا المبنى ٢٠ ألف برميل يوميا من النفط الخام ويشمل المشروع وحدة لتكرير .. ووحدة لتحسين البنزين واخرى لازالة الكبريت من المشتقات الخفيفة .

احتفالات العراق بالذكرى العاشرة لتورة ١٤ رمضان

بغداد - و.ع. - يحتفل العراق اليوم بالذكرى العاشرة لتورة ١٤ رمضان (٨ شباط) وبهذه المناسبة ستعطي الدوائر الرسمية وثبة الرسمية والمصالح والمؤسسات كافة .. كمبارك سيجري افتتاح عدد من المشاريع الصناعية والعمرانية ووضع الحجر الاساس لعدد اخر .

ويفتح الدكتور سعدون حمادي وزير النفط والمعادن وحدة تصفية النفط الخام في المنطقة الصناعية لشركة العراقية للصناعات النفطية بمحافظة كركوك شمال العراق وسيتم نصب وحدة ناتية للتصفية في المنطقة نفسها يبدأ تشغيلها بداية نيسان المقبل .. وتبلغ كلفة الوحدة ١٢ مليون وربع مليون دينار وتنتج الوحدتان ١٤ مليون جالون من النفط الابيض و ٤٢ مليون جالون من زيت الغاز .

ويضع الدكتور عزة مصطفى عيسى - مجلس قيادة الثورة وزير الصحة والعمر - الاساس لمستشفى جديد في قضاء العمودية قرب بغداد بكلفة ٢٥ ألف دينار ويتسع المستشفى الجديد الذي تشارك في انشاؤه لجنة العمل الشعبي في رئاسة صحة محافظة بغداد وبعض المنظمات الشعبية لـ ٢٤ مريضا .

ومن المشاريع الصناعية التي سيوضع لها الحجر الاساس بهذه المناسبة مشروع الألواح الاسبستية بكلفة ٢١٢ ألف دينار وبطاقة انتاجية تقرب ١٢ ألف و ٥٠٠ طن من الألواح الاسبستية .

غبار كثيف قائم من ايران يغلف عمان

مسقط - ٧ - رويتر. - الغل مطر السبب في مسقط وسارت السيارات وهي تضيء مصابيحها الامامية غشا اليوم عندما غل غبار كثيف لم يشاهد مثله منذ سنوات منطقة واسعة من شمال شرق سلطنة عمان . وانخفضت الرؤية الى مسافة ٥ مترات تقريبا في المطر الدولي ولم يستطع المسؤولون القول متى يمكن ان يستأنف استقبال الطائرات . وقال احد سكان البلاد منذ زمن بعيد انه لم يشاهد غبارا بهذه الكثافة فوق مسقط منذ ثمانين سنوات .

.. امانه يمثل الدول العربية المواجهه
لاسرائيل ؟ هذه هي الاسئلة التي بحسب
التقرير التالي ان يجيب عنها .. من خلال
استقراء اخر التطورات □

الرئيس الاميركي ريتشارد
نيكسون يستقبل الان وفي
الفترة القادمة ، زائرين
مهمين : حسين ملك
الاردن في السادس من
هذا الشهر ، وغولدا
ماير في بداية شهر
مارس (اذار) المقبل .
والاميركيون ، بعد ان
تخلصوا من تورطهم
النيكسوني ، يضمنون الان
جولدا مزدوجة من اجل
التوصل سريعا الى
تسوية للصراع
الاسرائيلي - العربي .
ومن هنا كان النشاط
الدبلوماسي الهام ، في
واشنطن كما في
العواصم العربية الاخرى .
الواقع ان غولدا ماير
اجرت استشارات هامة
في « على اعلى المستويات »
وذلك بعد ان علمها
بغيرها في واشنطن
الجنرال اسحاق رابين
يكافة مطالب نيكسون .
نيكسون يريد هذه المرة ،
كما يبدو ، اقتراحات
يلموسة . اذ ان النظرية
الاسرائيلية القائلة بـ
« اننا مستعدون للتفاوض
حول السلام دون اية
شروط مسبقة » في اي
وقت كان ومع اية
حكومة عربية « هذه
النظرية لم تعد تكفي
ابدا . ومن جهة اخرى
نلاحظ بان القسبل

الدبلوماسي لمشروع
روجرز ، قد لقى
الاميركيين درسا لا ينسى .
فهم ما عادوا براغبين
اقتراح اي شيء ما عدا
وساطتهم ، لذا باتوا في
انتظار قيام الاسرائيليين
بتحديد سياستهم بنفسهم
.. وذلك فيما يتعلق
بمفاوضات التسوية .
ولقد قال نائب رئيسة
الوزراء الاسرائيلية ابغال
الون لروجرز منذ فترة :
« ان فترة الانتخابات
الشريعية التي بدانسا
بدخولها .. ليست
مناسبة تماما لقضية اية
تنازلات دبلوماسية » .
وعلى هذا القول اجابه
روجرز بجفاف :
« ومع هذا .. ليس
بامستطاعتكم اجبارنا على
تخير الروزنامة السياسية
الدولية اكراما لعينسي
انتخاباتكم الشريعية » !
فلك ان هذه الروزنامة
السياسية تنص - كما
يبدو على بدء المباحثات
الاميركية - السوفياتية
عند نهاية الربيع القادم
على الاكثر . ويبدو ان
نيكسون قد قرر التقاط
مع غولدا ماير قبيل
التباحث مع ليونيد
بريجنيف . اما اذا لم
يتمكن نيكسون من هذا ،
واذا ما اصرت اسرائيل
على « البقاء في الاراضي

(2)

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 27 FEB 1973 NBR 12

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Your reference

Our reference 1/1

Date 22 February 1973

Dear Graham,

IRAQ PUBLIC RELATIONS BUREAU

1. The Revolutionary Command Council issued on 13 January 1973 their Decision No 46 which transfers all officials and employees of the Public Relations Bureau attached to the Revolutionary Command Council to the cadre of the Directorate General of Intelligence. The officials and employees retain their present grades and duties. This information was published in the Official Gazette on 24 January.
2. On the face of it this seems to be a sensible rationalisation of the security organisation.
3. The Official Gazette of 30 January reported Republic Ordinance No 34 of 24 January appointing Sadun Shakir Mahmud as Director-General of Intelligence.

Yours ever,

I McCluney

Encl

By 7/3 for GSB

I McCluney

c.c. M & V Department
F C O

Noted

12/3
pa

27/2




BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

1/9

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO



Enter

Dear Graham

IRAQ

- ① - 1. Please refer to my letter 1/9 of 12 February about Kuwaiti press reports on Iraq.
2. I now enclose another piece by Mustafa Abu Libdah, which appeared in As-Siyasa on 13 February, in case the interviews with Karim Ahmad of the Politbureau of the Iraqi Communist Party and Dara Tawfiq of the Kurdish Democratic Party contain any nuggets of background interest - and the brief remarks of "Abu Karim" of the Ahwaz Liberation Front on its links with PFLOAG and the Baluchistan Liberation Front.
3. I am not copying the article to Ian McCluney. The principle points of interest to him are likely to be Dara Tawfiq's dismissal of the possibility of Mulla Mustafa visiting Moscow; Karim Ahmad's assurance that the Baath and the ICP are still negotiating over the National Charter; and the list the latter gave of the representatives in the negotiations between the Baath and the Kurds:

"Nationalists"	:	Hisham al Shawi, Minister of Higher Education
"Independents"	:	Abdul Latif al Shawwaf Aziz Sharif
ICP	:	Karim Ahmad Abdul Razzaq al Safi Mahdi Abdul Karim Dr Rahim 'Ajinah Makram al Talabani
KDP	:	Salih al Yusifi Dara Tawfiq
"Independent" Kurds	:	Fuad Arif Ihsan Shirzad
Baath Party	:	Muhammad Fadhil Abdul Khaliq al Samerrai Murtadha Said Abdul Baqi Sa'dun Ghaidan Tariq 'Aziz

Don't reply
BB 14/3
Pa

Yours ever

Pagan

cc I S McCluney Esq

P G de Courcy-Ireland

حق السيد حافظ اسماعيل ما عهد - كاساسي المسلم في السلطة .

العراق : دولة خليجية

- قمة القصور في ١٠ -

واقعا بقيادة حزب البعث ، لكن بدون
ايات لله نجا بالمال .

في كربلاء لا يهتمون بالسياسة

أحد استبداد نظرية كارل ماركس من

« مصير العنكبوت » تقول ان قوة

الاستبداد السلطوي لينة فلهذا هي في

بعض دولها لا يهتمون بالسياسة

ما تركت الاثر في الحياة السياسية في

السلطة .

فكلا طبقت هذه النظرية على الرئيس
السلطوي الثاني التطيد في العراق
فول بالمكان الترحيل الى صيغة حكمية
الغري في الصيغة القراية ؟ وصحوا ؟
الله .

قامت لاجلهم الفيني ، وكان لاجلهم في

كربلاء لسلطة البعث : فهي —

نظرية ملك : ولا عرف في السلطة

لخط ارادة في جدول التوزيع السياسي

قال زعيم البعث : ان السلطة هي

نفسها في الحياة السياسية في

لا يهتمون بالسياسة .

العراق: دولة خليجية أم دولة سورية

أين وصلت العلاقات بين القوى الرئيسية داخل العراق، وكيف لتوفيق بين الالتزامات السياسية والشعارات الحزبية بالنسبة للخليج والأهواز وبلوشستان الخليج غير موهل اجتماعياً لقيام أحزاب شيوعية وروسيا لا تستطيع حالياً دعم أحركات اليسارية في الخليج شائعات عن نية كردية باحتناق المذهب الوهابي، وتفسير لعدم ضرب جبهة الأهواز للمنشآت النفطية الإيرانية

— نظرية كارل دويتش — القليلة على كثافة طبيعة «الصب العسكري» والربط بين سياسات القوة وسياسات التنمية.

العراق، حل هو دولة خليجية أم دولة سورية حتى مطلع الخمسينات، كان السور السياسي الممنوح للعراق، دوراً قديماً مؤكداً لقطعة الشام أو سوريا الكبرى. لا يزل لحنه ملازمة مصر له أو مناصرة السعودية. غير أنه مع ثورة ٢٢ يوليو في مصر واكتساب القاهرة طابعاً عربياً معزولاً، تنقش دور العراق السياسي في منطقة سوريا، وازدادت ثقافته بعد ١٩٥٨ بسبب مسلسل الانقلابات والاضطرابات الداخلية.

وإذا كانت منطقة الخليج قد أصبحت منذ أواسط أو مطلع الستينات «بعداً عربياً» للعراق، فإن هذا البعد العربي قد أخذ يتجسد عملياً مع وصول حزب البعث للسلطة، ومع اشتداد الصراع الدولي على منطقة الخليج — نفطياً واستراتيجياً — بحيث لم يعد بالإمكان لبغداد أن تتصرف نفطياً وسياسياً في معزل عن حجم الهجمة الدولية الهائلة على مياه الخليج. وعين أصبح قيد التداول التساؤل عما هو مستقبل الخليج بين الدول المطلة عليه، أصبح معروفاً أن العراق دولة خليجية، بصرفه قريب أو تنقش من كون العراق دولة

هدف معين بأقل عبارة صكّة (وبين سياسة النور، هذه العلاقة بصعب أن يتوفر نظام سياسي في الشرق الأوسط يكون نمطاً توضيحياً لها بأكثر مما هو الحال). العلاقة بين حزب البعث الحاكم والأحزاب الأخرى المشاركة — كالشيوعي والديمقراطي الكردستاني والحركة القومية — وكذلك ترويح ما يفسر بالمجالات الحيوية للاندثار السياسي هذا النظام، نوماً يشعل الجبهة القومية (منطقة الشام تاريخياً) ويشعل بها منطقة الخليج وكذلك الحدود الجنوبية الجنوبية. والعلاقة بين المذهب السياسي القوي بشكلاي القنن، والاحتجاجية للتنشيط الشعارات العزيمية المزعومة. هذه الظواهر بعضها تحصل من القاع السياسي للعراق، نولجا هنا لأخبار القنن السياسية الحديثة.

قاسم السور، سكرتير تحرير «السياسة»، عاد من عدن وصنعاء. اليوم يبدأ مجلة تقاريره السياسية.

صنعاء من الجزيرة — عدن ما يقع خلف الظهر. —

بغداد — من مصطفى أبو لبدية
 على سنوات قليلة مضت، كانت معظم النظريات السياسية توجه في الأساس للبحث عن قوة الحكومة، أية حكومة، وعن قوانين ومؤسسات تلك الحكومة. غير أنه منذ مطلع الستينات، وبالأدوات منذ ١٩٦٢ بعد ما نشر «كارل دويتش» كتابه المعروف باسم «الحكومات» حصل تغير أساسي في منطلقات فهم أصلاّب الأنظمة السياسية وأدوارها. فقد بدأ البحث مع دويتش، ليس من نقطة تفسير القوة المفضلة للجدد السياسي لأية حكومة وإنما من تفسير «الصب الحكومي». حيث المقصود بالصب الحكومي في أية دولة، قوات الاتصال والقرارات الموجودة لدى تلك الحكومة، وهي القوات والقرارات التي تلجأ في النهاية مسألة التفسير في ذلك الكيان الجبرالي... ولعل من أبرز ملامح النظرية السياسية الجديدة هذه، مسألة التمييز والعلاقة بين سياسات القوة وسياسات النور. القوة التي تعني بلوغ هدف معين بأقل عبارة (والنور الذي يعني نمو القوة البشرية مثلباً وجسمانياً مع النور الاقتصادي ونمو ذاتية النظام بشكل يضمن زيادة القدرة لدى ذلك النظام على تنفيذ أهدافه فيما لتفسيرات النظرية على التنبؤ الاجتماعية.

مسألة العلاقة بين سياسة القوة (بلوغ

سورية ، بالمضي القديم لفظة سوريا التي اشتق ما يسمى الآن عسكريا بالجهتين الشمالية والشرقية . لكن فعلا ، أين هو « البعد القومي » للعراق ، أم الخليج ، أم منطقة سوريا ؟ أهد منظري حزب البعث هنا ، يرفض طرق الموضوع بهذه الصورة ، معتبرا السؤال بهذه اللفظة سؤالاً مفرضاً ، ومتناقضاً أصلاً مع الشعار والمطلق الاسمي للحزب : أمة عربية واحدة ، ذات رسالة خالدة . حيث قضيا هذه الأمة ، في الخليج ، ومع إسرائيل ، وفي الشمال الأفريقي ، قضيا على مستوى واحد من الأهمية بالنسبة لبلداد .

يوضع الخليج في التقييم المركزي

● كريم أحمد ، عضو المكتب السياسي للحزب الشيوعي العراقي والشخص الثاني بعد سكرتير الحزب - عزيز محمد الذي يعالج الآن في موسكو - ورئيس تحرير صحيفة الحزب الشيوعي الاهلومية الفكر الجديد يقول : الخليج هو القطعة الرئيسية التي يدور عليها الصراع بين حركة التحرر العربي وبين الاستعمار . وما المشاكل التي تواجه الشعوب العربية في المناطق الاخرى (ومنها القضية مع إسرائيل) ما هي الا مجرد الهاء للشعوب العربية حتى لا توجه اهتمامها للمنطقة الرئيسية منطقة الخليج . وباعتقادنا انه اذا وجهت حركة التحرر العربي نحو الاهتمام بهذه المنطقة والاهلها ، فانها تكون قد نجحت نجاحاً كبيراً في توجيه الضربة لإسرائيل ايضاً .

من بين التيارات والحركات اليسارية في الخليج نشكر كل من دعمت وتوسعت لها . يضاف الى ذلك عدم وجود أو نشوء قيام احزاب شيوعية هناك .

كريم أحمد : هناك منظمات ثورية في الخليج ، لكن هذه الاحزاب والتنظيمات لم تأسس على اساس ماركسية - لينينية وانما تكونت على اساس حركة ثورية قومية وطنية . بعض هذه الحركات يدعى الماركسية - اللينينية لكنها ما زالت مختلفة عن هذا الاتجاه . وفي النهاية هي قوى ثورية مهنها التمسك من أجل التحرر الوطني والديمقراطي .

بالنسبة لوقت الاتحاد السوفيتي منها ، فهو لم يتوان بتبني الحركات الثورية . أما كحزب فهو ما زال يتوكلها بامتنان . الاتحاد السوفيتي لديه علاقات مع حزبنا - الحزب الشيوعي العراقي - ومع حزب البعث ومع الديمقراطية الكردستانية . وهذه العلاقات نتيجة خبرات طويلة ، إذ ليس بالهين ان يقيم علاقات مع أي تنظيم حيث ذلك يحتاج الى تركيبة ، وبالذات تركيبة الحياة والنضال . ونضال هذه الحركات هو الذي بإمكانه ان يخلصها فيما بعد ليقيم الاتحاد السوفيتي معهم العلاقات التي يطلبونها .

أما من يجب عدم قيام احزاب شيوعية في الخليج ، ذلك ما دل الى ان تطور الحياة الاجتماعية وخصوصاً حجم الطبقة العاملة - كما ونوعاً - لم يبلغ بعد الدرجة التي تتيح فيها هذه الاحزاب الشيوعية . لم ان هناك محاولات من قبل العناصر الثورية لتقامة مثل هذه التنظيمات ، الا انها لم تبرز لحد الآن لوجود كتل شيوعية .

منذ بعد النظريات السياسية تقول انه ليس في الخليج وهدد لم يتم او لم تنجح الاحزاب الشيوعية ، وانما ايضاً في كل العالم العربي . ويظهرون ذلك بتطبيقات شتى ، منها ان موسكو نفسها سبقت ونظمت عن الدعم المباشر لهذه الاحزاب بعد تبني الطرق الاشتراكية للاحتراكية .

كريم أحمد : الاحزاب الشيوعية العربية هي المسطرة الاولى من رسم سياساتها ، وليس الحزب الشيوعي السوفيتي . مساهمة الاحزاب الشيوعية العربية هي قيام جبهات وطنية مع الاحزاب القومية وقوى الثورة في العالم العربي ،

● كريم أحمد : لم يحدث هذا الشيء ، لسبب بسيط وهو انه عالم عبد الله لم يكن هو المسئول الاول عن الحزب انذاك .

من : بعض اطراف الحزب الشيوعي السوري تقم موسكو ، وتتهمها بقضايا قومية وتفرطت كثيرة في المسألة الفلسطينية .

● كريم أحمد : الحزب الشيوعي السوري منقسم الى جناحين . هذا واضح . وكل جناح له وجهة نظر خاصة في القضايا المطروحة ، وبالنسبة لبرنامج الحزب وخصوصاً البرنامج السياسي ، عام ١٩٧١ عقد كونفرانس حزبي سبقته مناقشات طويلة . وقد برزت في هذا الكونفرانس الخلافات بشكل اساسي ، وجرى محاولات عديدة من قبل الحزب الشيوعي بالعراق - بشكل خاص - في مجيل صيانة وحدة الحزب الشيوعي السوري إذ انه ليس من مصلحة حركة التحرر العربي الانشقاق في اية حركة او حزب .

في جهونا كنا نرمي لوحدتنا شئني الحزب السوري ! مجموعة ريفاني الترك كانت تضط باتجاه تبني وجهة نظر الهيئة القيادية للمكتب السياسي حيث كانوا يتمتعون بالاكثية . اما في اللجنة المركزية فقد كان الطرفان متساويين تقريباً ! بالنسبة لمنظمات الحزب كانت مجموعة خالد بكداشي اكثر من مجموعة ريفاني الترك . يومها ذهب وفد مشترك للاستشارة برأي الحزب السوفيتي ، وجرى الاتفاق هناك بين الطرفين على اساس العمل من اجل اعادة وحدة الحزب . وقد نشر ذلك . لكن كما يعتقد فان مجموعة ريفاني الترك لم تنسك بالاتفاقية خصوصاً فيما يتعلق باللجنة الرامية لقيادة الحزب خلال الفترة حتى انعقاد المؤتمر . اما عن الكتاب الذي نشر اليه والمطروح في السوق ، فقد نشر باتجاه دعم افكار ريفاني الترك وقد جاء بشكل مبسّط . ونعتقد هنا انه ما كان من الصحيح نشر هذا الكتاب في الظروف الحالية لانه يعمل الانقسام اكثر .

اما اللجنة الرامية التي اشترت اليها فتكون من خالد بكداشي ، يوسف فيصل ، طاهر عبد الصمد ، دانيال نعمة . واما عن الموعد المتضمن لعقد المؤتمر فلم يتحدد بعد حيث المعلومات تتعقد اكثر فأكتر داخل الحزب الشيوعي السوري .

من : قيل ان مجموعة ريفاني الترك على اتصال بمجموعة صلاح جديد ومجموعة ابراهيم علوي .

كريم أحمد : لا داعي للاعراج .

النشاط الحزبي للبعث

في الخليج

عندما قامت المظاهرات في راس الخيمة في العام الماضي توجهت الانظار لحزب البعث - في العراق - حيث نشر يومها الكثير من التكهنات عن علاقة البعث بحزب العمل هناك .

وعندما تعرضت احدى المنشآت النفطية الايرانية (في خط شاه شمال الاهواز) في العام الماضي لحادث تحريق وتدميرها من حزب البعث يتبع وراء الحركة .

ولي صناديق يتحنون هذه الايام عن محاولة انقلاب قريبة ، يقولون ان حزب البعث وقت وراها .

أحد مسئولو حزب البعث حين تطرح هذه القضايا امامه يقول : اني اناهم يريدون اقتاع العالم اننا متفردون لانظمة الانقلابات في الخليج . فصل انتهت بشكائنا الداخلية الى ذلك الحد الذي يسمح لنا سياسياً واقتصادياً ومالياً بان ننشر دبلوماسياً في الخارج على هذا النحو ؟

● أحد مسئولو الجبهة الشعبية للتحرير الخليج يطلب منه ان يصف نوع العلاقة التي تربت على زيارة اميرة - قبل ثلاثة أسابيع - قام بها لبلداد وفد من الجبهة ، ليرفض الاجابة ، وان كان لا ينكر ان العراق يرفض باستمرار الاستجابة لطلب الجبهة بان تقوم بلداد بنزع علاقاتها ومحب اميراتها بقوله الامير الحسين ملك العراق .

الاشيوية الفكر الجديد يقول : الخليج هو المنطقة الرئيسية التي يدور عليها الصراع بين حركة التحرر العربي وبين الانحلال . وما المثلل التي تواجه الشعوب العربية في المناطق الاخرى (ومنها القضية مع اسرائيل) ما هي الامجرد الهاء للشعوب العربية حتى لا توجه اهتمامها للمنطقة الرئيسية منطقة الخليج . وباعتقادنا انه اذا وجهت حركة التحرر العربي نحو الاهتمام بهذه المنطقة والهلبها ، فانها تكون قد نجحت نجاحا كبيرا في توجيه القضية لاسرائيل ايضا .

م : لكن الجبهات والحركات اليسارية في الخليج تفكر في عدم دعم موسكو لها . يضاف الى ذلك عدم وجود او فشل قيام احزاب شيوعية هناك . كرمي احمد : هناك منظمات ثورية في الخليج ، لكن هذه الاحزاب والتنظيمات لم تأسس على اساس ماركسية - لينينية وانما تكونت على اساس حركة ثورية تقدمية وطنية . بعض هذه الحركات يدعى الماركسية - اللينينية لكنها ما زالت مختلفة عن هذا الاتجاه . وفي النهاية هي قوى ثورية مهمتها النضال من اجل التحرر الوطني والديمقراطي .

بالنسبة لوقت الاتحاد السوفيتي منها ، فهو لم يتوان بتبني الحركات الثورية . اما كحزب فهو ما زال يترتبها باليمن . الاتحاد السوفيتي لديه علاقات مع حزبا - الحزب الشيوعي العراقي ، ومع حزب البعث ومع الديمقراطي الكردستاني . وهذه العلاقات نتيجة خبرات طويلة ، اذ ليس باليمن ان يقيم علاقات مع اي تنظيم حيث ذلك يحتاج الى تركيبة ، وبالذات تركيبة الحياة والنضال . ونضال هذه الحركات هو الذي يملكه ان يدعم فيها بعد ليقم الاتحاد السوفيتي مهم العلاقات التي يطلبونها .

اما من سبب عدم قيام احزاب شيوعية في الخليج ، فذلك عائد الى ان تطور الحياة الاجتماعية وخصوصا حجم الطبقة العاملة - كما ونوعا - لم يبلغ بعد الدرجة التي تبتلي منها هذه الاحزاب الشيوعية . فمع ان هناك محاولات من قبل العناصر الثورية لاقامة مثل هذه التنظيمات ، الا انها لم تبرز لحد الان الوجود كتشبيات شيوعية . من وراء هذه النظريات السياسية تقول انه ليس في الخليج وهذه لم تقم او لم تنجح الاحزاب الشيوعية ، وانما ايضا في كل العالم العربي . ويترهون لذلك تطالبت حتى ، منها ان موسكو نفسها سبقت ونظمت عن الدعم المباشر لهذه الاحزاب بعد تبني الطريق الاشتراكي للاشراكية .

كرمي احمد : الاحزاب الشيوعية العربية هي المسئلة الاولى من رسم سياستها ، وليس الحزب الشيوعي السوفيتي . سياسة الاحزاب الشيوعية العربية هي قيام جبهات وطنية مع الاحزاب التقدمية وقوى الثورة في العالم العربي ، وليس اتجاهها ان تنفرد بالتفصيل وتعمل على تجاوز ما هو ممكن في مرحلة التحرر الوطني والديمقراطية . ولذلك كان التركيز على سياسة الجبهة الوطنية . قد تكون الاحزاب الشيوعية لم تصل للسلطة في العالم العربي . وهذا صحيح ، لانها تفتقر من اجل اقلية حكومات تبتلي من الجبهة الوطنية وتوجه اهدافها مع القوى الثورية في البلدان العربية . وواضح ان الاحزاب الشيوعية ليست نرفا مضامرة او متامرة لتبني اوضاع معينة من خلال اسلوب عمل المفايرين ! انها تستند لاسي خليفة من اجل قيام ثورات اجتماعية . ولذلك من الخطا تحميلها مسؤولية عدم مجيئها للسلطة . م : قبل ان عابر عبد الله - ممثل حزب الان في الحكم - جرى تعييله مسؤلية عدم وصولكم للسلطة باسم عبد الكريم قاسم .

في جوهنا كما ترمي لوجهة فسني الحزب السوري ! مجموعة رسائل التركة كانت تخطط باتجاه تبني وجهة نظر الهيئة القيادية للمكتب السياسي حيث كانوا يتمتعون بالثغرة . اما في اللجنة المركزية فقد كان الطرفان متساويين تقريبا ! بالنسبة لقطاعات الحزب كانت مجموعة خالد بكداشي اكثر من مجموعة رياض التركة . يوما ذهب وفد مشترك للاستشارة برأي الحزب السوفيتي ، وجرى الاتفاق هناك بين الطرفين على اساس العمل من اجل اعادة وحدة الحزب . وقد نشر ذلك . لكن كما يعتقد فان مجموعة رياض التركة لم تنسك بالالتفاتية خصوصا فيما يتعلق باللجنة الرئاسية لقيادة الحزب خلال الفترة حتى انعقاد المؤتمر . اما عن الكتاب الذي نشر اليه والمطروح في السوق ، فقد نشر باتجاه دعم افكار رياض التركة وقد جاء بشكل مبسر . ونعتقد هنا انه ما كان من الصحيح نشر هذا الكتاب في الظروف الحالية لانه يصل الانقسام اكثر .

اما اللجنة الرئاسية التي اشترت اليها فتكون من خالد بكداشي ، يوسف فيصل ، طاهر عبد الصمد ، دانيال نعمة . واما عن الموعد المتضمن لعقد المؤتمر فلم يتحدد بعد حيث العلاقات تتعلق اكثر فاكتر داخل الحزب الشيوعي السوري . م : قيل ان مجموعة رياض التركة على اتصال بمجموعة صلاح جديد ومجموعة ابراهيم علاوي . كرمي احمد : لا دامي للاخراج .

النشاط الحزبي للبعث في الخليج

عندما قامت المظاهرات في راس الخيمة في العام الماضي توجهت الانتظار لحزب البعث - في العراق - حيث نشر يومها الكثير من التكتلات عن علاقة البعث بحزب العمل هناك . وعندما تعرضت احدى المنشآت النفطية الايرانية (في خط شاه شمال الاهواز) في العام الماضي لحادث تحريق ، قيل يومها ان حزب البعث يتبع وراء الحركة . وفي صنفاء يتحدثون هذه الايام عن محاولة انقلاب قريبة ، يقولون ان حزب البعث يقف ورائها .

احد مسئولي حزب البعث حين تطرح هذه القضايا امله يقول : اتري ! انهم يريدون اقتاع العالم اننا متفرغون لاقامة الانقلابات في الخليج . فحصل انتهت بشللنا الداخلية الى ذلك الحد الذي يسمح لنا سياسيا واقتصاديا ومحتويا بان ننشر دبلوماتنا في الخارج على هذا النحو !

● احد مسئولي الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير الخليج يطلب منه ان يصف نوع العلاقة التي تربت على زيارة اخيرة - قبل ثلاثة اسابيع - قام بها بغداد وفد من الجبهة ، فرفض الاجابة ، وان كان لا ينكر ان العراق يرغب باستمرار الاستجابة لطلب الجبهة بان تقوم بغداد بقطع علاقاتها ومصب امتثالها بدولة الامارات العربية وقطر والبحرين .

● ابو كرم المسئول السياسي للجبهة الشعبية لتحرير الاهواز يسأل عن علاقة العراق بمطلب جبهة تحرير الاهواز اقامة دولة عربية في تلك المنطقة فيقول :

نحن نطمح لان نقيم دولة عربية متحدة ذات حكم ثوري يؤمن بالاشراكية في الاهواز . ونريد ان تكون جزءا من الامة العربية وليس جزءا تابعا لاصرائل .

م : وهل لكم علاقة مع الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير عمان والخليج ، او مع جبهة تحرير بلوشستان ؟ ابو كرم : بعض عمليات المستقبل ستقوم بها مع جبهة تحرير عمان والخليج . ولدينا تفصيل كبير مع جبهة تحرير بلوشستان .

م : ومع الحزب الشيوعي الايراني (ثورة) ؟

عليها بالمرء ، فسيات الاشتراكية
محددة في سياسات الاتفاقية والبيان ،
والهدف بناء مجتمع متحضر . عند هذه
النقطة لم يخطف العرب ، والجامعة
العربية ، والنزول العربية ، كلها
اسهمت في ادخال الاشتراكية بالاتفاق
والدكتور ابراهيم كان يتحدث وامامه
نشرة اليوم التي يصورها مكتب
وكالة الأنباء العراقية في عدن ، نقرا
منها نصريها طازجا للقاضي عبد الله
الحجري رئيس الوزراء في صنعاء ،
ينفي قيام اي خلاف من اي نوع مع
الجنوب .

المن القوايا متوفرة لاحقا الوحدة ،
وهي في صلبها تهدف الى تحقيق مجتمع
متحضر . مسألة التحضر ، ووضع
البرامج التحضيرية هي التي اخلت
على العيني ، وانهم بسببها انه مترفع
على المؤسسات الحاكمة في صنعاء ،
ومتصلب متفرد في رايه ، وهو بسبيله
لتحقيق الممارسات العملية التي تقود
بلاده ، وفق رؤياه ، الى هذا المجتمع
المتحضر المتشود .

ابن المشكلة ان ؟
انها في السؤال : متى تقوم الوحدة ؟
وطالما ان المسألة ذات صلة بتحضر
المجتمع اليمني ككل ، وهذه معركة
من اقصى واشد معارك هذه البلاد ،
فانه من الافضل استطلاع وسائل كلا
العاصمتين ، صنعاء وعدن ، الموضوع
اساسا لتحقيق هذا الهدف المشترك ،
ولفتين ، بالتالي كيف امكن استحداث
وسيلة عمل مشتركة لا تخرج النظام
المقاتلي في الجنوب ، وقد توقع
رجال النظام التقديري في الشمال في
مازق حقيقي .

● رؤيا عدن الوحدوية

للي جانب ان الوحدة اليمنية معتبرة
في عدن مطلباً جماهيرياً عظيماً « ياخذ
الصدارة من مطالب الشعب اليمني »
فان عدن ايضا ترى ان بناء الدولة
اليمنية الموحدة المواكبة لمسيرة الامة
العربية « لن تكون الا نتاجا لروح
المصر الحديث التي تتطلب من اجل
بناء اركانها واسسها قوانين حديثة
متطورة ومؤسسات اقتصادية وسياسية
 واجتماعية متحضرة تتناسب والتحديات
الجسام التي قدها شعب اليمن منذ
بداية هذا القرن ، فالتجزئة مرفوضة
مهما كانت ونعت اي اسم ، لانها
كانت - وما زالت - المخل الاساسي
لشل حركة التقدم في الوطن كله ،
والعقبة الرئيسية التي تعترض طريق
تطوير وتوسيع الاجراءات الاجتماعية
التي حققها شعبنا طوال تاريخه
الحديث » .

فاصرار عدن على ان قيام اليمن الموحدة
« لن تكون الا نتاجا لروح العصر »
مستند في الاساس على نجاح تجربتها ،
ونجاح نظامها .. هذا النظام الذي ما
زال غائبا عن الشمال ، حيث لم
تبدأ بعد التجارب هناك .

كيف يمكن التوفيق هنا في هذا المجال .
المسؤولون المعنويون يقولون ان البيان
طرابلس نقل بهذه المشكلة . فلي
البيان صيغ انفاق الرئيس عبدالرحمن
الايوبي وسلم ربيع على ان يكون
الاسلام ليس فقط دين الدولة ، بل

اعضاء من الجنوب برئاسة محمود
عبد الله عيسى .

● لجنة الشؤون التشريعية والقضائية:
وتتألف من سبعة أعضاء من الشمال
 برئاسة غالب راجع ، وسبعة أعضاء
من الجنوب برئاسة صالح علي صالح .
● لجنة شؤون التربية والثقافة والاعلام
وتتألف من تسعة أعضاء من الشمال
 برئاسة احمد جابر عفيف وعشرة أعضاء
من الجنوب برئاسة احمد عبد الله عبد
الله .

● لجنة الشؤون العسكرية
وتتألف من سبعة أعضاء من الشمال
 برئاسة علي الضبي وسبعة أعضاء
من الجنوب برئاسة محمد صالح مطيع .

● لجنة الشؤون الصحية
وتتألف من ثلاثة أعضاء من الشمال
 برئاسة محمد عبد الوهيد وثلاثة أعضاء
من الجنوب برئاسة الدكتور عبدالعزیز
الدالي .

● لجنة الادارة والمراقب العامة
وتتألف من ثمانية أعضاء من الشمال
 برئاسة عبد الله سعيد الكوشي ،
وثمانية أعضاء من الجنوب برئاسة
مصطفى عبد الله الخالقي .

واحدة من هذه اللجان الثماني
اعمالها يوم ٢٨ يناير الماضي وهي اللجنة
الدستورية ، ومهمتها وضع مسودة
الدستور الوحدوي . ولقد جرت
امعة لرميم مبنى خاص في كورنيش
بعدن سيكون المقر الدائم لاجتماعات
اللجان المشتركة ، وكلها - كما يبدو -
لجان فنية ، منوط بها مهمات عملية
كثيرة مطلوب منها انجازها .

وعلى ما يظهر ، فلا كان وقد جرت
اليمن الديمقراطية الشعبية ، قد
اقترح باسم حكومته في اجتماع ونادي
البنين بالجامعة العربية يوم ١١ أكتوبر
٧٢ علما كاملا تستغرقه مرحلة انتقالية
تؤدي الى الوحدة الناجزة ، فان اعمال
هذه اللجان قد تستغرق اكثر من ذلك .
ولي كل الظروف العملية التي تسود
المنطقة ، ولي التون الممارسات اليومية
الحادة في الجنوب ، فان هذه المسألة
كافية لاحداث اكثر من تفاؤل في هذه
البلاد .. اكثر من تفاؤل قاهرة عدن ،
بحكم تنظيها الصارم ، على التحكم
به وتوجيهه ، لانها ترى مسبقا ، وهذا
تحذير منها ، انه قبل قيام الوحدة
يجب الاخذ بعين الاعتبار الظروف
المحيطة بالمنطقة ، « كما اننا
لا بد من الاستفادة من الدروس التي
عانت منها الامة العربية من جراء
الانفصال في سبتمبر ١٩٦١ والتي كانت
سببا مهما من اسباب هزيمة العرب
في حزيران ٦٧ امام اسرائيل » .

الن في ادراك عدن ان طرفا ما من
الاطراف الاقليمية العربية او الدولية ،
ان يتمكن - بأي حال - في كل هذا
الادراك من التمسك الى صنعاء او
عدن والعمل على تحقيق حركة انفصالية
بوسيلة ما ، الا انها مستعدة لمواجهة
اي طرف مماثل للطرف الذي طرا على
دمشق عام ١٩٦١ ونجح في فصلها عن
مصر ، محققا اعظم انتكاسة قومية في
تاريخ العرب الحديث .

● على بوابات البحر الأحمر

انها في السؤال : متى تقوم الوحدة؟ وطالما ان المسألة ذات صلة بتطهير المجتمع البني ككل ، وهذه معركة من أقسى واشد معارك هذه البلاد ، فانه من الأفضل استطلاع وسائل كلا العاصمتين ، صنعاء وعدن ، الموضوع اساسا لتحقيق هذا الهدف المشترك ، ولتبيين ، بالتالي كيف يمكن استحداث وسيلة عمل مشتركة لا تخرج النظام العقائدي في الجنوب ، وقد توقع رجال النظام التقليدي في الشمال في مازن حقيقي .

● رؤيا عدن الوحدوية

لن جانب ان الوحدة اليمنية معتبرة في عدن مطلباً جماهيرياً عظيماً « يلخص الصدارة من مطالب الشعب اليمني » فان عدن ايضا ترى ان بناء الدولة اليمنية الموحدة المواكبة لمسيرة الأمة العربية « لن تكون الا نقاجا لروح العصر الحديث التي تتطلب من اجل بناء اركانها واسسها قوانين حديثة متطورة ومؤسسات اقتصادية وسياسية واجتماعية متحضرة تتناسب والتضحيات الجسام التي قدمها شعب اليمن منذ بداية هذا القرن ، فالتجزئة مرفوضة مهما كانت وتحت اي اسم ، لانها كانت - وما زالت - المدخل الاساسي لشل حركة التقدم في الوطن كله ، والعقبة الرئيسية التي تعترض طريق تطوير وتوسيع الاجراءات الاجتماعية التي حققها شعبنا طوال تاريخه الحديث » .

فاصرار عدن على ان قيام اليمن الموحدة « لن تكون الا نقاجا لروح العصر » مستند في الاساس على نجاح تجربتها ، ونجاح نظامها .. هذا النظام الذي ما زال غائباً عن الشمال ، حيث لم تبدأ بعد التجارب هناك .

كيف يمكن التوفيق هنا في هذا المجال . المسؤولون العثمانيون يقولون لك ازديان طرابلس تكفل بهذه المشكلة . ففسي البيان صيغ اتفاق الرئيس عبد الرحمن الايراني وسلم ربيع على ان يكون الاسلام ليس فقط دين الدولة ، بل ان الدولة الموحدة ستتركز على القيم الروحية وتتخذ الشريعة الاسلامية المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع . هذه نقطة اتفاق عليها ، وهي هامة للغاية .

بخصوص الاشتراكية التي هي سبيل قيام المجتمع الحضري المتشرد ، والتي تحقق انهاء اليمن الموحد الى العصر ، فان الطرفين اتفقا على ان دولة الوحدة تهدف لتحقيق الاشتراكية مستلهمة التراث العربي الاسلامي ، وقيم الدولة الانسانية ، وظروف المجتمع اليمني . والهدف ، عدا ما ذكر سالفا ، « تطبيق الدولة الاجتماعية التي ترفض اي شكل من أشكال الاستغلال » . وفي هذا التوافق اتفق على ان تعمل دولة الوحدة عن طريق اقامة علاقات اشتراكية في المجتمع ، على تحقيق العدالة في الانتاج والعدالة في التوزيع التي ترمي الى توحيد الفوارق بين الطبقات ، كما ان الملكية العامة للشعب اساس تنظيم المجتمع وتشييده .

وهذه ايضا نقطة اتفاق هامة واساسية . اما الهدف لتحقيقها فهو انشاء تنظيم سياسي موحد في البلدين « يضم لجان الشعب المتقدمة صاحبة المصلحة الحقيقية في الثورة ، للعمل ضد الظلم ، ومخالفات المهادين الاماميين والاستعماري ، ضد الاستعمار القديم والجديد ضد الصهيونية » .

الن الصيغ المقروضة اعتمادا لتفصيل المجتمع اليمني الواحد الى العصر اتفق بشئها ، وطالما ان هذه الصيغ هي التي تشكل المحور الاساسي ، في حال الخلاف عليها ، لقيام الوحدة ، فان استنباطها ، والموافقة على انتهائها ، قد فتح الباب واسعا امام البعثيين للانطلاق على طريق الوحدة ، طريق

ولمناحية اعضاء من الجنوب برئاسة مصطفى عبد الله الخالقي . واحدة من هذه اللجان الثماني اعضاءها يوم ٢٨ يناير الماضي وهي اللجنة الدستورية ، ومهمتها وضع مسودة الدستور الوحدوي . ولقد جرت امدة ترميم مبنى خاص في حي كركي بعدن سيكون المقر الدائم لاجتماعات اللجان المشتركة ، وكلها - كما يبدو - لجان فنية ، منوط بها مهمات عملية كترية مطلوب منها انجازها .

وعلى ما يظهر ، فلا كان وفد جمهورية اليمن الديمقراطية الشعبية ، قد اقترح باسم حكومته في اجتماع وندي البين بالجامعة العربية يوم ٢١ أكتوبر ٧٢ عاما كاملا تستغرقه مرحلة انتقالية تنفي الى الوحدة الناجزة ، فان اعمال هذه اللجان قد تستغرق اكثر من ذلك . وفي ظل الظروف الصعبة التي تسود المنطقة ، وفي اتون الممارسات اليلامة العادة في الجنوب ، فان هذه المسألة كافية لاحداث اكثر من تفاعل في هذه البلاد .. اكثر من تفاعل قاهرة عدن ، بحكم تنظيمها الصارم ، على التحكم به وتوجيهه ، لانها ترى مسبقا ، وهذا تحذير منها ، انه قبل قيام الوحدة يجب الاخذ بعين الاعتبار الظروف المعقدة بالمنطقة ، « كما اننا لا بد من الاستفادة من الدروس التي عانت منها الأمة العربية من جراء الانفصال في سبتمبر ١٩٦١ والتي كانت سببا مهما من اسباب هزيمة العرب في حزيران ٦٧ امام اسرائيل » .

الن في ادراك عدن ان طرفا ما من الاطراف الاقليمية العربية او الدولية ، لن يتمكن - بأي حال - في ظل هذا الادراك من التمسك الى صنعاء او عدن والعمل على تحقيق حركة انتصالية بواسطة ما ، اذ انها مستعدة لمواجهة اي طرف مماثل للطرف الذي طرا على دمشق عام ١٩٦١ ونجح في فصلها عن مصر ، محققا اعظم انتكاسة قومية في تاريخ العرب الحديث .

● على بوأبات البحر الاحمر

بين موحدة ١٩٦١ !!

« لان موقع بلادنا - يقول المسؤولون في عدن - الاستراتيجي والمسيطر على المدخل الجنوبي لبحر الاحمر يزداد ايمانا بقتية وحدة اراضينا وامكتبة تحقيقها ، بل مضاعف من جهودنا المشتركة من اجل تحرير جزرنا السراصبحت مراكز للاستطول الامريكسي والنشاط الاسرائيلي في البحر الاحمر » . البحر الاحمر والسيطرة على مضايقه الجنوبي . هذه واحدة .

والثانية ، حين مستنجز الوحدة اليمنية ، مستحق الدولة - النبذ التي قد تكون نواة الاعداد للجبايات القادمة في المنطقة ، ووسيلة تعليم الكفريات التي ستقام بواسطتها الحراسات المشددة على خزائنها التي تزداد سطوحها حرارة ، فلا يقدر الرافقون الان على هذه السطوح احتفال حرارتها ، كما لا يقسرون على تبريدها .

حرب الاعلام المجهولة !!

ربما . لكن ليس اعلام البعثيين ، لا في الجنوب ، ولا في الشمال . الا الاطلاعة مستحق هنا . وهي علامة ميسرة علامات مودتهم . عودة القرامطة .

فسدا

القتال على خزان النفط كند

فيقنم عربية في ظفار

هند صينو - عربية

تشكل الآن

2

أبو كريم : الحزب الشيوعي الإيراني
نعتقد انه يعمل مع المخابرات المركزية
الأمريكية . جريمة تلك الحزب
« منارة » رفضت تسمية الأهواز
بـ « إيران » ، وإذا تمهم السرية « بك
إيران » والتي كانت تبث من المخابر
الشرقية أينما احتلال إيران للجزر .
والمطوية فقد أغلقت تلك الإذاعة
مؤمرا بعد اعتراف الغرب بالمناخ
الشرقية .

س : لم نسمع انه جرى التصدي من
طرفكم للمنشآت النفطية الإيرانية ؟ هل
يقع النفط في استراتيجيتكم للتصدي
للمواقع الفارسية ؟

أبو كريم : إذا كنا لم نفعل ذلك حتى
الآن ، فهو بوقوف خاص من طرفنا
حتى لا نخرج العراق وهو في أزمته
الراقة مع الشركات . فبحر أن التعرض
للمنشآت النفطية مستقبلا هو أمر وارد
في الحساب . ولا بأس من الانتظار
قليلا .

أية امكانيات اذن للوساطة

التقليدية بين العراق وإيران

في ضوء هذه المواقف النظرية - تجاه
الخليج - لأحزاب البعث ، والشيوعي
واللتزام العراقي تجاه جهات تحرير
الأهواز (يلاحظ أن العدد الأول من
نشرة الأهواز كانت افتتاحيته تطالب
بوحدة الأراضي الإيرانية ، أما ابتداء
من العدد السادس فقد رفع شعار
تحرير الأهواز وفصلها عن إيران)
وتحرير بلوشستان ، والجهة الشعبية
لتحرير عمان والخليج .. في هذا الإطار
أين يصبح موقع العراق بالنسبة
للخليج ، وإلى أي حد يستطيع
العراق - حسب نظرية كارل بوشني
من المنهج الحكومي - أن يوفى بين
سياسة القوة وسياسة التفضيل
الذاتية التي تعني القدرة على تغيير
المواقف تبعاً للتطورات اللاحقة في البنية
الداخلية للحكومة ؟

وما هي امكانيات نجاح جهود الوساطة
بين بغداد وطهران ، وهي جهود تقوم
بها سويسرا من خلال موضوع طاقرة
الهليكوبتر الإيرانية ، وتقوم بها
أطراف عربية عدة ؟

شروع حالة الاطمئنان

في الشمال :

خلال السنة الماضية لوحدها ، شهدت
بغداد قنوم ما لا يقل عن ثلاثين فرقة
موسيقية صغيرة لتعمل في المطاعم
القلبية . كما ازداد عدد دور السينما
التي لا تحتفظ باستيراد الأفلام
الأجنبية المأظفة . وأصبح من غير
المسل أن يجد الزائر لوانسند من
الفنادق الرئيسية فرقة خالصة في زحمة
الوفود الاقتصادية من أوروبا الشرقية
والغربية . وإذا كان بالإمكان التفرغ
من فوق هذه الجزبات الصغيرة من
أجل الوصول إلى قاعة بان بغداد
استعانت مرة أخيراً ، وصار
بامتنانها أن تصحك بصوت مسرور ،
فلا بأس .

دارا توفيق عضو المكتب السياسي
للحزب الكرديستاني يقول : ليس بغداد
وهدما التي استعانت الطمستانية .
الشمال أيضاً ! فبعد أن رفضت جريمتنا
الثورة - لسان حزب البعث -
والأطفي - لسان الحزب الكرديستاني
- كل ما لديهما من تعضلات تجاه
مواقف الأطراف الأخرى ، استجبت
اتصالات عميلة مع البعث بـ « حضور
أطراف أخرى ، الأمر الذي جعل
الحوار أكثر جدوى مما كان عليه
الوضع قبل شهرين .

الأطراف المشاركة في

محادثات الكراد

كريم أحمد عضو المكتب السياسي
للحزب الشيوعي المصري يستند
بالأسماء ، مطلي الأطراف السياسية
المشاركة في مفاوضات البعث مع
الكراد . فقد دخل ممثلون من الطامير
القومية وكذلك من الحزب الشيوعي
في هذه المحادثات في الفترة الأخيرة .
عن التومين السيد حاتم الشامي
وزير التعليم العالي ، وعن الممثلين
عبد الطيف الشواف وعزيز شريف

كريم أحمد : ليس هناك خلاف في
تعديد المناطق المخططة والمناطق التي
لا جدال فيها . فقد جرى التأكيد على
هذه القضايا للبدء بممارسة الحكم
الذاتي في المناطق الأخيرة . أما بالنسبة
للأهواز فقد لا نلجأ لذلك لأننا ننتظر
من الأقرار بوجود دولة مستقلة
الغويات . دولة مركزية تضمن الحقوق
القومية للأقليات .

أسباب عدم زيارة البرزاني لموسكو
س : ما هو الدور الذي لعبته موسكو
في دفع الحوار البعثي الكرديستاني
باتجاه الجدية ؟ ولماذا امتنر البرزاني
عن زيارة موسكو ؟

دارا توفيق (الحزب الكرديستاني) :
لقد زرت موسكو شخصياً ضمن وفد
ضممني مع محمد محمود ونسوري
الشامي . علاقتنا مع موسكو قوية
والشعب الكردي علاقة قديمة مع
الاتحاد السوفيتي تعود لما قبل ثورة
أكتوبر . وعندما قامت جمهورية
مهايات الكردية في إيران قدم لها
الاتحاد السوفيتي الدعم .

س : يقال أن من بين أهداف الاتحاد
السوفيتي إقامة دولة كردية على
حدوده الجنوبية تضم أطرافاً من العراق
وتركيا وإيران ؟

دارا : اتساء كثيرة تقال تكون بدون
شواهد ثابتة .

أما عن سؤالك بشأن الملا مصطفى
البرزاني عن زيارة موسكو ، فأقول
لك أن الملا منذ عام ١٩٦١ لم يغادر
المنطقة . فلذا كان للعاصمة بغداد
لم يحضر ، فكيف يذهب إلى موسكو ؟
ثم أن حرية الحركة وأمنه شخصياً ،
قضية لا بد من مراعاتها ، وقد كان
الصحفي السوفيتي بريماكوف قبل أيام
في زيارة البرزاني بالشمال .

س : هناك من يراهن على الحزب
التاسع للحزب الكرديستاني ، على
أمل أن تخرج قيادة جديدة شابة
تكون بديلاً أو بمثابة تطوير للقيادة
الحالية .

دارا : هناك ميزة خاصة في الحزب
الكرديستاني وهي أن الحزب
الديمقراطي الكرديستاني جزء منها .

بمعنى أن الملا يقود الحزب والناس
أي يقود الجميع . فلذا كانت الانتفاضة
التي (يفترض بها أن تتفقد
شهر من الآن) ستأتي بعناصر جديدة
فذلك من شأنه أن ينشط الحزب
وإذا كنت تشع إلى بطول السنين
جلال الطائفي للحزب (كان يقود
الحزب القومي الكرديستاني) فقد كان
الضباب للحزب الديمقراطي تهيؤ
قاعة وقبول ببداية الحزب .
س : يشاع أن الحركة الكرديستانية
ستتخذ المنهج الوهابي ؟

دارا : هذه الإشاعة سمعتها من قبل
لكنني لا أتصور كيف سيتم ذلك ،
لو افترضنا أن البرزاني قبل به . فليس
الأمر سهلاً بهذه الصورة .

س : ويشاع أن عبد الله الرزائي
يدير بعض القبائل في الشمال ؟

دارا : ألم أقل لك أن الشائعات كثيرة
لكن تذكر أن هناك أصراً من الطامير
الحزب الكرديستاني وحزب البعث في
الالتزام باتفاقية آذار ، وبالإمكان توقع
قضايا جدية من الآن وحتى الشهر القادم
ذكرى الاتفاقية .

منح الجنسية للكراد النيلين :

في مطلع الشهر الحالي صدر هنا قرار
بمنح الجنسية العراقية للكراد النيلين
وهم قبائل كردية تقطن في باب الشامي
وشارع الكفاح ببغداد ، وفي المناطق
الجنوبية الشرقية مثل واسط وميسان
والبصرة ويبلغ تعدادهم حوالي
مليون . ويأتي توقيت إصدار هذا
القرار قبل حلول ذكرى بيان الأيوبي
بمناسبة دفعة أولى كبيرة على حساب
مناخ الاطمئنان بين البعث والكراد ،
ففي المكرة الشهيرة التي بحث بها
الحزب الكرديستاني في صيف العام الماضي
لحزب البعث كان موضوع الكراد النيلين
مطلباً رئيسياً للبرزاني حيث أن
هذه المجموعات الكردية في العراق
الكلمة في مشروعة وقد سجل وأبشرك

في ضوء هذه المواقف القفوية - تجاه الخليج - لاجزائ البعث ، والشيعي والائتزام العراقي تجاه جهات تحرير الاهواز (يلاحظ ان العدد الاول من نشرة الاهواز كانت انتفاعيته تطلب بوحدة الاراضي الايرانية ، اما ابتداء من العدد السادس فقد رفع شعار تحرير الاهواز ونفصلها عن ايران) وتحرير بلوشستان ، والجهة الشعبية لتحرير عمان والخليج .. في هذا الاطار اين يصبح موقع العراق بالنسبة للخليج ، والى اي حد يستطيع العراق - حسب نظرية كارل فونش من المذهب القومي - ان يوفق بين سياسة القوة وسياسة التمسك بالاذنية التي تعني القدرة على تغير المواقف تبعاً للتطورات اللاحقة في النهاية الداخلية للحكومة ؟ وما هي امكانيات نجاح جهود الوساطة بين بغداد وطهران ، وهي جهود تقوم بها سويسرا من خلال موضوع طاقرة الهليكوبتر الايرانية ، وتقوم بها اطراف عربية عدة ؟

شروع حلة الاطمئنان في الشمال :

خلال السنة الماضية لوحدها ، شهدت بغداد قدوم ما لا يقل عن ثلاث فرق موسيقية صغيرة لتعمل في المطاعم القبلية . كما ازداد عدد دور السينما التي لا تتحفظ باستيراد الافلام الاجنبية المأخوذة . واصبح من السهل ان يجد الزائر لواحد من الفنادق الرئيسية غرفة خالصة في زحمة الوفود الاقتصادية من اوربا الشرقية والغربية . واذا كان بالامكان التسلل من فوق هذه الجزليات الصغيرة من اجل الوصول الى قاعة بان بغداد استعانت حرة خلعها ، وصار باستطاعتها ان تصحك بصوت مسرور ، فلا بأس .

دارا توفيق عضو المكتب السياسي للحزب الكردستاني يقول : ليس بغداد وحدها التي استعانت بالطبقة الشمالية ايضا ! نجد ان وضعت جريمتا الثورة - لسان حزب البعث - والناهي - لسان الحزب الكردستاني - كل ما لديها من تخطات تجاه مواقف الاطراف الاخرى ، استجبت اتصالات عميقة مع البعث بخصوص اطراف اخرى ، الامر الذي جعل الحوار اكثر جدوى مما كان عليه الوضع قبل شهرين .

الاطراف المشاركة في محادثات الاكراد

كريم احمد عضو المكتب السياسي للحزب الشيوعي العراقي حشد بالاسماء ، ممثلي الاطراف السياسية المشاركة في مفاوضات البعث مع الاكراد . فقد دخل ممثلون من الحزب القومي وكذلك من الحزب الشيوعي في هذه المحادثات في الفترة الاخيرة . عن القوميين السيد هشام الشاذلي وزير التعليم العالي ، وعن المستقلين عبد اللطيف الشواف وعزيز شريف وعن الحزب الشيوعي كريم احمد ، عبد الرزاق الصال ، مهدي عبيد الكريم ، الدكتور وهيب مجينة ، ومكرم الطالبي . من الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني محمد محمود ، صلاح اليوسفي ودارا توفيق . ومن الاكراد المستقلين فزاد عارف واحسان شيرازاد . ومن حزب البعث عبد الحلال السامرائي ، مرتضى سعيد عبد الباقي ، مسعود ليدان ، محمد فاضل وطاهر عزيز .

وقال السيد كريم احمد ان هناك جدول اعمال للاجتماعات بقايل مسائل رئيسية واخرى ثانوية . « حتى الآن انتهينا المسائل الثانوية باعتبارها مهد لفتح المسائل الرئيسية . وقد بدأتنا نطرح في الرئيسية لاصبح جسيمة البعث وحرصه على حسم المسألة الكردية .

س : ماذا من قضايا الاصلية ونعتمد المثلث المخطط ؟

س : يقال ان من بين اهداف الاتحاد السوفيتي اقامة دولة كردية على حدوده الجنوبية تضم اطرافاً من العراق وتركيا وايران ؟ دارا : انتهاء كثيرة تقال تكون بدون شواهد ثابتة .

اما عن سؤالي بشأن الاكراد مصطفى البرزاني عن زيارة موسكو ، فاقول لك ان الاكراد منذ عام ١٩٦١ لم ينفكوا المنطقة . فلما كان العاصمة بغداد لم يضر ، فكيف يذهب الى موسكو ؟ ثم ان حرية الحركة وامنه شخصيا ، قضية لا بد من مراعاتها ، وقد كان الصحفي السوفيتي بريملوف قبل ايام في زيارة البرزاني بالشمال .

س : هناك من يراهن على المراتب التاسع للحزب الكردستاني ، على امل ان يخرج قيادة جديدة شابة تكون بديلاً او بمثابة تطوير للتبعية الحالية .

دارا : هناك ميزة خاصة في الحركة الكردستانية وهي ان المصالح الديمقراطية الكردستانية جزء منها . بمعنى ان الاكراد يقود الحزب والناهي اي يقود الجميع . فلما كانت الانتفاضة المقبلة (يفترض بها ان تتفقد كل شهر من الآن) سنتاني بضائع جديدة تلك من شأنه ان ينشط الحزب . واذا كنت تشع الى تحول المسألة لجلال الطالبي للحزب (كان يقود الحزب القومي الكردستاني) فقد جازت الضمانة للحزب الديمقراطي تهيئة قاعة وقبول بمبادئ الحزب .

س : يشاع ان الحركة الكردستانية ستطرح المذهب الوهابي ؟ دارا : هذه الاشاعة سمعتها من قبل ، لكنني لا اتصور كيف سيتم ذلك ، لو افترضنا ان البرزاني قبل به . الامر سيلا بهذه الصورة .

س : ويشاع ان عبد الفتي الرزوقي يدرب بعض القبائل في الشمال ؟ دارا : الم اقل لك ان الشائعات كثيرة لكن ناك ان هناك اصراراً من الطائفة الحزب الكردستاني وحزب البعث على الالتزام باتفاقية اذار ، وبالامكان توقع قضايا جديدة من الآن وحتى الشهر القادم نكوي الاتفاقية .

منح الجنسية للاكراد النيلين : في مطلع الشهر الحالي صدر هذا قرار بمنح الجنسية العراقية للاكراد النيلين وهم قبائل كردية تقطن في باب الشيوخ وشارع الكفاح ببغداد ، وفي المناطق الجنوبية الشرقية مثل واسط وميسان والبصرة ويبلغ تعدادهم حوالي مليون . ويأتي توقيت اصدار هذا القرار قبل حلول ذكرى بيان الادوية بمثابة دفعة اولى كبيرة على حساب مناخ الاطمئنان بين البعث والاكرااد ، في الفكرة الشهيرة التي بعث بها الحزب الكردستاني في صيف العام الماضي لحزب البعث كان موضوع الاكراد واليهام مطلباً رئيسياً للبرزاني حيث ان اقامة هذه المجموعات الكردية في العراق كانت اقامة غير مشروعة وقد سبق وابعد عدد منهم في حملة تسفيرات عام ١٩٧٠ .

س : والجهة الوطنية ؟ كريم احمد (الحزب الشيوعي) : الحزبان الشيوعي والبعث مستمران في محادثاتهما للاتفاق على مسودة برنامج الميثاق الوطني . ونحن الآن في نهاية مرحلة البعث في التفاوض المتفق عليها . ونعتقد انه من قريب مستغرب على بعض المسائل الباقية .

س : وقضية الاقرار بقيادة حزب البعث للحزب الشيوعي ، وهي القضية التي كان يرفضها عزيز الحاج والقيادة المركزية للحزب الشيوعي ؟ في حين الاصرار الشيوعية السورية والتونسسية والجزائرية نقرها ؟

كريم احمد : لا اعتقد ان هناك حزبا شيعيا يقبل الاقرار رسمياً بان يفرده حزب آخر . نحن نؤكد لكواحدة انها طبقة الطبقة الحالية . ولذلك تم الاتفاق مع البعث على اتنا نقر عليها



.. ما هم قد عاشوا : بهتون ، بلوهون بالبنات ، وبتون صلاة الثورة .

● كتب قاسم أنصوني من عدن:

أوساط بطة جريدة « لوموند » الفرنسية ، ومن ضمنها زوجة أريك رولر المعروف جيدا لدينا ، هذه الأوساط كانت في عدن محسوبة على جماعة الـ « لوبيز » . ولوبيز عدن هم هؤلاء القادمون من أراضي العرب ، ومن أوروبا ، وهم عادة من مجسي المظاهرة ، ومرافقة الولادات الجديدة . وجماعة الـ « لوبيز » هؤلاء كانوا في تلك الليلة كثيري الكلام ، كثيري النطق ، ويصلون إلى النظر الاستراتيجي على مستوى السياسة وعلاقات الدول بعضها ببعض . تلك الليلة كان في أحد الجدران محطة الحضور المسادي الشتاء الحضي الذي هو غير شتائنا في حال ، إذ الرطوبة ، والحرارة الرافعة في هذا الوقت الشتوي بالذات ، ظهر كثيرا بأيام الشهر التاسع الكروبي من يبدأ الصيف اللاهب بالانحسار ، والتقدم أيام الشتاء مسبوقه بالرطوبة والكمات البهر .

كل هذا هو الإطار العام لجماعة جريدة لوموند الفرنسية التي يرئسها منصور ، ومن ضمنها زوجة أريك رولر . والحاديث جاءت مرآة بعد نهار شال من العمل . وخلاصة ما قيل أن على جماعة أهل الشمال ، وهم هنا سكان شلال الجزيرة أن يتحسروا اقبيتهم : « قل لهم انظروا ماذا يدور خلفكم » . هذا ما قالته أوساط بطة

التاريخ العربي ، وهاولوا وصيها بالمول . والعاس ، حتى الآن ، تنظم ومن هذا التقييم !!

وطالما أن موضوعنا ليس من القرامطة ، وهو بكل حال موضوع جماعة لوموند ، إلا أنه يصلح مدخلا لكلامنا ، خاصة وأن الاعتبار السائد أن القرامطة ينحدرون الآن وينبعثون من عدن . ومن قال أصلا أنهم ليسوا من عدن !!

قالها أحد أفراد بطة لوموند . لقد انطلقوا أصلا من هنا ، ومن منطقة باتع بالذات ، ومن هذه المنطقة ذهبوا إلى البحرين ومن البحرين بدأوا ، حيث مع بدايتهم قامت دولة في خلاصة التاريخ ككتابك كانت الأوساط عليها لولا الظروف .

الآن من هنا جاء القرامطة ، ومن هنا أيضا يشارون بظهم .

لكن هذه المرة صد من ، ولأجل من !! هذا كان موضوعا ، ومن هذا الموضوع كانت الاطلاعه على عدن الجديدة الامتقولة .

عدن الجديدة ضد كل شيء . ومعدن الجديدة لأجل بحث الإنسان اليمني ، هي الآن كذلك ، وكذلك هي عقيدتها . أما الأسلوب فعن الجديدة قائمة به ، وغير راجية في تصديره .

واستطرادا مع بطة لوموند ، وهكذا القبلي الرطبة التي تنبع عادة من قاع الرأس — كان لا بد من النظر ، ولا بد من الاستراتيجيا « إذ قليل من الاستراتيجيا يكفي لوضع أصابعنا في اشارة ثابتة نعر المستقبل » .

في ضمن هذا التصور ، يمكن النظر إلى الخلطة : شبه الجزيرة العربية

بالمدون . والماس ، حتى الآن ، تقطع
 ومن هذا التقييم !!
 وطالما ان موضوعنا ليس من القرامطة ،
 وهو بكل حال موضوع جماعة لوموند ،
 الا انه يصلح مخطا لتلاخيصا ،
 خاصة وان الاعتبار السائد ان القرامطة
 بنجدون الآن وينبعثون من عدن .
 ومن قال اصلا انهم ليسوا من
 عدن !!

قلنا احد افراد بطة لوموند . لقد
 انطلقوا امامنا من هنا ، ومن منطقة
 بانج بلالات ، ومن هذه المنطقة
 ذهبوا الى البحرين ومن البحرين بداوا ،
 حيث مع بدايتهم قامت دولة في خاضرة
 القرامطة . كانت القرامطة على
 لولا الظروف .

الآن من هنا جاء القرامطة ، ومن هنا
 ايضا يباشرون بحكمهم .

لكن هذه المرة ضد من ، ولأجل من !!
 هذا كان موضوعا ، ومن هذا الموضوع
 كانت الاطلاعه على عدن الجديدة
 الاممقولة .

عدن الجديدة ضد كل شيء . وعسكن
 الجديدة لأجل بحث الانسان اليمني ،
 هي الآن كذلك ، وكذلك هي مقبعتها .
 اما الاسلوب فعن الجديدة قاتمة به ،
 ولغير راحة في تصديره .

واستطرادا مع بطة لوموند ، وحكايا
 القبلي الرطبة التي تتبع عادة من قاع
 الرأس - كان لا بد من النظر ، ولا
 بد من الاستراتيجيا « ان قليل من
 الاستراتيجية يكفي لوضع اصابعنا في
 اشارة ثابتة نحو المستقبل » .

في ضمن هذا التصور ، يمكن النظر
 الى الخارطة : شبه الجزيرة العربية
 جسد عملاق « مطروح » فوق الماء .
 على خاضرته الشرقية خليج العرب ،
 او بحر عمان ، وعلى خاضرته الغربية
 البحر الاحمر . في شماله كتف عرسني
 يغني للعرب الآخرين على ضفاف
 المتوسط الشرقية ، وفي جنوبه محيط
 الهند ، حيث على ضفاف هذا المحيط
 بركان عدن الذي يطل بمحافظاته
 الست .

واذا ما جرى الاعتبار ان اكبر
 المجتمعات العربية خضوعا لتقلبات
 متجانسة شبه موحدة ، ولصادات
 سائدة متوافقة ، هي المجتمعات
 العربية الغالية فوق جسد شبه
 الجزيرة ، أمكن بالتالي تصور كم هو بركان

لوموند بطة جديدة « لوموند »
 الفرنسية ، ومن ضمنها زوجة اريك
 بعل المعروف جيدا لدينا ، هذه
 اللوموند كانت في عدن محسوبة على
 جماعة الـ « لوبيز » . ولوبيز عدن
 هم هؤلاء القادمون من أراضي العرب ،
 ومن أوروبا ، وهم عادة من محبي
 المصارف ، ومرافقة الولادات الجديدة .
 وجماعة الـ « لوبيز » هؤلاء كثروا في
 تلك الليلة كثري الكلام ، كثري النطق ،
 ويصلون الى النظر الاستراتيجي على
 مستوى السياسة وعلاقات الدول
 بعضها ببعض . تلك الليلة كسبان
 لوموند في عدن بطنها في عدن
 لوموند ، ول من بطن العرب على
 الجبل في الشتاء ، وكذلك في الشتاء
 ظهر اصوات وهذات التكيف المظنة
 في الجدران مظنة الحضور المادي
 الشتاء المعنى الذي هو غير شتائنا
 في حال ، ان الرطوبة ، والحرارة
 المرتفعة في هذا الوقت الشتوي بالذات ،
 ظهر كثيرا بياض الشهر التاسع الكروبي
 من يبدأ الصيف الالهب بالانحسار ،
 وتضم ايام الشتاء مسبقة بالرطوبة
 ولتحات البحر .

كان هذا هو الاطار العام لجماعة
 جديدة لوموند الفرنسية التي يرئسها
 منصور ، ومن ضمنها زوجة اريك رولو .
 والاحاديث جاءت مرآة بعد نهار شاق
 من العمل . وخلاصة ما قيل ان على
 جماعة اهل الشمال ، وهم هنا سكان
 شمال الجزيرة ان يتعمسوا اقبيتهم :
 « قل لهم انظروا ماذا يدور خلف
 ظهركم » . هذا ما قالته لوموند بطة
 لوموند . هنا ظهر الجزيرة هي صنعاء ،
 وعدن هي ما يقع خلف هذا الظهر ، ول
 عدن يجري ما يجري ويدور ما يدور .
 ومن هذه النقطة يبدأ الكلام .

ماذا في عدن . ماذا يدور خلف ظهر
 سكان شمال جزيرة العرب (السعودية ،
 الكويت ، دول الخليج برمتها) !!

كان هذا سؤال الى البطة الفرنسية .
 وردت على ذلك : « ماذا تفعلون انتم
 هنا ايضا . ماذا يصنعكم اذا ما دار خلف
 ظهر جماعة الشمال « ثمة » من النوع
 الذي تطرون منه على ما يبدو » .

البطة هنا في عدن تعد دراسة عن
 القرامطة . نعم القرامطة وهم
 الجماعة التي ليها المارغون عمرا من



قبلا ، وابام حرب الاستقلال : نسيحولورة . الثورة انتصرت ولجبت كاتة !!



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

P G de Courcy Ireland
British Embassy
KUWAIT

Your reference

Our reference NBR 1/2

Date 15 March 1973

PRESS CUTTINGS ON IRAQ

1. Your letters of 12 and 20 February were awaiting me on my return from a month's course in Edinburgh.
2. It was thoughtful of you to send me the cuttings on Iraq taken from the Kuwaiti press and given ideal conditions we should be only too happy to receive them regularly. Whilst I appreciate your concern not to overburden Issa Farah and Co., I fear that other demands on our time make it difficult for us to get through lengthy Arabic press cuttings in their original form. I am afraid, therefore, that this is a bonus we must forego.
3. May I suggest, as an alternative, that any such articles of interest which you spot in future, be saved for Ian McCluney's perusal during his regular visits to Kuwait. If he thought it necessary he could then have them translated in Baghdad and sent on from there.

G S Burton
Middle East Department

ASB 16/3
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PRIORITY

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
24 MAY 1973
NBR 1/2

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1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 450 23 MAY/INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT.

IRAQ INTERNAL POLITICS

1. THE CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON KHALATBARI'S INSTRUCTIONS, DREW THE COUNSELLOR'S ATTENTION YESTERDAY TO AN AFP REPORT OF 20 MAY WITH A BEIRUT DATELINE, QUOTING AN ARTICLE IN AN NAHAR TO THE EFFECT THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE BA'ATH PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAQ FOR FUTURE COOPERATION.
2. NADIM SAID THAT THEY KNEW THAT AN NAHAR WAS OFTEN UNRELIABLE. IF, HOWEVER, THIS REPORT WAS TRUE, THEY REGARDED IT AS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT WHICH MUST CAUSE CONCERN TO IRAN.
3. NADIM ASKED IF WE COULD LET HIM KNOW WHETHER WE COULD CONFIRM THE REPORT AND HOW WE ASSESSED IT.
4. WE KNOW THAT THE BA'ATH AND THE ICP WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BUT HAS THIS NOW BEEN FORMALIZED IN SOME NEW AGREEMENT?

RAMSBOTHAM.

FILES

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TO ROUTINE PARIS TEL NO 429 OF 25 MAY, INFO TEHRAN AND BEIRUT.

3 IRAQ INTERNAL POLITICS: TEHRAN TELNO 450 TO FCO WHICH IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU.

1. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE THE AN NAHAR REPORT. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE QUAI D'ORSAY IF THEY HAVE RECEIVED NEWS OF THE RUMOURED AGREEMENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 435 OF 25 MAY ¹⁹⁷³ INFO TEHRAN.

③ TEHRAN TELNO 450: IRAQ

1. THE AFP CORRESPONDENT IN BEIRUT WAS REFERRING TO AN 'AL NAHAR' ARTICLE WHICH SAID THAT ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM BAGDAD, 'RESPONSIBLE SOURCES' THERE WERE SAYING THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE BAATH AND THE ICP HAD ENDED IN SUCCESS. AGREEMENT WAS SAID TO HAVE 'APPARENTLY' BEEN REACHED, ON THE PROPORTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE PROPOSED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE EXTENT OF COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN TRADE UNIONS, STUDENT FEDERATIONS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL. BAKR WAS SAID TO HAVE ALLUDED TO THIS AGREEMENT IN HIS LABOUR DAY SPEECH WHEN HE DECLARED THAT 'EFFORTS TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT HAD PASSED THROUGH THEIR FINAL STAGES'.

2. 'AL NAHAR' DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THESE REPORTS FROM BAGDAD WERE NECESSARILY ACCURATE NOR CAN WE JUDGE HOW WELL FOUNDED THEY MIGHT BE.

WRIGHT.

FILES
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MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS
MOD INTERNAL

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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD


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G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Your reference

Our reference

Date 31 May 1973



Dear Graham,

IRAQ'S MINISTER OF TRANSPORT

It was reported in the press here on 26 April that a new Minister of Transport had been appointed to the Government of Iraq. His name is Saiyid Nihad Fakhri al Khaffaf.

2. I have delayed reporting this since we know very little about Saiyid Nihad. There was some speculation at the time as to the reason for this appointment; some suggested that Nihad was one of Saddam Hussein's men and his appointment might thus weaken the power of President Bakr. However I have been unable to glean anything factual.

3. It is possible that Saiyid Nihad is Brigadier Nihad Fakhri who was involved with other Nasserist officers in an abortive coup of September 1965, after which he fled to Cairo. The same man was also reported as being in prison awaiting trial in connexion with Abdul Razzaq's attempted coup of June 1966.

Yours ever,

I McCluney

I McCluney

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FM BAGHDAD 020530Z JUNE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 266 OF 2 JULY/⁷³INFO TEHERAN,
BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SHIHAB.

THE ASSASSINATION OF GEN SHIHAB REPORTED BY BBC WAS
ANNOUNCED ON BAGHDAD RADIO 8 PM 1 JULY.

TEXT OF STATEMENT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 - 2 JUL 1973 NBR 1/2

2. THE STATEMENT CAME AFTER 24 HOURS OF SPECULATION AND
RUMOUR FOLLOWING PRESIDENT BAKR'S RETURN FROM POLAND.
HOWEVER DESPITE INCREASED SECURITY ACTIVITY IN THE CITY
LIFE GOES ON AS USUAL AND STAFF AND BRITISH COMMUNITY
ARE UNAFFECTED.
3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT GEN SHIHAB'S SON IS AT SANDHURST.
4. MED PLEASE REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.

MCCLUNEY

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MR ROSE
MOD INTERNAL

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 267 OF 2 JULY, 1973.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RCC STATEMENT.
BEGINS.

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26/7/73
19

ON 30TH JUNE, 1973, NADHEM GZAR, THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY, MISGUIDED THE MINISTERS OF DEFENCE AND INTERIOR AND A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AND OFFICERS TO A FEAST WHERE HE PREPARED AN AMBUSH.

A NUMBER OF HIS FOLLOWERS ARRESTED THEM, AND WHEN THE CONSPIRACY WAS EXPOSED, HE AND HIS GANG TRIED TO FLEE TOWARDS ZERBATIA ON THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDER, TAKING WITH THEM THE TWO MINISTERS AND OTHER DETAINEES.

AUTHORITY FORCES AND MASSES OF THE PEOPLE CHASED THEM AND ARRESTED GZAR AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF HIS GANG, BUT BEFORE HE WAS ARRESTED, HAVING REALISED THAT THE AUTHORITY FORCES AND THE MASSES HAD BESIEGED THEM, THEY SHOT MARTYR GENERAL HAMMAD SHEHAB, RCC MEMBER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND SLIGHTLY WOUNDED GEN. SAADOUN GHAI DAN, RCC MEMBER AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR.

DURING THE CHASE, LT. SULAIMAN MUNSHED AND POLICE LT. NEHAD AHMED AL-DULAIMI WERE SHOT DEAD.

"THIS CRIMINAL ACT COMMITTED BY THE TREACHEROUS GANG HAS TAKEN PLACE WHILE THE NATIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES OF OUR PEOPLE ARE HEADING TOWARDS UNIFYING THEIR RANKS AND ANCHORING COOPERATION RELATIONS ON FIRM BASES.

IT HAS TAKEN PLACE WHILE OUR PEOPLE ARE CELEBRATING JULY FESTIVITIES AND THE VICTORIES WHICH FOLLOWED THE BATTLE OF NATIONALISATION, AND WHILE THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY, LED BY THE ARAB BAATH SOCIALIST PARTY, IS RESOLVED TO PLACE THE COUNTRY'S RESOURCES IN THE SERVICE OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERESTS OF THE MASSES FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF PERMANENT STABILITY AND PEACE.

"THE REVOLUTION

5/1/90
"THE REVOLUTION AND ITS LEADER-PARTY, WHILE CONSIDERING THIS ACTION AS A TREACHEROUS AND RECKLESS CRIMINAL ACT WHICH WRECKED HAVOC IN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY, HAS DECIDED TO REFER THE ACCUSED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE TO RECEIVE THE FAIR PUNISHMENT THEY DESERVED. WE CALL UPON THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE, THE FIGHTERS OF OUR PARTY AND OTHER NATIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES NOT TO BACK DOWN DUE TO THIS CALAMITOUS INCIDENT, FROM THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR VICTORIOUS REVOLUTIONARY PROCESSION TO BUILD THE HOMELAND AND LIVE UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF ALL ARAB AND PROGRESSIVE CITIZENS THE WORLD OVER.

"ON THIS PAINFUL OCCASION WE EXTEND OUR CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE MARTYRS WHO HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE CARAVAN OF THEIR GLORIOUS COMRADES".

ENDS.

MCCLUNEY

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 95 - 2 JUL 1973 NBR 1/2

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 269 OF 2 JULY 1973,
INFO ROUTINE PARIS.

IRAQ INTERNAL.

ALTHOUGH EVERYTHING SEEMS CALM IN BAGHDAD TODAY
THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INTERNAL
STRIFE WITHIN THE PARTY MAY COME TO THE SURFACE.
AND WORSE THERE MAY BE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS OF
FOREIGN (E.G. IRANIAN, U.S. OR EVEN BRITISH)
MEDDLING IN IRAQI POLITICS.

2. SHOULD THIS HAPPEN, AND I HAVE NO GROUNDS AT
THIS MOMENT FOR THINKING THAT IT MIGHT, THE
BRITISH COMMUNITY AND OTHER FOREIGNERS MAY BECOME
AT LEAST UNPOPULAR AND SUBJECT TO INCONVENIENCE.

3. THE SWEDISH AND DUTCH AMBASSADORS ARE ABSENT
FROM BAGHDAD. THE ITALIAN IS NEW AND HAS NOT
PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS. OF THE OTHER WESTERNERS,
THE FRENCH IS BEST INFORMED AND I PROPOSE TO
KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIS EMBASSY FOR NEWS OF
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE
FOREIGN COMMUNITY.

MCCLUNEY

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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TO PRIORITY PARIS TELNO 518 DATED 2 JULY/73 INFO TEHRAN BEIRUT KUWAIT

(11) — BAGHDAD TELNO 269 (NOT TO ALL): ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SHIHAB
1. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE QUA I IF THEY
HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT AND FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT
OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 266 OF 2 JULY/⁷³INFO TEHERAN,
BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SHIHAB.

THE ASSASSINATION OF GEN SHIHAB REPORTED BY BBC WAS
ANNOUNCED ON BAGHDAD RADIO 8 PM 1 JULY.

TEXT OF STATEMENT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

2. THE STATEMENT CAME AFTER 24 HOURS OF SPECULATION AND
RUMOUR FOLLOWING PRESIDENT BAKR'S RETURN FROM POLAND.
HOWEVER DESPITE INCREASED SECURITY ACTIVITY IN THE CITY
LIFE GOES ON AS USUAL AND STAFF AND BRITISH COMMUNITY
ARE UNAFFECTED.
3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT GEN SHIHAB'S SON IS AT SANDHURST.
4. MED PLEASE REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.

MCCLUNEY

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- 4 JUL 1973

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 270 OF 2 JULY, 1973.
PARA 5 OF MY LETTER 2 JULY 1973 TO BURTON MED.
LOOKING CRITICALLY AT THE RCC STATEMENT IT
CAN ONLY BE THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG. SHIHAB AND
SAADOUN GHAIIDAN ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE GONE TO
A MEETING WITH NADHIM KHAZZAR UNLESS THEY WERE
EITHER PROPERLY ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR OWN TRUSTED
MEN, OR PARTICIPANTS IN A PLOT WITH KHAZZAR TO
STAGE SOME POWER REALIGNMENT ON THE PRESIDENTS
RETURN. IF KHAZZAR WAS MAKING A PERSONAL BID
FOR POWER HE MUST HAVE BEEN COUNTING ON SUPPORT
FROM SOME QUARTER. WAS HE HOPING TO GET IT FROM
THE ARMY? AT ALL EVENTS THE SCHEME WAS FOILED
IN BAGHDAD AT LEAST BY PARTY MEN WHOSE LOYALTY
IS PRESUMABLY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND THE
QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER IN THEIR FLIGHT TOWARDS
IRAN, GHAIIDAN AND SHIHAB WERE KIDNAPPED,
OR RUNNING AWAY.

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
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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

**British Interests Section
BAGHDAD**



G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 2 July 1973

Dear Graham,
IRAQ - INTERNAL

Enter 1? Sec'd 10/7
 10/7
 10/7

Any description of recent events is inevitably incomplete and disjointed, but for what it is worth I shall summarise the events of the last two days as seen in Baghdad.

2. The President returned from Bulgaria on 30 June. He was expected to arrive at 5 pm but was delayed inexplicably until 7 pm. Security precautions on his return, as on his departure, were elaborate. Army and plain clothes security men lined the road to the airport. (It was noticed when he left for Poland on 25 June that instead of using the lined route to the airport he chose a back road via Abu Ghraib). Between 6.30 and 7.30 on the day of his return some of the city's bridges were closed. Diplomatic colleagues had trouble getting to the airport, and to their other engagements that evening. Police and army prevented from 4 pm free access to the Mansour area of the city.

3. During the night of 30 June all was quiet until the early hours when staff reported hearing shots at Raschid Camp and our duty drivers on their first runs on 1 July met police checks. During the day (1 July) Baathi civilians patrolled the city with automatic weapons. News of an attempted coup circulated till dusk when the text of the RCC statement gradually became available and was broadcast.

4. On 2 July the Baath were still in the streets though not so numerous. It was rumoured that they have taken over Rashid (army) Camp, and arrested several hundreds apart from Nadhim Khazzar. The plain clothes security men were not on the streets.

5. See my telegram No 270.

/ 6.



6. We know a little of Nadhim Khazzar's history. He is a young man (about 32) who was arrested as a Communist in 1963. He informed on other communists and a large number were executed following his disclosures. He himself was sentenced to ten years hard labour, but he did not serve it, for in 1969 he was appointed, whilst a student, to the Public Relations Bureau. In July 1969 he became a Director General of Security with the equivalent rank of Major General.

After the attempted coup of January 1970 he was Chairman of a special court of three (one of the others was Taha al Jazrawi, presently member of the RCC and Minister of Industry) who tried the conspirators and hanged 46. He is a man greatly feared by the ordinary people; some say ranking as seventh in the present Baath hierarchy.

To the best of my knowledge Taha al Jazrawi and Foreign Minister Abdul Baqi have not returned from Poland. They remained behind for further talks and to sign agreements.

Yours ever

I. McCluney

I McCluney

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FROM PARIS 031535Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 888 OF 3JULY INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN ROUTINE
BEIRUT KUWAIT

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Pa

⑫- YOUR TELNO 518: ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SHIHAB

1..THE QUAI REGARDED GENERAL SHIHAB AND GENERAL GHEIDAN AS BELONG-
ING TO THE MODERATE WING OF THE BA'ATH, WITH PARTICULARLY CLOSE
CONNECTIONS WITH PRESIDENT BAKR (THEY UNDERSTAND THAT SHIHAB WAS
BAKR'S NEPHEW). SO FAR AS THE LEADING CONSPIRATOR, NASIM KAZZAR,
IS CONCERNED, THE QUAI COMMENT THAT IT HAD BEEN KNOWN FOR MONTHS
THAT HE HOPED TO BECOME MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. HE HAD IN THE
PAST BEEN VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN (THOUGH
NOT NECESSARILY NOW)

2..THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAS REPORTED THAT THE LEADING
PART PLAYED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND BY TALFA, THE GOVERNOR OF
BAGHDAD AND FATHER-IN-LAW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, AT THE FUNERAL OF
SHIHAB WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SADDAM
GROUP WERE "DE-SOLIDARISING" THEMSELVES FROM KAZZAR.
KAZZAR'S OBJECTIVE WAS EVIDENTLY TO ELIMINATE TWO OF THE LEADING
MILITARY SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT BAKR, BUT WAS FRUSTRATED BY THE
LOYALTY OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO REPORTS
THAT KAZZAR HAD MADE FOR THE IRANIAN FRONTIER AND SUGGESTIONS
IN THE IRAQI PRESS THAT HE WAS ACTING WITH OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
SEEMED TO BE DESIGNED TO ENABLE THE REGIME TO TRY TO IMPLICATE THE
IRANIANS, IF THIS SHOULD SEEM DESIRABLE.

3..THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CONCLUDES THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER EPISODE
IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE MORE

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EXTREME CIVILIAN WING OF THE BA'ATH (FOLLOWING THE RECENT ELIMINATION OF GENERAL HARDAN AND AMMASH). IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHAT THE EFFECTS ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S POSITION MIGHT BE THOUGH SHIHAB'S DEATH HAD REMOVED ONE OF HIS MOST POWERFUL RIVALS.

4..THE QUAI NOW AGREE THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN IN SUPPOSING THAT ANY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ OVER SHATT-AL-ARAB.

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BAGHDAD

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Your reference

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Date 4 July 1973

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Dear Graham,

It is of interest that two young officers affected by the assassination of General Shihab are British trained.

2. His son, Lt Rarid Hamad Shihab first went to Sandhurst in early 1972, but poor health and work results delayed his training. After treatment at the Netley hospital he resumed in September 1972 and completed the standard military course satisfactorily. He is now on the Regular Career Course and is due to finish on 10 August. The Iraq authorities have made every effort to keep him in Britain on courses and it is possible that he may attend a course starting in October this year.

3. One of the two young officers killed with General Shihab was Lt Sulaiman Munshed al Amiri who was at Sandhurst with Shihab and completed his course in March this year. Although the Iraqis wished him to continue in Britain for a while we were unable to place him, despite the fact that he was the top foreign student on his course and described as 'intelligent with the makings of a really good officer'.

Yours ever

la

I McCluney

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD



17

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Your reference

Our reference

Date

5 July 1973

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Dear Graham

IRAQ - INTERNAL

I enclose the text of two RCC Resolutions issued on 2 July.

2. You will see that an investigating committee has been formed to interrogate and prefer charges against Nadhim Kazzar. The three members are Saadoun Shakir - appointed Director General of the Public Relations Bureau in December 1969 and Director of Intelligence on 30 January 1973. In April 1973 he was made a part-time member of the PRB along with Hikmat Azzawi, Minister of Economy and Hamid Jebouri ~~Jubwi~~ Minister of Information.

Discuss with Ian OR

Kahim Muslem - not known

Abdul Samad Abdul Hamid - a founder member of the Iraqi Communist Party in 1960, and later a member of its Central Committee.

3. The special court formed to try Nadhim Gazzar 'and his clique' consists of Izzat al Douri - RCC member since 1969 Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and a member of the Regional Command of the Baath Party

Tahir Ahmed Amin - appointed in 1970 a Director of the RCC Public Relations Bureau

Khalil Ibrahim al Azzawi - not known

4. The meaning of the exclusion of certain articles of the Penal Code is, I am told, that the accused cannot be represented by a lawyer at his trial.

5. It is expected that this matter will be dealt with quickly, before the 14 July celebrations.

Yours ever
la
I McCluney

Enc:

2 DECISIONS BY RCC

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) issued yesterday evening the following decision No. 539:

In accordance with Para 1, Article 43 of the Interim Constitution, the RCC decided, at its meeting held on July 1, as follows:

1— To set up a special investigating committee comprising the following:

- a— Ismail al-Douri, Chairman.
- b— Nadhem Gzar, member.
- c— Abdul Samad Abdul Hamid, member.

2— To empower the committee with all the prerogatives of an investigating magistrate to interrogate Nadhem Gzar and clique.

3— Those charged to be tried by a special court.

4— This decision is to be implemented on the date of its publication.

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, RCC Chairman.

The RCC also issued the following decision No. 540 announcing the formation of a spe-

cial court to try Nadhem Gzar and his clique:

In accordance with Para 1, Article 43 of the Interim Constitution, the RCC, at its meeting held on July 1, 1978, decided the following:

1— To set up a special court comprising:

- a— Ismail al-Douri, ROC member, as chairman.
- b— Tahir Ahmed Amin, member.
- c— Khalil Ibrahim al-Azzawi, member.

2— The said court will try Nadhem Gzar and his clique.

3— The provisions of Chapter One, Book Three, of the Penal Laws No. 3 of 1971 will not apply to the Special Court.

4— The sentences passed by the Court are final, except the death sentence.

The provisions of Article 288 of the Penal Code will not apply to the decisions of the Court.

5— This decision was issued

in exclusion of provisions regulating penal courts.

6— The decision will come into force on the day of its publication.

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, RCC Chairman.

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Mr Goulding ✓

[Handwritten signature]
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pa

[Handwritten: Mr. Parsons]

[Handwritten: 19, 6/7, pa]

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY - 9 JUL 1973 NR 1/2

1. As requested, I attach a speaking note for Mr Amery's use at Cabinet this morning on recent events in Iraq.

[Handwritten signature]

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

5 July 1973

cc: Mr Coles
Mr Parsons

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CABINET

5 July 1973

IRAQ

Speaking Note

1. According to an announcement on Baghdad Radio on 1 July, the Iraqi Minister of Defence, General Hammad Shihab, was killed and the Minister of the Interior, General Sa'adun Ghaidan, was injured on 30 June by a group led by General Naddim Kazzar, Director General of Security, after being tricked into a meeting with him. Kazzar and his supporters were reported to have been arrested on their way to Iran.
2. We have^{no}/reliable information about the events leading to General Shihab's death. It is probably the result of an internal feud within the Iraqi Ba'ath Party (and between the military and the more extreme civilian wing of the Ba'ath) rather than external intervention (the Iranians appear to have been taken by surprise). General Shihab was a firm supporter of President Bakr who was absent at the time on a visit to Eastern Europe. Kazzar may have taken advantage of Bakr's absence to attempt a full-scale coup. Alternatively, the assassination may possibly have been engineered by Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Bakr's chief rival for power as a means of eroding the President's position.
3. It is too early to judge the effect of this incident on Saddam Hussein's position, but Shihab's death has removed one of his most powerful rivals.

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TO ROUTINE ANKARA TELNO 722 OF 05 JULY.73 INFO TEHRAN.

IRAQ

1. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WHEN MR AMERY WAS IN ANKARA ON 1 JUNE HE DISCUSSED WITH MR BAYULKEN THE SITUATION IN IRAQ.
2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY AS A FOLLOW UP TO THAT CONVERSATION TO SEEK MR BAYULKEN'S VIEWS ON RECENT EVENTS IN BAHADAD. IN DOING SO YOU MAY DRAW ON THE JIC ASSESSMENT OF 5 JULY BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY.
3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS APPROACH WOULD BE TO SHOW THE TURKS THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS FOR CONTINUED CONSULTATION WITH THEM ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 861 OF 6 JULY 1973

INFO TEHRAN.



(20) — YOUR TELEGRAM 722: IRAQ.

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS NOW IN HELSINKI, AND GOING ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO BULGARIA, NOT LIKELY TO BE BACK UNTIL ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF THIS MONTH. I MYSELF WILL NOT BE BACK IN ANKARA UNTIL 19 JULY FROM FORTHCOMING FIRST OFFICIAL VISITS TO BURSA AND IZMIR BEGINNING 9 JULY.

2. SINCE THE MAIN PURPOSE OF IT (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM) WOULD BE LOST IF AN APPROACH ON THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT WERE MADE AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTER, I SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD AWAIT HIS RETURN AND MY OWN. I DO NOT THINK THE SUBJECT WILL BE COLD, AND BY THAT TIME HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASSESS THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

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FM BAGHDAD 080650Z JULY

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1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 275 OF 8 JULY/INFO BEIRUT,
KUWAIT AND TEHERAN.

IRAQ - INTERNAL.

DESPITE THE ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY OF THE EXECUTION
OF 23 INCLUDING NODHIM KAZR, BAGHDAD REMAINS CALM.

2.

APART FROM HAVING TO PASS A FEW ADDITIONAL ROAD CHECKS
ON OUT OF TOWN TRIPS, BRITISH RESIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN
AFFECTED OR INCONVENIENCED BY THIS WEEK'S EVENTS.

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*See summary
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 276 OF 8 JULY. 1973
IRAQ'S MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

I WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA THIS MORNING AND SAW
SHIEKHLI, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. HE GAVE ME THE
FOLLOWING (VERBAL) MESSAGE FROM LT. GEN SAADOUN
GHADAN TO THE HOME SECRETARY.

"I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT LONDON PRIVATELY FOR FURTHER
MEDICAL TREATMENT FOLLOWING THE RECENT INJURIES TO MY
ARM. BEFORE MAKING THE MEDICAL ARRANGMENTS I
SHOULD LIKE TO ASK YOUR EXCELLENCY IF IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO ARRANGE FOR MY PROTECTION AND
SAFETY WHILST I AM IN LONDON."

2. SHIEKHLI TOLD ME THAT THE MINISTER HAS TWO
BULLETS WOUNDS IN HIS LEFT ARM, BUT DESPITE TREATMENT
HERE THE NERVES ARE STILL AFFECTED. IN VIEW OF
RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ, SHIEKLY ASKED IF THE HOME
OFFICE AND SPECIAL BRANCH WOULD BE PREPARED TO
TAKE ANY NECESSARY MEASURES TO PROTECT SAADOUN
GHADAN'S LIFE. I ASKED IF THEY HAD ANY PARTICULAR
THREAT IN MIND WHICH MIGHT EXIST IN LONDON, AND HE
REPLIED NO.

3. THE MINISTER WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE OUR
ADVICE ON THE BEST HOSPITAL TO USE FROM A SECURITY
POINT OF VIEW. LONDON CLINIC AND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
WERE MENTIONED.

4. A PARTY OF 2 OR 3 AIDE-DE-CAMPS PLUS A DOCTOR
AND THE MINISTERS WIFE WOULD TRAVEL WITH HIM.
I SAID WE WOULD PARTICULARLY WISH TO KNOW WHO
THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PARTY WERE, AND HE PROMISED
ME FULL DETAILS OF EACH MEMBER IF HMG AGREED
IN PRINCIPLE THAT GHADAN MAY TRAVEL.

5. SHIEKLY TELEPHONED ME ON MY RETURN TO THE OFFICE
TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS WAS A MESSAGE TO THE HOME

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/ SECRETARY

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SECRETARY FROM SAADOUN GHAIIDAN. NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES
SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT CONSTITUTE A RENEWAL OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT I HESITATE TO PUT SUCH
A CONSTRUCTION ON IT HERE.

6. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PRELIMINARY
REACTIONS TOMORROW.

MCCLUNEY

F I L E S

MED

POD

SECURITY D

PUSD

DEFENCE D

MR PARSONS

MR LEQUESNE

MR COLE

RESTRICTED


IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

GPS 97

FM BAGHDAD 081322Z JULY

RESTRICTED



TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 081500Z FCO TELNO 277 OF 8 JULY. 1973

MYTEL 276 MINISTER OF INTERIOR.

1. I ASKED SHIEKHLI IF THE MINISTER WOULD WISH HIS MESSAGE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT A MATTER FOR THE PRESS.

2. I KNOW THAT 'THE OBSERVER' HAS AN ARTICLE TODAY ON IRAQ BY GAVIN YOUNG (WHO CALLED ON ME EARLIER THIS MORNING). THIS MAY LEAD TO QUESTIONS IN NEWS DEPT BUT DESPITE THE DEARTH OF HARD NEWS FROM BAGHDAD I SUGGEST THE MINISTERS APPROACH IS KEPT QUIET FOR THE MOMENT.

3. MYTEL 275 SHOULD ANSWER QUERIES.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

SECURITY D

PUSD

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

PS

PS/LORD BALNIEL

PS/PUS

MR LEQUESNE

MR PARSONS

RESTRICTED

WBB 11/7
ja



British Embassy
Tehran

NBR 18/2

G Burton Esq
Middle East Dept.
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 1/16

Date 6 July 1973

Dear Graham,

Mr Wright
Mr Hunt
Mr Smith OK
may come to see
other interesting Iranian
assessment. A clue to
Ghardang report for
protection?
10/7

(15) PARIS TELEGRAM NO.888: ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SHIHAB

pas

1. Rumours have naturally been rife in Tehran about the origins of the latest up-heaval in Baghdad. You may find of interest the attached article in Kayhan International of 3 July, which probably reflects official guidance.
2. There has been no official Iranian comment on the coup attempt. But "according to informed sources" the Iranians do not consider that the replacement of one wing of the Ba'athist Government by another would have any real affect on Iran/Iraq relations.

Yours sincerely
NW

N W Browne

Encl

cc: I McCluney Esq
Swiss Embassy, Baghdad

P de Courcy Ireland Esq
KUWAIT

Chancery, Beirut

X SADDAM LIQUIDATE Takriti in

psd

SADDAM Hussein al-Takriti, Iraq's strongman and vice-president, seems to have been indirectly behind the latest attempt to overthrow President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr's regime in Baghdad, according to diplomatic sources here.

The abortive coup was headed by the director of Iraq's National Security Department, Nazem Ghar, an old friend and close aide of Saddam. The attempt has cost the life of Defence Minister General Hammad Shahab.

Reliable Arab sources here say the plot was aimed at removing from the scene two of Saddam's

By Our Diplomatic Correspondent

strongest rivals within the ruling junta. The first was Shahab and the second Interior Minister Sandun Ghaldan, who escaped the shoot-out at Zarbatia with minor injuries.

With these two men eliminated, the plotters hoped to arrest President Bakr on his return to Baghdad from state visits to a number of East European countries. This was to be followed by a full assumption of power on the part of Saddam and his younger associates within the party.

Five years ago when Bakr sacked the then strongman Colonel Abdul-Razzaq an-Nayef

to establish full Ba'athist rule he was flanked by a handful of "trusted" colleagues.

The list was headed by Air Marshal Hardan Abdul Ghaffar al-Takriti, and included the then Interior Minister Saleh Mahdi al-Ammash, Shahab, Ghaldan, Lieutenant-General Abdul Jabbar ash-Shenshal, Colonel Taha Jizrawi, Qizar, and Saddam, as well as Zlab al-Alkawi.

A few weeks after the establishment of Ba'athist rule it was clear that Hardan was the strongest card in the whole pack. Bakr, known for his indecisiveness and poor health, was at best a mere figurehead.

At the same time the military members of the ruling group were bitterly suspicious of their civilian partners, headed by Saddam. They wanted to emphasise army rule while the civilians insisted on full control by the Ba'ath Party. Saddam was, right from the start, an advocate of Ba'athification in the army while Hardan believed this would weaken the armed forces.

Furthermore, the army wanted the war against the Kurds pursued to its conclusion. The civilian group, on the other hand, wanted a truce with the Kurds that would enable the Ba'ath Party to crush all its political adversaries first.

Thus Saddam's first objective was the elimination of Hardan. He managed to remove the air marshal from his posts as vice-president and Minister of Defence and Hardan was then dispatched to Stockholm as ambassador. But he was ambitious enough to begin plotting his return to power in Baghdad.

A few months later, however, Saddam's agents succeeded in murdering Hardan who had gone to Kuwait on a private visit. One of Saddam's oldest friends, Ibrahim Juma'a, then Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait, was at Hardan's side when the air marshal was murdered, but the snipers were so accurate that Juma'a emerged completely unhurt from the incident.

As it working his way down a list, Saddam then proceeded with intrigues that led to the removal of General al-Ammash from his post as deputy-premier and



ONE DEAD, ONE EXILED — General Shahab (left) with General Ammash, and the Kremlin in the background.

S RIVALS IN IRAQ

-fighting

Interior Minister. The same scenario as had been used in the case of Hardan was again employed and Ammash was sent to Moscow as ambassador. He proved clever enough to stay put in the Russian capital, and is still alive although without any political power inside Iraq.

Saddam now found an opportunity to bring in one of his own party proteges, Shihbi al-Aythami, who took Ammash's place in the ruling clique.

Next, Colonel Jizrawi was given a non-political post and made Minister for Industries. Brigadier al-Alkawi was buried in bureaucracy, and Saddam achieved his ceasefire with the Kurds, to the chagrin of the army, and proceeded to root out anti-Ba'athist groups inside Iraq.

Later, he tried to remove Ghaldan from the political arena by pushing him into diplomatic posts. On several occasions Ghaldan was sent abroad as roving ambassador, but somehow this unprepossessing officer, believed to be a close friend of the president, managed to hang on.

General Shenshal, made chief of staff, was effectively neutralised by the appointment of hand-picked deputies and Ba'athist political agents who began setting up their own alternative chain of command within the Iraqi armed forces. In any case Shenshal is known to lack the necessary intelligence to pose any political threat to Saddam.

The elimination of Shahab and Ghaldan would have left Saddam sole ruler of Iraq, with the ineffectual Bakr either in gaol or allowed to stay on as a figure-head.

Saddam, however, was aware of the fact that Shahab had his own trusted associates within the army. Thus, when the plot failed and Ghaldan escaped death he immediately appeared as the leader of the anti-coup faction.

According to students of the Iraqi scene here the struggle for power in Baghdad is far from over. Ghaldan is now likely to act swiftly in order to forestall his complete isolation. Saddam and Ghaldan will be waiting for the first chance to strike against each other. They are the only two gladiators left in the bloody arena, and whoever hits first might prove the winner.

Is the struggle in Baghdad concerned with rival politics? This is a difficult question to answer. Many observers here believe that the whole thing should be seen as a prolonged personal feud.

All the leading characters in the fragile farce belong to the Takriti clan which has its stronghold in the small town of Takrit, northwest of Baghdad. Some are even distant relatives of each other.

There are few other countries in the world where political power is quite so completely monopolised by a single clan, and yet the Iraqi junta is one of the most disunified ruling groups in the world.

Other observers, however, claim that rivalry between the party and the army is at the root of struggle in Baghdad. Saddam wants the armed forces dominated by the Ba'ath Party, and on many occasions he has said that the political shape of the army is far more important than its actual fighting capability.

Hardan, Shahab, Ammash, and Ghaldan, all ex-professional soldiers, did not have much time for the party which they treated as a mere propaganda department for the army.

Furthermore, these observers add, Saddam was behind the plan to take Iraq out of the Arab drama with Israel and into the Soviet camp. Hardan, speaking in Tehran only two weeks after the Ba'athist seizure of power, said the then new government had two main objectives. The first was to increase the Iraqi contribution to the Arab effort against Israel. The second was the defeat of the Kurds on the battleground. Both were strictly military objectives. Both were aimed at enhancing the prestige of the Iraqi army.

Saddam, however, has repeatedly said Iraq had no interest in getting involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict as long as Baghdad was denied a chance to plan the whole of the Arab strategy in that respect. As for the Kurds, Saddam has tried to defeat Mulla Mustafa Barzani politically by isolating him and fomenting discord within the Kurdish ranks. On at least one occasion Saddam plotted the assassination of Barzani. He prefers assassination to open warfare in accordance with his

background as a professional conspirator.

On foreign affairs, the military wing of the junta is less than enthusiastic about Saddam's policy of turning Iraq into a virtual satellite of the Soviet Union. They prefer the policy pursued by their military counterparts in Syria who have remained friendly with Russia without signing any formal pact with Moscow. And yet Saddam succeeded in making Iraq a member of the Soviet-sponsored Comecon — the so called East European Common Market — and personally signed a 15-year military and political pact with the USSR.

While the military members of the junta are interested in seeing Iraq play a more active role in Arab affairs, Saddam is pursuing a policy that has led to quarrels between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, and Kuwait on the other. Today, Iraq's only friend in the Arab world is the shaky regime of South Yemen.

To strengthen his influence over Iraqi foreign policy, Saddam ousted Foreign Minister Abdul Karim ash-Shalkhi, a protege of Hardan and Ammash, and replaced him with one of his own trusted men, Mortadha Sa'ad Abdul Baqi al-Hadidi al-Takriti.

According to Arab sources here the Baghdad junta was bitterly divided on such issues as the conflict with Iran, the smuggling of arms into Pakistan, and the recent invasion of Kuwait.

One reliable source quoted a high Iraqi official as saying that the smuggling of arms into Pakistan was ordered by Saddam and executed by Qizar without the knowledge of Bakr and other key members of the junta. The invasion of Kuwait, according to the same source, was a personal enterprise of Saddam and opposed by the military inside the junta.

The same source says that Shahab and Ghaldan had planned to oust Saddam on July 17 on the anniversary of the Ba'athist coup. Saddam apparently acted to forestall them. He succeeded in part. But the struggle was resumed as soon as Shahab was buried near Baghdad amid tears — including those of Saddam.

CONFIDENTIAL

R 320

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 091100Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 281 OF 9 JULY INFO PARTS.

IRAQ - INTERNAL.

I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS WITH
PIERRE CERLE THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

I TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE OF GHADAN'S REQUEST TO GO
TO LONDON.

2.

HE THOUGHT THIS SIGNIFICANT AND, WITH THE IMPRISONMENT
TODAY OF KHALIQ AS SAMMARAIE (RCC MEMBER), AGREED THAT
THE SITUATION NOW MADE SENSE. GOING BACK TO DECEMBER, 1972
HE HAD BEEN WORRIED BY SAMMARAIE'S OPPOSITION TO COMPENSATION
FOR IPC AND I REMINDED HIM OF IPC'S CONCERN IN FEBRUARY
THAT THE BAATH PARTY ELECTIONS, (IN WHICH SAMMARAIE CAME OUT
ABOVE SADDAM HUSSEIN) WOULD INTERFERE WITH AN EARLY SETTLEMENT.

CERLE ANALYSED THE RCC NOW AS FOLLOWS:-

LEFTIST/BAATHIST	KHALIQ AS-SAMMARAIE, TAHA AL JAZRAWI.
MIDDLE OF THE ROAD	SADDAM HUSSEIN, ABDUL BAKI, ISSAT AL DOURI.
PRAGMATIST/WESTERN	BAKR, GHADAN, SHIHAB, IZZAT MUSTAPHA.

3.

ON THIS BASIS, ELIMINATION OF THE LEFT, INCLUDING
(OUTSIDE THE RCC) MOHD FADHIL (PRB),
NA'IM HADDAD (A NEW NAME NOT SO FAR PUBLISHED) AND
KAZR, LEAVES, AFTER THE PURGE, A STRONG GROUP LESS BAATHI-PURIST
OR COMMUNIST THAN IN THE PAST.

IT IS A STRONGER GOVERNMENT MORE INCLINED TO TAKE A
PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD.
THIS HE FELT WAS A GOOD SIGN FOR THE WEST, AND FOR THE FUTURE
OF IRAQ.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. HOWEVER,

4.

HOWEVER, HE DESCRIBED AT THE SAME TIME THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE IRAQ INEXTRICABLY WITH THE EASTERN BLOC AND WHAT HE CALLED THEIR 'ZONE OF PEACE'.

THEIR APPROACH WAS THREE PRONGED.

FIRSTLY, THE DIRECT CONTACT WITH RUSSIA BASED ON THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY, ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT AND MILITARY AID.

SECOND, THE GROWING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTACTS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

THIRDLY, THE IRAQ-INDIAN AXIS BASED ON INDIAN OCEAN/GULF SECURITY (THE ZONE OF PEACE), OIL SUPPLIES, AND THE CHIPPING AWAY OF MUSLIM LINKS WITH PAKISTAN.

5.

NO DOUBT YOU HAVE OTHER ACCESS TO CERLE'S VIEWS IN PARIS OR LONDON BUT YOU MAY FIND THIS USEFUL TODAY.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

M E D

N E N A D

NORTH AMER DEPT

DEFENCE DEPT

E E S D

P U S D

S A D

NEWS DEPT

RESEARCH DEPT

(NORTH AMER AND SOVIET SECTIONS)

GR 170

CONFIDENTIAL

2b

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 091030Z JULY
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35	
NR1	2

(22) (15) TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 280 OF 9 JULY. 1973
MYTEL NO. 276.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

MFA WILL EXPECT A REPLY FROM THE HOME SECRETARY, AND IT MIGHT WELL INCLUDE SOME REFERENCE TO RECENT EVENTS. MANY COUNTRIES HAVE SENT CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF SHIHAB, THOUGH NOT THE FRENCH, OR ANY WESTERNERS TO MY KNOWLEDGE. IF THE RCC IS NOW SLIGHTLY MORE WESTERN-PRAGMATIST AND GH Aidan IS REPRESENTATIVE OF IT, THEN HIS PRESENCE IN LONDON MAY BE THEIR WAY OF CREATING AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS.

2.

A FIRST DRAFT REPLY MIGHT READ AS FOLLOWS:-

"I WAS SORRY TO LEARN OF YOUR RECENT INJURIES AND OF THE DEATH OF YOUR COLLEAGUE GEN. HAMMAD SHIHAB.

I KNOW OF NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD BE CONCERNED FOR YOUR SAFETY WHILST IN LONDON AND I HOPE YOU WILL QUICKLY RECOVER THE FULL USE OF YOUR ARM.

THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE RSE WILL ASSIST YOU IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR VISIT".

3.

I HAVE INFORMED IN CONFIDENCE THE SWEDISH CHARGE, CERLE (FRANCE) AND LOWRIE (US) OF GH Aidan'S MESSAGE.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

M E D

P O D

SECURITY DEPT

P U S D

DEFENCE DEPT

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

MR COLE

CONFIDENTIAL

MSB 1/7
pa

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 11 JUL 1973	
NS	R1/2

R K Buist Esq
Personnel Services Department
FCO

7 July 1973

pas *Tel sent by M Buist*
agreeing *WJH*

1. Following Shihab's assassination I have been considering whether I should go on leave as intended on 15 July.
2. The staff of the Section during my absence can cope with normal work during the slackish summer period, given our senior and experienced local staff. However, there is little spare capacity to follow or cope with unexpected political developments. (The Swedish Embassy is in the same position with a single administration officer as Chargé d'Affaires).
3. If we were required to strengthen the Mission during the summer for some reason, those officers already accredited here with visas to re-enter Iraq would have to return first. In any semi crisis situation it would be difficult to get approval from the Iraqis for a new officer to enter the country.
4. With this in mind I am prepared to return here at any time at short notice, and Peter Field (who will be on local leave for 3 weeks in southern Turkey with my American colleague Arthur Lowrie) will keep in touch with Ankara so that he can be contacted.
5. Barry Seddon (Grade 9 Commercial) our principal Arabist, will be on a course and leave in Britain and can easily be contacted.
6. Unless you see objection, I intend to take my leave in the usual way.

I McCluney

cc Middle East Department
FCO

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
 British Interests Section
 BAGHDAD

G S Burton Esq
 Middle East Department
 FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

7 July 1973

K
REGISTER No. 25
11 JUL 1973
NR R1/2

Don Graham,

*Enter
 Mr. Smith - 1m not sure!
 like para 9 of
 major field report
 26/7*

1. I enclose copies of some notes I have made following talks with various people in Baghdad about the present situation. I think I can legitimately send them to you since they largely represent factual evidence on which you can make an assessment of the political situation.

2. Frankly, quite apart from the agreement not to indulge in political reporting from Baghdad, I do not yet feel able to assess the events of last weekend. The situation is confused and I have the impression that colleagues are also reporting that it is too early to see the full significance or depth of the conspiracy in which Shihab was assassinated. Baghdad is still quiet and life goes on normally for the man in the street, the foreign community and the diplomatic corps.

*Yours ever,
 Ian.*

I McCluney

Enc:

Mr Donovan
Major Field
Mr Rae
Mr Voysey
to see

IRAQ - INTERNAL

I discussed the Internal Situation on Monday 2 July with Pierre Cerjes (French Ambassador) and Arthur Lowrie (US Interests Section).

2. They agree on one thing. The present situation seems to stem from a longterm plan to rid the Baath party of its military wing. That wing was represented at cabinet level by Saddam Ghaidan and General Shihab. Cerle traced the history of events back to the accusations against General Takriti in 1970 - that he betrayed the Palestinian cause by not allowing Iraqi troops to intervene in Jordan. Takriti was subsequently assassinated in Kuwait in March 1971.

3. Cerle quoted the power of the civilian wing evident in his meetings with Bekr (May 70) and earlier Hammash (September 71) when despite their personal willingness to reach an agreement with IPC they seemed to have been overruled by 'more progressive' civilian elements, which included Saddam Hussein.

4. Cerle drew attention to the complex nature of any political situation in Iraq. He quoted the three cornered nature of the Kurdish problem. Negotiations go on trilaterally between the KDP, CPI and Baath. Similarly within the Baath itself there are the 3 groups of RCC, National Front and Army.

5. I suggested that the assassination of Shihab may have been a by product of Saddam Hussein's intention to rid himself of a too powerful security chief, Muthim Kazzar. He did not dissent, but it did not fit his own theory.

6. Neither did our information that the General and Saddam Ghaidan were seen alive and under guard in Kut on Saturday evening.

7. I told Cerle that my primary concern was the safety of the British Community in the event of further trouble, and asked him to keep me informed of any sign of deterioration in the situation. I also said that internal politics was outside my brief, but I was happy to talk to him at anytime. He invited me to keep in touch.

112

IRAC - INTERNAL

Sd Ali Ridha Al Mudaris, Director General in Public Relations Bureau since July 1969, is said to have been arrested along with Nadhim Kazzar on 30 June 1973. He was a member with Kazzar of the court set up to try those who conspired against the regime 20/21 January 1970.

for McCluney

I McCluney

5 July 1973

EVENT OF 30 JUNE/1 JULY

1.

combine to give the following picture.

Lunch Party 30 June. Saddam Hussein invited Shihab, Gaidar and other ministers and officers. It got wind that something was up. There were 500 men had been detailed to guard the town. Saddam did not go to the party or got a message to the President to delay his return and come to the International Airport.

Flight this did take place, firstly to Iraq and on to Zar Bahia/Badri. It was night by then. The fugitives were caught on the road by army from the border area. But.

1am Sunday Baath militia were alerted on the ? Take over of Rashid Camp.

Sadoun Chaikan is on the 3rd floor of the building. No one is allowed near him. No reports of Saddam Hussein and his family with him.

Banks have been asked to freeze assets of Kazzar, a captain in Security, and a number of "ranks" living in al-Furra township.

This is said to be a cover up to convince that no high level figures were/are involved.

Other names in the plot

Director General Bata Shoe Co. Saffar
Director General of Police.

Others killed Khatib Omar - an officer (Lt) from the ranks and was in the RGC Labour

Query much of this serves to support the RGC statement that this was a personal bid to kill by Kazzar. But are we being fed this information?

I McClanery
4 July 1973

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER
SECTION 5(1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 UNTIL2014.....

SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE BY CHINESE MILITARY ATTACHE
on 3 JULY

1. Quoted an Iraqi paper (I don't know which one) which said that Gsar, his henchman and his Master must be brought to justice etc. He believes that Saddam Hussein is that Master.
2. Quoted an East European in Baghdad (again I don't know which one) who told him that Saddam Hussein's position has been changed and the 'incident' was a victory for "Progressive Forces".
3. He would not be surprised if something else happened soon. If nothing does then Saddam Hussein's position has been further strengthened.
4. He does not believe that two Ministers would accept an invitation and be out of Baghdad at the time the President was due to return. Therefore he suspects that the shootings took place in the Baghdad area.
5. The President's delay is explained by his waiting until it was safe for him to land.
6. The President has direct control over only the Baghdad Garrison and Palace Guard. Other troops are controlled by RCC and MOD. Additional troops were brought in to Baghdad and are in temporary accommodation on the military airfield. (I have seen no sign of these).
7. Rashid Camp area is closed and there has been some kind of fight inside the camp. The road blocks are manned by soldiers with one or two policeman.
8. He believes that Saddam Hussein is backed by the Soviet Union and that Saddam Hussein has a strong base of support amongst the junior officers in the army.
9. He asked if we could meet again and our discussion then went on to general topics such as CENTO, NATO and the European Security Conference.

P S Field

4 July 1973

286

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD



G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 7 July 1973

Dear Graham,

pas

*Enter in B. to see OK
SB 1/2*

PRESS REACTION TO GENERAL SHIHAB'S DEATH

1. The general feeling is one of regret that this internal strife should have upset the steady progress of the revolution.
2. 'Genuine revolutions' says Al Thawra 'are bound to face difficulties and crises, even those emerging from their own ranks, created by people regarded as from their own force..... It is natural that a conspirator's attempt will give rise to a wave of anxiety as to the capability of the leaders in overcoming the crisis and forging ahead on their steady path.
3. 'But the correct assessment is that such a crisis, not withstanding its pain and bitterness, did not and shall not encroach on the essence of the revolution. It is a certain fact that the leadership is fully capable of facing this crisis with the utmost care and placing all matters in their correct perspective'.
4. Similar sentiments are expressed by the Iraq Communist Party. In a message to the National and Regional leadership of the ABSP, the Communists 'share with you the sorrow at the loss of a number of statesmen and ABSP members The treacherous acts of Nadhim Gzar and his clique were not directed against their victims but against the leadership of the ruling authority, in a prelude to launching an onslaught on the national regime, liquidating the peoples accomplishments and interrupting their progress.
5. 'The Iraqi Communist Party confirms its solidarity with the ABSP to paralyse the treacherous hands which encroach on the countrys sovereignty and the peoples gains'. This message from the communists seems to indicate that more people have died than has yet been announced.
6. A message of condolence to President Bakr from Dr Elias Farah of the ABSP National Leadership points out that 'the intrigues which enfeeble the cohesion of the Arab revolutionary



movement hamper its progress in confronting the imperialist/Zionist and reactionary enemy'. Indeed this enemy finds these 'subversive intrigues' a "proper inlet for their own conspiracies against the revolution in Iraq". 'May this calamity', he concludes 'serve as a lesson to us - and turn our condemnation into more resolute emancipation towards attainment of our objectives of unity, liberty and socialism'.

7. The anxiety for the immediate future may be indicated obliquely in the published extracts of Saddam Hussein's talk to printing workers (perhaps as politically sensitive a group here as at home!). He said 'I have come here to talk to you despite my preoccupations; your letters and reports receive a harkening ear from us. Every Citizen may contact the party or the state explaining any passive aspect or shortcoming in the conduct of certain people be they officials or partisans.' (Hussein's visit to the Hurriyah Printing House followed 'a report sent by a citizen'.)

8. 'We are responsible' he went on 'for the protection of peoples security, property and interests'. 'We are not here to make statements of the partys objectives, these are well known. However there are certain misgivings and fallacies for which the party is not responsible'.

yes. | 9. Despite suggestions in the British press to the contrary, there has been no attempt here so far to pin this internal conspiracy on Iran or other foreign powers. The reference in the RCC statement to a flight towards the Iranian border left the way open for such an accusation but none has been forthcoming. Since there can be no lack of speech writers and flimsy evidence one must assume that there has been a positive decision against the implication of Iran or 'imperialist/Zionist' forces at this stage. But it is early days and we have yet to hear the findings of the investigating committee working on Nadhim Kazzar.

Yours ever
Ian.

I McCluney

Enc

The Central Committee of Iraqi Communist Party addressed the following cable of condolences to the National and Regional Leaderships of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Revolutionary Command Council on the martyrdom of Lt. Gen. Hammad Shehab, RCC Member and Minister of Defence:

"We received with sorrow the news of the martyrdom of Lt. Gen. Hammad Shehab, Minister of Defence, and a number of armed forces members.

"While we share you the sorrow, we express in the names of Iraqi communists and their mates our denunciation of the criminal acts committed by Nadhem Gzar clique which resulted in the loss of a number of statesmen and Arab Baath Socialist Party members.

"The recklessness of Nadhem Gzar clique and the consequences of its treacherous acts

were not the victims lead by the clique members but against the leadership of the ruling authority and the national parties and forces in the country, in prelude to launching an onslaught on the national regime liquidating the people's accomplishments and interrupting the people's progressive procession.

"The Iraqi Communist Party confirms, on this occasion, its solidarity with you to paralyse the treacherous hands which aim to encroach on the sovereignty of the country and trespass on the people's gains.

"We are confident that the consolidation of alliance between the progressive parties and forces in the country in a joint national front is the decisive retaliation to the conspiracies of our country's enemies and a firm confrontation to their vicious intrigues.

"Our joint destiny on the thoroughfare of alliance, democracy and national fraternity on the basis of March Manifesto, for the execution of self-rule for the Kurdish people within the framework of Iraq Republic and mobilisation of the people in a unified camp of struggle is bound to transform our country into a fortified invincible fortress. We share you the confidence that the revolutionary procession of our people will not stop. Kindly accept our cordial condolences, and to the families of the victims patience."

Cables of condolences to President Bakr

HEADS OF STATE & NATIONAL LEADERS GRIEVE MARTYRDOM OF HAMMAD SHEHAB

News of the treacherous conspiracy which resulted in the assassination of Martyr Lt. Gen. Hammad Shehab, RCC Member and Minister of Defence was responded to by Heads of state, national leaders and upstanding personalities from every part of the world.

The following cable of condolences, was addressed by Dr. Elias Farah, Member of the National Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party to Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and President of the Republic:

"The news of the martyrdom of Comrade Hammad Shehab

and the other comrades moved me deeply. Comrade Shehab was an example of gallant and noble man, and his martyrdom has constituted a big painful loss.

"I wish to express to you and the kindreds of the martyr and his comrades who passed away with him my profound feeling of sorrow for this big loss, and my deep condemnation of the calamitous misgivings inflicted on us under these critical circumstances confronting our Arab Nation.

"While Iraq's reputation is boosted as a centre of gravity for the aspirations of the Arab Nation and all forces of progress and struggle, the intrigues which enfeeble the cohesion of the Arab revolutionary movement and deviate it from the course of its grand objectives and sound democratic pathways, thus hampering its unity in confrontation of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary enemy should deserve condemnation and denunciation.

"The Imperialist, Zionist and reactionary conspiracies find these alien subversive intrigues a proper inter for their conspiracies against the revolution in Iraq with a view to disrupting the unity of its progressive national forces and fraternal nationalities, and undermine peace on its territory.

(Continued on page 1)

"May this calamity serve as a lesson to us, to turn Iraq into a fortress for the revolutionary, democratic struggle, and turn the condemnation into a more resolute emancipation towards the attainment of our objectives to unity, liberty and socialism."

Bag Obs

5 July 1973

5 July

Comrade Saddam Hussein Deputy Secretary General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council stressed that "our pioneering objective is to attain people's interests and safeguard the revolutionary objectives."

"We are responsible for the protection of people's security, property and interests," Comrade Hussein told workers and officials of Hurriyah House for Printing yesterday morning.

"We are not here to make statements of the party and its objectives, for they are no more a secret; they are the property of all the masses. However, there are certain misgivings and fallacies for which the Party is not responsible," Comrade Hussein added.

The RCC Vice-Chairman emphasised the keen interest of the Party and revolutionary leadership in the people's affairs and problems.

"I have come here to talk to you despite my preoccupations; your letters and reports receive a hearkening ear from us. Every citizen may contact on the telephone or send an application or report to any responsible in the party or state explaining any passive aspect or shortcoming in the conduct of certain people be they officials or partisans," Comrade Hussein said.

The RCC Vice-Chairman was accompanied by Comrade Mohammed al-Zubairy, Director of the Regional Leadership's Secretariat Bureau.

He was received by Sd. Saad Qassim Hammoudi Chairman of the Board of Administration of al-Jamaheer House for Press.

Comrade Hussein's visit to Hurriyah House for Printing followed a report sent by a

"We would not be making a revolution when we say that genuine revolutions are bound to face difficulties and crisis, even those emerging out of their own ranks, and created by people regarded among their own force; and they are also bound to face the conspiracies of the imperialists, reactionaries and all detachments of the counter-revolution.

"It is perfectly natural that any crisis, difficulty or conspiratorial attempt would give rise to a wave of anxiety among the champions of the revolution and its capable at the same time of overcoming difficulties and crisis, acquiring more experience and wisdom and forging ahead in their steady path.

"The events of last Saturday and Sunday have been a crisis forced upon the Party and revolution, and it was doubtless a painful one because the people responsible for it had been regarded as part of the Party and the revolution, and because it has destroyed the lives of dear comrades who had their role in the revolution.

"But the correct and sober assessment of matters is that such a crisis, notwithstanding its painful and bitter element, did not and shall not encroach upon the essence of the revolution and its march; and did not and shall not diminish its capability for carrying out its planned policy and strategic aims. It is also a certain fact that the leadership of the Party and the revolution is fully capable of facing this crisis with the utmost care and placing all matters in their correct places".

Al Thawra
4 July.

1344 5/7/73
The editorial of the daily AL-JUMHURIYAH was dedicated to a comment on the speech of Comrade Saddam Hussein in the al-Hurayyah Printing House. It wrote:

"The speech of Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, among the workers of al-Hurayyah Printing House yesterday morning, two important points have come out:

1— Full response and mutual confidence between the leadership of the Party and Revolution and the toiling masses,

2— The deep faith of the Party and its revolutionary regime in criticism and self-criticism, and in the importance of Party and popular control over the administrative organs and their chiefs, officials and workers".

Al-Jumhuriyah then went on to say: "The leaders of the Party and revolution have frequently stressed their concern for the citizens' requirements and demands and the publication of their opinions, proposals and programmes".

"The July 17 revolution belongs to all the masses", continued al-Jumhuriyah.

"The assurance of its rising march, realisation of its progressive nationalist objectives, and the protection of its revolutionary gains, are not the responsibility of the Arab Baath Socialist Party alone, but a task which should be shouldered by every honest and loyal citizen, regardless of his views and trends.

"The observation of errors, identification of negative aspects and rectification of crooked behaviour are an everyday necessity to which we should contribute with all means and possibilities, truthfully, objectively and honestly, and for the public interest.

"The speech of Saddam Hussein, despite its shortness, has reflected the adherence of the Party and revolution leadership to the genuine democratic concepts, and to the people's freedom in determining their fate and building their happy socialist future".

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

Brit. Interests Section
BAGHDAD

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO


Your reference

Our reference

Date

8 July 1973

*Enter
rsh 13/7*



Dear Graham

IRAQ - INTERNAL

1. It was announced on the afternoon of 7 July that the special court set up to try Nadhim Kzar and his clique had sentenced the first batch to death. Full text of the Iraq News Agency report is enclosed.

2. Apart from Nadhim Kzar, all the names on the list are little known and comparatively minor figures.

Yours ever

pas

La

I McCluney

Enc

Translation from the Press of 8 July 1973

The Special Court set up to try Nadhim Kzar and his clique ended the trial of the first batch of this clique and sentenced them to death.

The President of the Republic has endorsed the decision of the Special Court, and the death sentences were executed at noon yesterday.

Names of Persons Sentenced to Death.

1. Nadhim Kzar, former D.G. of Security
2. Lt. Saad Muhammad Ali Thabit
3. Security Lt. Hamad Shihab Ahmad al Ubaidi
4. Security Inspector Muhammad Husain Abdul Amir al Juburi
5. " " Nisan Abdul Aziz Muhammad
6. " " Hashim Suwaidan Baidan
7. " " Abdul Muttalib Hadi Mahdi
8. " " Abdul Khaliq Ahmad Ramadhan
9. " " Luay Abbas Redha
10. " " Muayyad Ibrahim Hatan
11. Sergeant-Major (Commando) Abid Hashush Husain
12. " " " Suri Zamil Dhamad
13. " " (Intelligence) Zuhair Hasan Husain
14. Sergeant (Intelligence) Salah Husain Hasan
15. " " Mahmud Khalaf Muhammad
16. Corporal Mumtaz Abdul Husain Jari Saleh
17. Mumtaz Abdul Karim Shanati
18. Husham Jalal Ismail
19. Sabih Abid Ali
20. Abdul Baqi Ghaffur Karim al Zahawi
21. Majid Arif Majid
22. Hikmat Ibrahim Muhammad
23. Khalid Husain al Samarraie

1. The sentences were passed under Article 190 read with Article 156 of the Penal Code.

2. The Court ordered the confiscation of a sum of I.D. 47,785/750 found with the criminals, the amount to be credited to the account of the Treasury.

TOP COPY

30

IMMEDIATE

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CYPHER/CAT A

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RESTRICTED.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 193 OF 9 JULY, 1973.

22-23 YOUR TELS NOS 276 AND 277: SAADOUN GHAIIDAN

1. WE ARE SEEKING URGENTLY HOME OFFICE APPROVAL FOR THE PROPOSED VISIT AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPLY YOU WITH A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY ON 10 JULY.

2. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR RECEIVING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FULL DETAILS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ACCOMPANYING PARTY IF APPROVAL FOR THE VISIT IS GIVEN.

3. IF YOU JUDGE THAT YOU CAN OBTAIN THESE MEANWHILE WITHOUT IN ANY WAY IMPLYING THAT APPROVAL FOR GHAIIDAN'S VISIT IS LIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING, PLEASE DO SO.

DOUGLAS-HOME

pas

FILES

M.E.D.

M.V.D.

SECURITY DEPT:

P.U.S.D.

DEFENCE DEPT:

MR PARSONS

MR LE QUESNE

MR COLES

SIR G ARTHUR

MR ROSE

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TOP COPY

GPS 20

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 091350Z

(NB)

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE ANKARA TELNO 736 OF 9 JULY ¹⁹⁷³ INFO TEHERAN

YOUR TELNO 861: IRAQ

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 : WE AGREE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

MED

SED

PUSD

RES D (SE)

MR PARSONS

MR WIGGIN

MR CARTER

1881319
ja

Mr Parsons
Mr Goodenough

12/9
16/10



VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR
PROBLEM

1. The Iraqi Minister of the Interior has sent a message to the Home Secretary saying that he would like to visit London privately for medical treatment and asking if HMG will arrange for his protection and safety while he is here.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

2. The Iraqi Minister of the Interior, General Saadoun Ghaidan, has sent a message via the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying that he would like to visit London for medical treatment following the injuries which he sustained during the incidents of 30 June during which the Iraqi Minister of Defence was assassinated (see my note prepared for Cabinet). In conveying this request (Baghdad tel no 276), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have said that the Minister of the Interior would be prepared to take our advice on the best hospital to use from a security point of view and have also said that he would like to bring two or three aides with him.

3. We have consulted the Security Service and the Home Office who are opposed to meeting this request on the following grounds:

1. The Security Service argue that the Minister of Interior's connections with the terrorist branch of the Baath Party, the Public Relations Bureau (PRB) make it undesirable that he should come to this

/country.

country. Visas for known PRB members are normally refused on application.

2. The Home Office (at my level) believe that there might be criticism in Parliament and elsewhere if it were known that we had allowed the Iraqi Minister of Interior to come to London and had given him protection.
3. The Home Office believe that their police branch (whom they have not yet been able to consult fully) will be concerned about the risk of a possible assassination attempt on the Iraqi Minister of Interior and the difficulties of providing him with adequate protection. The Home Office therefore propose to put forward an adverse recommendation to their Ministers.
4. I have explained to the Home Office that our view at official level is that we should respond as positively as possible to this approach from General Ghaidan. Given the absence of diplomatic relations and any political contact between the Iraqis and ourselves, I have argued that it is important not to miss opportunities of showing the Iraqis that we do not wish this absence to continue indefinitely. A positive response to a request of this sort provides us with such an opportunity without in any way putting us in the position of demandeurs or of compromising our firm view that it is for the Iraqis to make the first move in any proposal to resume relations.
5. On the particular points referred to in paragraph 3, I have argued as follows:

/1.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. We fully support the policy which has been followed for the past year of refusing visa applications to members of the PRB. When this policy was agreed, however, specific exclusion was made for Ministers, and I have drawn this to the attention of the Home Office.
2. I very much doubt whether there would be any criticism in Parliament or elsewhere at our action in agreeing to General Ghaidan's entry into the UK. It is surely a well-established principle of British democracy that we allow foreigners to come here for medical treatment and for private purposes whatever their political complexion. Since the break in diplomatic relations, several Iraqi Ministers have visited this country privately. I have also pointed out to the Home Office that General Ghaidan was a victim rather than a perpetrator of the recent "coup", and on one possible interpretation (see also paper at Flag A) the victim of an attempt by the extremist wing of the Baath Party against the Military.
3. I accept that there might be a risk of an assassination attempt against General Ghaidan while he is here, but I would judge this to be very slight (even though he is presumably himself aware of the risk in making his request). If the Home Office are not able to afford protection, I would hope that at least we could respond positively by suggesting the names of some private security organisation.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATION

6. I recommend that we should encourage the Home Office to respond as positively as possible to this request, and I attach a draft letter for Lady Tweedsmuir to send to Mr David Lane. MVD and PUSD concur.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

9 July 1973

De Gaulle.
cc: Mr Mallett (MVD)
PUSD

I agree : we should not pass up a chance of a high-level contact with the Iraqis. Additionally, Mr Balfour Paul (our last Ambassador in Baghdad) tells me that Ghaidan ^{is} ~~was~~ helpful and by Iraqi standards moderate and relatively harmless - he had a lot to do with him between 1969 and 1971.


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10

7



TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVE

CONFIDENTIAL

(32)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

From The Minister of State

10 July 1973

Dear David,

15/7/73
JBB

IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

(22) - I believe that you may have had submitted to you a request which we have received through our Interests Section in Baghdad for the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, General Saadoun Ghaidan, to be allowed to visit this country privately for medical treatment and to be given protection while he is here. For ease of reference, I enclose a copy of Baghdad telegram No. 276.

I understand that your officials have expressed some doubts about this proposal and I wanted therefore to let you know our views as quickly as possible.

We have, as you know, had no diplomatic relations with Iraq since they broke off relations at the end of 1971. Our view remains firmly that it is for the Iraqis to make any approach for a resumption of relations and there has been no sign so far that they are anxious for this. Nevertheless, I think it important that we should not go out of our way to reject contacts when these become possible, and it is partly for this reason that I would hope that you would be able to respond positively to this approach from the Minister of the Interior.

By way of background, I should explain that the Minister of the Interior was wounded as a result of an incident on 30 June in the course of which the Iraqi Minister of Defence was assassinated. The reasons behind the incident are still obscure, but

Mr. David Lane MP
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

/it is
(42) refers



it is at least possible that it represented an attempt by the extremist wing of the ruling Baath Party in Iraq against the supporters of the President, including the Minister of the Interior.

I understand that there is a reluctance on the part of the Security Service to agree to a visa being issued to someone who must be presumed to have close connections with the Public Relations Bureau which, as you know, is the terrorist arm of the Baath Party and whose officials have regularly been refused visas to this country. We have, however, agreed in the past that this refusal should not automatically apply to Ministers, and I believe that there are good grounds for making this exception in this case, as we have done on several occasions within the past two years.

It might also be argued that there would be some criticism in Parliament or elsewhere if we were to grant entry and protection to General Ghaidan. Since his rôle in the recent incidents was in fact one of victim rather than perpetrator I doubt whether this is a valid criticism if indeed his presence here (among the many hundreds of Arab visitors seeking medical treatment in the summer) were even noticed.

I accept that the request for protection may raise genuine difficulties at a time when the resources of the police and Special Branch are severely stretched. I hope nevertheless that we will be able to give this request urgent and sympathetic consideration. I personally believe that political considerations argue in favour of a positive response.

I should add, by way of a postscript, that we fully accept that we shall have to consider very carefully the visa applications of his aides in the light of our records and in accordance with normal visa regulations.

Yours ever,
P. Smith.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Goodenough
Private Secretary


Lady Tweedsmuir agrees.

AM Goodenough 10/7.

*13/7
JA*

IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR

1. Since Lady Tweedsmuir wrote her letter at Flag A below to the Minister of State in the Home Office this morning, I have heard that the Home Office, at official level, are still recommending against the admission of General Saadoun Ghaidan.
2. I understand that Mr Lane is likely to submit this question personally to the Home Secretary and I therefore recommend that a letter, on the lines of the attached draft should go from the Secretary of State to the Home Secretary in support of the case outlined in Lady Tweedsmuir's letter. My submission of 9 July is at Flag B.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

10 July 1973

cc: Mr Goulding
Mr Parsons
MVD
PUSD

Draft to issue


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FM BAGHDAD 100803Z JULY
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NR1/2



TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 282 OF 10 JULY. 1973.

30- YRTEL 193: SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT DETAILS OF THE PARTY MIGHT WITH ADVANTAGE BE PREPARED IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DECISION, BUT SINCE THAT DECISION CAN HARDLY DEPEND ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO INSIST ON HAVING THE DETAILS TODAY.

2.

HOWEVER IF THE HOME OFFICE AGREE THE VISIT, WE WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO GRANT VISAS TO THE PARTY SO THAT GHAI DAN CAN TRAVEL QUICKLY.

3.

ONE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE SECURE ROUTE ON WHICH GHAI DAN AND WIFE AND PERHAPS PROTOCOL OFFICER COULD TRAVEL AND SAY THE REST OF THE PARTY CAN FOLLOW WHEN VISAS ARE GRANTED.

DEFENCE ATTACHE SUGGESTS IRAQ AIR FORCE TO CYPRUS AND THENCE BY RAF.

WE WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS SAFETY FROM CYPRUS.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
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M & VD
SECURITY D
PUSD
DEFENCE D
MR PARSONS
MR LE QUESNE
MR COLE

13/9
1/9

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

11 July, 1973

Handwritten signature/initials

Iraqi Minister of Interior

Priscilla Tweedsmuir wrote to David Lane on 10 July asking that urgent and sympathetic consideration should be given to the message which the Iraqi Minister of Interior has sent to you requesting admission to this country for medical treatment and protection while he is here.

I understand that this question is still causing some difficulties for you in spite of the arguments in Priscilla Tweedsmuir's letter, and I therefore wanted to let you know that I think it important, in the light of our current lack of contact with Iraq, to avoid rejecting this approach out of hand.

I realise that the request poses some very real problems for you, but I think that this is one of those cases where it is in our interest to produce a swift and sympathetic response.

(ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME)

The Rt. Hon. Robert Carr, MP.

reply at 42

CONFIDENTIAL

EN CLAIR
GR 150

FM BEIRUT 110945Z

UNCLASSIFIED

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 552 OF 11 JULY, ⁷³ REPEATED FOR INFO TO
D14, JISNE AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV,
BAGHDAD: AND SAVING TO DAMASCUS.

IRAQ:

1. THE RIGHT-WING DAILY 'AL-HAYAT' REPORTED ON 11 JULY
THAT THE IRAQI ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE IN BEIRUT,
CAPTAIN MOHAMMED KAZEM MUSAWI, HAD APPLIED TO AN UNNAMED
ARAB COUNTRY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM.
2. MUSAWI IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT 'THE REVOLT ON 30 JUNE
WAS A POWERFUL EXPRESSION OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE'S WILL TO CRUSH
THE BAATHIST-TAKRITI DICTATORSHIP', AND THAT THE REVOLT WAS
NOT PLANNED BY FOREIGNERS.
3. ALSO ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, A STATEMENT WAS ISSUED
IN BEIRUT 9, 10 JULY BY SUPPORTERS OF THE ABORTIVE COUP,
SAYING THAT IF ABDUL KHLIK SAMARRAI'S LIFE WAS ENDANGERED
THEY WOULD MAKE PUBLIC THE 'POLITICAL CRIMES' COMMITTED
BY THE BAATH SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN IRAQ.

DEFCONCEN PASS D14, JISNE
FCO PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS.

WRIGHT.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FILES

NENAD

MED

PUSD

DEFENCE D

GIPD

IRD

NEWS D

PS

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

SIR G ARTHUR

MR ROSE

MOD INTERNAL

Not so good ~~WAD~~

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

(31)



CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP

11th July 1973

N. B. Smith

N.E.D.

Subs to A.P. 12/7
in light
12/7

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
12 JUL 1973
Anthony

IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

You telephoned this evening reinforcing the request by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in his letter of 11th July for an urgent reply to Lady Tweedsmuir's letter of 10th July. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also spoke to the Home Secretary this afternoon.

The Home Secretary has asked me to let you know that the request raises a number of points which he had not had an opportunity to consider fully this evening. He hopes to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have a reply tomorrow.

Yours sincerely,
S. G. Norris

S. G. NORRIS

A. A. Acland, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE
GR 38

TOP COPY

38

ENCL AIR
FM BAGHDAD 110635Z JULY
UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 283 OF 11 JULY, 1973

34 MYTEL NO 282 OF 10 JULY.
SAADOUN GHAI DAN HAS ASKED TO SEE ME AND I HAVE
SUGGESTED THAT THE APPOINTMENT IS TOWARDS THE
END OF THE MORNING E.G. 1000 GMT.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 12 JUL 1973
NR 1/2

MCCLUNEY

FILES
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M & V D
SECURITY D
PUSD
DEFENCE D
MR PARSONS
MR LE QUESNE
MR COLE

13/9
pa

A R Williams Esq
Chancery
Budapest

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 16 JUL 1973 NBR 1/2
--

11 July 1973

*JB 13/7
put with Mr Williams
letter 2 rec'd*

Thank you for sending me the copy of your letter 3/5 of 26 June 1973 to EESD.

2. Khaliq as Sammara'ie was sentenced to death on 8 July by a special court set up to try those involved in the recent conspiracy of the "Nadhim Kazar clique". His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Bakr.

3. The 'waterways of the Arab region' about which the Iraqis are constantly expressing their concern are

- a. the Shatt-al-Arab, where they are in dispute with the Persians
- b. the Gulf, where they feel Iran and the Gulf States are exercising influence to the detriment of Iraqs interests. e.g. Iran took over the Thumbs and Abu Musa in 1971
- c. the Red Sea, where there have been accusations of Israeli/Ethopian co-operation to control the Bal al Manqab through strategic lighthouses and islands (they seem to forget that the Russians are in Aden).

I McCluney


*JB 13/9
pr*

cc J B Noss Esq
East European and Soviet Dept
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

(40)

GRS 135
IMMEDIATE



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CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 120745Z JULY
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 120900Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TEL NO 284 OF 12 JULY. 1973.

IRAQ INTERNAL: SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

GHAI DAN'S REQUEST TO SEE ME YESTERDAY DID NOT RESULT IN AN APPOINTMENT (AND MAY HAVE BEEN A PLOY TO GET A QUICK REPLY FROM YOU).

HOWEVER, SHIEKHLI EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SURPRISE AND ANXIETY THIS MORNING WHEN I SAID I STILL HAD NO REPLY FOR THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

4 DAYS IS A LONG TIME, AND WITH 4 DAYS HOLIDAY BEGINNING TOMORROW I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF GHAI DAN'S VISIT TODAY - THIS AFTERNOON IF NECESSARY.

2.

PROTOCOL TELL ME THEY HAVE PREPARED DETAILS OF THE ACCOMPANYING PARTY.

3.

PRESS :

GAVIN YOUNG (OBSERVER) AND CORRESPONDENTS OF 'LE MONDE' AND 'NEW YORK TIMES' WERE TO HAVE AN INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN YESTERDAY EVENING, AS A GROUP.

MCCLUNEY

Handwritten: 13/9
Signature: [illegible]

FILES
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DEFENCE D
NEWS D
MR PARSONS
MR LE QUESNE
MR COLES
SIR G ARTHUR
MR ROSE


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GRS 85
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ENCLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 120845Z JULY.

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 285 OF 12TH JULY 1973.
INFO ROUTINE VISFO



40 MY TEL 284 SAADOUN GHADAN

FOLLOWING IS PARTY WISHING TO ACCOMPANY MINISTER:

- (1) HIS WIFE.
- (2) DR. (BRIG) SALEM KHAFFAF
- (3) SECURITY LIEUT ABDUL RAZAK QARAGHULI
(MINISTERS BROTHER-IN-LAW- HE HAS TWO I BELIEVE,
THE OTHER BEING COL QARAGHULI, LEGAL ADVISOR
IN THE MOD)
- (4) PRIVATE SEC. AND ADC, LIEUT FAWSI AL ANI.
- (5) SECURITY OFFICER QSAY AHMED FLAIYIH
(RELATED TO ADC)

2. MINISTERS WIFE TRAVELLED TO UK LAST YEAR WITH
HER SON AND ANOTHER DOCTOR.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED
M & VD
SECURITY D
PUSD
DEFENCE D

NEWS D
MR PARSONS
MR LE QUESNE
MR ROSE
SIR G ARTHUR

28/13/73
pa

SECRET



WHITEHALL, LONDON S.W.1

12th July 1973

(1) Right-side (government)
(2) 1st contact - cyborgs - contact with us -
(3) Shall justify - Father of my up to log - relative to access to our
(4) How say No?
(5) When policy laid down as for a Public Relations Bureau.
J.B. 11/7
ja

Dear Alec

Lt. Gen. Saadoun Ghaidan

(35)-
(32)-

Thank you for your letter of 11th July. The papers have now come before me and I am bound to say that, having taken full account of the points made in it and by Priscilla Tweedsmuir in her letter of 10th July to David Lane, I feel that I really cannot agree to the grant of visas to Ghaidan and his aides. I do recognise the advantages that you see emerging from our acceding to the request, but I do not believe we could defend ourselves - and it would make nonsense of our counter-terrorist precautions - if we admitted a man so closely associated with the Public Relations Bureau and the previous assassination attempts in London against General Al Naif.

/// We could not in my view make an exception, as Priscilla Tweedsmuir suggests, on the ground that he is a Minister and not merely an official. Indeed this seems to me to make the case for excluding him stronger. Even leaving aside the question of security, Parliamentary and public consternation would be great particularly when Ghaidan's part in the purge that followed the coup in Iraq earlier in the month is borne in mind.

The problems entailed in Ghaidan's protection are really secondary. They are, however, very substantial in view of his political background and I am advised that 24-hour cover would be involved, which would place a real strain on the Special Branch particularly with their other commitments. This would have to be borne if there were grounds for admitting Ghaidan, but I believe there are not. Although, as I say, this is a secondary consideration, the Ambassador might want to use it with Ghaidan as a reason for not acceding to his request.

I am sorry I cannot be more helpful, but as I said I really feel I could not defend this man's admission.

J
P. Heu

SECRET



SECRET

Now over taken

12.6.73

pe - pa

WHITEHALL, LONDON S.W.1

12th July 1973

- (1) Right-side
- (2) 1st contact - cylogi - with an -
- (3) Shall join - under of cylogi - relative to accession on the next 10 yrs
- (4) How say No?
- (5) When being laid down as for a Public Relations Bureau
- (6) No more action (Security)

Dear Alec

Lt. Gen. Saadoun Ghaidan

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 25 16 JUL 1973 NR 1/2

Thank you for your letter of 11th July. The papers have now come before me and I am bound to say that, having taken full account of the points made in it and by Priscilla Tweedsmuir in her letter of 10th July to David Lane, I feel that I really cannot agree to the grant of visas to Ghaidan and his aides. I do recognise the advantages that you see emerging from our acceding to the request, but I do not believe we could defend ourselves - and it would make nonsense of our counter-terrorist precautions - if we admitted a man so closely associated with the Public Relations Bureau and the previous assassination attempts in London against General Al Naif.

We could not in my view make an exception, as Priscilla Tweedsmuir suggests, on the ground that he is a Minister and not merely an official. Indeed this seems to me to make the case for excluding him stronger. Even leaving aside the question of security, Parliamentary and public consternation would be great particularly when Ghaidan's part in the purge that followed the coup in Iraq earlier in the month is borne in mind.

The problems entailed in Ghaidan's protection are really secondary. They are, however, very substantial in view of his political background and I am advised that 24-hour cover would be involved, which would place a real strain on the Special Branch particularly with their other commitments. This would have to be borne if there were grounds for admitting Ghaidan, but I believe there are not. Although, as I say, this is a secondary consideration, the Ambassador might want to use it with Ghaidan as a reason for not acceding to his request.

I am sorry I cannot be more helpful, but as I said I really feel I could not defend this man's admission.

J
P. H.

SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.

42a

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 JUL 1973 NBR 1/2

Your reference

Our reference

Date

12 July 1973

See Copy on NKR 3/3

Mr Smith
Mr Hunt
Mr Wright
Enter

Dear Graham

SADDAM HUSSEIN

Three pressmen, Gavin Young (Observer), Eric Reuleau (Le Monde) and Juan de Leis (New York Times), spent four hours with Saddam Hussein yesterday evening (11 July). Saddam Hussein was calm, authoritative and un-pompous. He is an intense man, without great deal of humour - confident and unruffled. Khalis Azme (Ministry of Information) made the final arrangements for their call. (Azme known to us through his part in registering the British Council under the new cultural law)

Quote from Gavin Young no doubt

2. Mr Young was kind enough to give me this afternoon some points from their interview, which he and his colleagues intend to publish in the next few days. Each story will presumably be angled towards Iraq's relations with each journalist's country. Saddam also asked the correspondents for their views and comments on Iraq. I gather these were given on a "no holds barred" basis.

3. FOREIGN POLICY

Saddam said that Iraq's foreign policy was based on two central principles:

- a) Trade and diplomatic relations with regions of the world of differing (political) natures.
- b) Mutual respect of each country for the other. He had found US policy, and to a lesser extent British, hostile.

But he would never close the doors in the face of any positive development which occurs in these policies and concerning which relations might change for the better. If there is any positive change, he said, we will be the first to proclaim it loudly and positively to our own people. There are great new developments in the world today. There is no winning party and no losing party (in bilateral relations). Relations are between two gainers, like a buyer and a seller. There is room for a re-study (of Anglo-Iraqi relations). But Iraqis intend to be masters in their own country without outside interference, from wherever it may come (implying USSR, apparently) Iraq would build itself in a completely independent manner, and remain neutral in international conflict.

4. IRAN

Naturally, Iraq was concerned with any abnormal surplus armaments beyond the boundaries of what was needed for self-defence. Such surpluses gave rise to worries about the purposes of such armament. Following the occupation of the three islands in the Gulf, and the unilateral abrogation of the treaty of 1937 (Shatt el Arab) there was little doubt that Iranian intentions

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date

intentions were aggressive. Iran should withdraw from the islands, or come to some agreement with the Emirates about sovereignty.

5. INTERNAL

I did not discuss with Young the new boring details of the recent plot, though he told me Saddam had explained and expanded the published story, and was convinced of Khaliq as-Sammara'ie's complicity. More importantly he talked of future plans.

The watchword is 'democratisation' - with the aim of achieving a 'healthy concensus' in government. The National Action Charter is to be brought into being. There will be a Council of Ministers meeting regularly under President Bakr, which will issue decrees in its own name. But there will be no power sharing in the RCC (all Baathis) or the Army. Nevertheless participation will come about in every other aspect of life in Iraq. A parliament will be set up in which all political movements will be represented.

6. Towards this goal, the Baath have reached agreement with the Communist Party in Iraq on the National Action Charter. Details will be announced shortly, about 17 July.

Negotiations with the Kurds on this and other matters are at an advanced stage. The Kurds will achieve self government in March 1974, and amendments to the existing agreement will be allowed provided they are related to Kurdish matters and do not affect the wider progress of Iraq.

7. BRITAIN

In addition to paragraph 3 above, Saddam said, in answer to Mr Young's questions, that he did not think Britain was supporting the Kurds through Iran; and he was amused when Young mentioned the soup rumour that the British were guiding the Baath. "Would they (the party) be doing what they are doing today?" he quipped. Tackled about Shadhil Taqa's (MFA Under Secretary) assertion to Young three weeks ago that Sir Alec Douglas-Home's presence in Teheran was a hostile act, he said that minor officials tend to exaggerate.

A relationship with Britain more akin to that which existed with France would be welcome.

Yours ever
Ian.
I McCluney

cc

**Chancery
Tehran**

**Chancery
Kuwait**

**Chancery
Beirut**

**Chancery
Damascus**

**Chancery
Amman**



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IMMEDIATE

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DESKBY 1700Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 286 OF 12 JULY 73

SADDAM HUSSEIN.

GAVIN YOUNG (OBSERVER) AND TWO OTHER CORRESPONDENTS
SAW SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR 4 HOURS YESTERDAY.

YOUNG TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HIM ABOUT RELATIONS
WITH BRITAIN AND IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY.
YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN A FEW OF THE POINTS.

2.

HUSSEIN SAID IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS BASED ON TRADE AND
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH WORLD REGIONS OF
DIFFERENT (POLITICAL) NATURES, AND THE MUTUAL RESPECT OF
EACH COUNTRY FOR THE OTHER.

HE FOUND US POLICY, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT BRITISH, HOSTILE.
BUT HE WOULD NEVER CLOSE THE DOOR IN THE FACE OF ANY
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT THAT OCCURRED IN THE POLICY
OF THESE COUNTRIES AND CONCERNING WHICH RELATIONS MIGHT
CHANGE FOR THE BETTER.

'IF THERE IS ANY POSITIVE CHANGE WE WILL BE THE
FIRST TO COMMUNICATE IT LOUDLY AND POSITIVELY TO
OUR PEOPLE'.

3.

THERE ARE GREAT NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
THERE IS NO WINNING PARTY AND NO LOSER.

RATHER RELATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN TWO GAINERS E.G.
THE SELLER AND THE BUYER.

IRAQ IS BUILDING ITSELF IN AN INDEPENDENT MANNER, AND HAS A
NEUTRAL POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.

THERE IS ROOM, HE SAID, FOR A RE-STUDY OF ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

4.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE BAD PRESS GIVEN
HERE TO SIR ALEC'S PRESENCE IN TEHERAN HE SAID
'MINOR OFFICIALS TEND TO EXAGGERATE'.

HE DENIED THAT BRITAIN WAS THOUGHT TO BE SUPPORTING THE KURDS THROUGH TEHERAN, AND LAUGHED AT THE SUGGESTION THAT BRITAIN WAS THOUGHT TO GUIDE THE BAATH.

"WOULD WE BE DOING THE THINGS WE ARE DOING" HE SAID.

5.

AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID IRAQIS INTENDED TO BE MASTERS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY (THOUGH THIS WAY HAVE APPLIED MORE TO THE RUSSIANS THAN OURSELVES) AND COMMENTED UNFAVOURABLY ON THE MILITARY BUILD UP IN IRAN.

6.

YOUNG INTENDS TO PUBLISH MUCH OF THIS ON SUNDAY.

LE MONDE AND NEW YORK TIMES WILL ALSO CARRY QUICKLY THOSE PARTS OF THE INTERVIEW RELEVANT TO FRANCE AND USA.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

N AM D

NENAD

NEWS. D

PS

MR LE QUESNE

MR FARSONS

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CYPHER CAT A GPS 40
FM BAGHDAD 121500Z JULY

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DESKBY 1700Z

TOP COPY
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
13 JUL 1973
NYBR1/2

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 287 OF 12 JULY 73

SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

IS THERE ANY INDICATION WHEN I SHALL BE ABLE
TO GIVE A REPLY TO THE MINISTER ABOUT HIS PROPOSED
VISIT.

WE CAN USE AN ANSWER TODAY UP TILL 1900Z.

ssh 13/9

MCCLUNEY

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M & V D
MR PARSONS
MR LE QUESNE

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 196 OF 12 JULY. 1973.

FOLLOWING FOR MCCLUNY FROM WRIGHT.

22 YOUR TEL NO 276: GHAI DAN.

I AM SORRY THAT WE CAN STILL NOT LET YOU HAVE A REPLY.
AS YOU WILL HAVE REALISED, REQUEST IS CAUSING GREAT DIFFICULTY
HERE. WE HOPE TO SEND A FINAL REPLY ON 13 JULY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F I L E S

MED

POD

SECURITY D

PUSD

DEFENCE D

MR PARSONS

• MR LE QUESNE

MR COLE

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NR R1/2
SECRET

S. of S.

Lt. Gen. Saadoun Ghaidan

The Home Secretary
approved this
submission and
the attached Ref.
has gone.

13/9
13/9

46
47
13/7

I understand that the arrangement reached between you and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary last night was that we should try to admit Ghaidan and his wife, but not the large entourage of aides that he proposed to bring; and that when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary later mentioned the affair to the Prime Minister the latter was disposed to accept this view. All this was to be subject to our re-assessing the situation this morning. This we have now done. We have had a meeting with representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Security Service, the Metropolitan ^{Police} Special Branch as well as of our own Immigration and Police Departments.

Our principal objection to admitting Ghaidan was his involvement in the earlier assassination attempts in London by the "Public Relations Bureau" (PRB) (the terrorist arm of the Baath Party). The original assessment by the Security Service of the situation was much affected by the information that Ghaidan was bringing with him a number of aides. They suspected that these men might be agents of the PRB, a fact which when combined with Ghaidan's own record put a complexion on the proposed visit that caused them to recommend against it. Information is now available, however, which shows that the aides whom Ghaidan proposes to bring are not known to us to be agents of the PRB; they are indeed all "clean" persons. In the view of the Security Service this puts a different complexion on the affair and renders it very much more ^{un}likely that the visit is a cover for any kind of operations in the United Kingdom. There remains Ghaidan's record. The man to whom the PRB reports in the hierarchy is the Vice President, not Ghaidan as Minister of the Interior, but Ghaidan has in the past worked pretty closely with the Vice President in these matters. While Ghaidan himself has not been closely and directly involved in the organisation of terrorism, he must be presumed, as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, to have as one might say, some Ministerial responsibility for it.

SECRET

SECRET

Ghaidan is not a person who has been personally and directly linked in the mind of the public here with the assassination attempt; the only public references to him have been as a victim of the attempted recent coup.


Bearing all these facts in mind, together with the weight that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary puts on the political danger of rebuffing this approach, our advice is that although some risk must still be said to be involved, this risk is acceptable when set against the wider considerations that concern the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. We therefore advise that Ghaidan and his wife should be admitted.

As I said, the aides whom he proposes to bring are not disreputable persons. Indeed the character of the aides puts a new complexion on the whole matter. It might be a pity to stick on the question of aides if we are prepared to admit Ghaidan himself and his wife. Moreover, there is some advantage from the protection point of view in having people available to identify strangers and so forth. We would, therefore, recommend allowing the named aides to come with Ghaidan.

Lastly, there is the question of protection. King Hussain's departure on Sunday will relieve the strain on the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, but they will be under very heavy pressure during the visit of the Prime Minister of Portugal next week. The assessment is that Ghaidan will certainly be in some danger and this will necessitate 24 hour coverage of him. The Special Branch accept with reluctance that if Ghaidan is to be admitted this additional burden will have to be borne. But the protection will have to be limited to Ghaidan himself, and our post in Baghdad will have to tell Ghaidan that this is so (in fact he asked only for his own protection).

If you are prepared now to agree to the necessary visas being granted to Ghaidan and his party, we will inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and No.10 and the necessary action will follow.

SECRET



The Val. has been despatched

SECRET

cc. Mr. Lyon
Mr. Belfall
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. McDowall
Mr. McQueen

(W 46)

A. H. Paul 13/7

A. S. 13/7

A. H. 13/7

Mr. Wright

S. of S.

Lt. Gen. Saadoun Ghaidan

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SECRET

SECRET

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If you are prepared now to agree to the necessary visas being granted to Ghaidan and his party, we will inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and No.10 and the necessary action will follow.

SECRET

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TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 197 OF 13 JULY. 1973

(44) — YOUR TELNO 287: SAADOUN GHAIIDAN

1. MINISTERS HAVE CONSIDERED GENERAL GHAIIDAN'S REQUEST VERY CAREFULLY AND HAVE AGREED THAT HE SHOULD COME TO THE UK AS REQUESTED AND THAT PROTECTION SHOULD BE ACCORDED HIM FROM THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL HERE.

2. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THIS DECISION TO HIM IN WHATEVER WAY YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD, IF NECESSARY EXPLAIN THAT PROTECTION WILL BE GRANTED TO HIM ONLY (AS REQUESTED IN HIS MESSAGE TO THE HOME SECRETARY) AND NOT TO HIS WIFE OR OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, IN VIEW OF THE PROTECTION TO BE PROVIDED, NO WEAPONS MAY BE BROUGHT IN TO THE UK BY HIMSELF OR BY ANY OF HIS PARTY.

(41) — 3. YOU MAY ACCORDINGLY ISSUE VISAS TO GENERAL GHAIIDAN AND TO THE PARTY NAMED IN YOUR TELNO 285. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR DETAILS OF WHEN THEY ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AND IF POSSIBLE OF THE LIKELY DURATION OF THEIR STAY.

/4. YOU SHOULD

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4. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE CHOICE OF HOSPITALS MUST BE FOR THE MINISTER HIMSELF TO DECIDE, BUT THAT A CONVENIENT ONE FROM A PROTECTION POINT OF VIEW IS THE NUFFIELD HOSPITAL, 10 BRYANSTON SQUARE, LONDON W1 (01 723 1288). WE HAVE MADE NO, REPEAT NO, CONTACT WITH THE HOSPITAL OURSELVES.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

M E D

M V D

P U S D

SECURITY DEPT

DEFENCE DEPT

NEWS DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS/MR AMERY

PS/LORD BALNIEL

MR LE QUESNE

MR PARSONS

MR ROSE

-2-

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WITH
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE
PRIVATE SECRETARY

HOME OFFICE, WHITEHALL
S.W.1.

*(As agreed to by
Home Secretary)*

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PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

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FM BAGHDAD 150630Z JULY

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13/19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
16 JUL 1973
NSR 1/2

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 288 OF 15 JULY. 1973
SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

(47) YRTEL 197 OF 13 JULY.

DONOVAN AND I CALLED ON SHIEKHLI 14 JULY AND I TOLD HIM THAT THE HOME SECRETARY HAD RECEIVED GEN. GHAI DAN'S MESSAGE AND HAD AGREED TO HIS PERSONAL REQUEST TO VISIT LONDON PRIVATELY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

IT WAS HOPED THAT THE TREATMENT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AND THAT THE MINISTER WOULD SOON RECOVER THE FULL USE OF HIS ARM.

2.

PROTECTION WOULD BE ACCORDED TO THE MINISTER FROM THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL.

THIS PROTECTION WAS PERSONAL AND DID NOT EXTEND TO MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY.

I MADE THE POINT ABOUT NUFFIELD HOSPITAL.

3.

ON WEAPONS, I EMPHASISED THAT, AS PROTECTION WAS OUR RESPONSIBILITY, NEITHER THE MINISTER NOR HIS PARTY SHOULD BRING WEAPONS WITH THEM; ANY ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THIS MIGHT JEAPODISE OUR AGREEMENT AND THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MINISTER'S PROTECTION.

4.

SHIEKHLI EXPRESSED HIS THANKS AND SAID THAT THIS HELPFUL REPLY WAS MUCH APPRECIATED. HE TOLD ME THAT GHAI DAN'S PARTY AND THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WOULD BE STAYING IN THE FORMER IRAQI RESIDENCE AND MILITARY ATTACHE'S HOUSE.

AS SOON AS ARRANGMENTS TO TRAVEL HAVE BEEN MADE HE WILL INFORM US.

RESTRICTED

/ HE WILL ALSO

RESTRICTED

HE WILL ALSO TELL US IF ANY INFORMATION IS TO BE
RELEASED TO THE PRESS.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

MVD

PUSD

SECURITY D

DEFENCE D

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR AMERY

PS LORD BALNIEL

MR LEQUESNE

MR PARSONS

MR ROSE

Received 5/7

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NLR 1/2
distributed to
all rel. depk.

(49)
(4515)

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER
OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANKARA, ON FRIDAY 1 JUNE 1973

lost 3/528/5

Present

The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP
HE Sir Horace Phillips
Mr C D Wiggin
Mr R A Fyjis-Walker
Mr M I Goulding

HE Mr Haluk Bayülken
HE Mr Ogüz Gökmen
HE Mr Oktay Cankardeş
HE Mr Celâl Akbay
Mr Gengiz Subükcebe

1. After recalling his previous cooperation with Mr Bayülken over Cyprus, Mr Amery said that Britain valued the opportunity of exchanging views with Turkey on world problems, especially the Soviet Union and the Middle East about which Turkey had long and exceptional experience. Like Turkey, Britain had lost a great empire. But now she had found a new role in the developing European Community. The EEC represented a market of 250 million people; they were only half as rich as the Americans but they bought twice as much from the outside world. We hoped and believed that Turkey would join us in the EEC when she judged the time right. Mr Bayülken interrupted to say that Turkey was determined to join the EEC as a full member. The EEC, Mr Amery continued, was in its present phase primarily concerned with trade and finance; but these could not in the long run be separated from foreign policy and defence. In facing these great issues, Britain wanted to keep in the closest touch with Turkey. He had therefore taken the liberty of inviting himself to visit Turkey. He brought messages of greetings from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who was looking forward to a private talk with Mr Bayülken in Tehran.

2. Mr Bayülken said that he had been delighted when he heard that Mr Amery was to visit Turkey. He only wished that he could spend more time there and hoped that he might return for a holiday in the summer. If the two Ministers could arrange for their holidays to coincide, Mr Bayülken would be very happy to show Mr Amery some of the south and west of the country where great / developments

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2.

developments were taking place.

3. He welcomed the opportunity of exchanging views. The world was at a "hectic juncture"; what preoccupied Turkey above all was her relationship with her allies in the West. She was as determined as Britain had been to become a full member of the EEC. That choice had been made in 1963. The Enlargement Protocol marked the beginning of the second stage of her association with the EEC. The negotiations had been strenuous and difficult but happily they were almost completed. Turkey was grateful to Britain for granting free entry to her manufactured goods. Because of Turkey's import of capital goods and because of the credits extended by Britain, the balance of trade was against her. The main item he wished to discuss with Mr Amery was how Turkey could participate in the EEC's deliberations about foreign policy and defence. Turkey might be economically backward but politically she was mature and she made a major contribution to the defence of Europe.

4. Mr Bayülken suggested that he and Mr Amery should also discuss the Middle East, especially Iran and Syria; the Sub-Continent, where the plight of Pakistan was of major concern to Turkey; the Soviet Union and the meaning of the recent changes there; and Cyprus.

5. Mr Amery agreed that the world scene was changing very rapidly and that the two Ministers should discuss the subjects Mr Bayülken had suggested. The problem was how is an associate member to make the transition to full membership of the EEC? Our difficulty was that some members of the Nine did not want foreign policy, let alone defence, discussed in the EEC forum.

6. Mr Bayülken said that Turkey felt some concern about recent developments in certain Western European countries, eg the strength of the JUSOS in the SPD in Germany, the elections in France, and the new Government / in the Netherlands.

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3.

in the Netherlands. Domestic changes in Western Europe in fact affected us all and Turkey was disturbed to see what appeared to be a move towards a less cautious attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Mr Amery agreed and said how much HMG had admired the way in which Turkey had found a constitutional solution to her own domestic problems. His visit to Turkey had given him good ammunition to use against those who alleged that Turkey was undemocratic.

7. At: this point Mr Bayülken took Mr Amery to call on the Turkish Prime Minister (conversation recorded separately).

TURKEY AND THE EEC

8. After the meeting had resumed, Mr Bayülken said that he hoped that Mr Amery would agree that political consultation between Turkey and the Nine should involve a real exchange of views and not just the transmission of information to Turkey. M. Harmel had agreed to this but M. Thorn had since said that an exchange of views was difficult because the participants always dispersed immediately after meetings of the Political Directors. Mr Cankardeş intervened to say that the procedure was for the Chairman of the Political Directors to give information after each meeting to the Turkish Ambassador in the country concerned. In addition he himself was regularly in touch with each of the Political Directors. Mr Wiggin said that the problem M. Thorn had described did exist. But the Political Directors were only part of the process and the only large subject they had tackled so far was the CSCE. Mr Bayülken accepted these points but said that what concerned him was the psychological aspect. There was opposition to the EEC within Turkey and the Turkish Government had to be able to demonstrate to public opinion that in foreign policy and defence, if not yet in economic relations, the EEC was already treating Turkey as a full member. He would be grateful / for anything that

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4.

for anything that Mr Amery could do to show that the EEC accepted Turkey's political maturity and welcomed her advice. Mr Amery said that he took this point but regretted that so far HMG had not been able to persuade the French Government to formalise discussion of foreign policy, let alone defence, in the EEC. There were thus evident difficulties in seeking to extend to associates of the EEC consultations which were not yet formally accepted by all of the full members.

9. Mr Bayülken said that parliamentary exchanges with the EEC were going well. The Joint Commission was now meeting three times a year and this gave Turkish parliamentarians the feeling that they belonged to the European Parliament, which was becoming of greater importance to them than the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Mr Amery said that we would do what we could to encourage these hopeful trends. As regards the Council of Europe, he urged Turkey not to worry unduly about ill-judged resolutions. Mr Bayülken said that he hoped that the rapporteur could be encouraged to kill the resolution put forward in January and that he would report that Turkish democracy was in good shape. Mr Amery said that he was not able to tell the rapporteur what to report, but as it happened Sir F. MacLean was a good friend of his and a man of experience and mature judgment.

10. After a somewhat confused intervention by Mr Gökmen complaining about the reduction in British bilateral aid to Turkey as a result of our joining the EEC, on which Sir H Phillips put the record straight, Mr Bayülken said that his Government would be much helped in presenting their EEC policy to the Turkish public if all the Ministers concerned could attend the signature of the Enlargement Protocol on 29 or 30 June, on occasion which would mark the 10th anniversary of Turkey's original association agreement and the end of 14 months of hard negotiations. Mr Amery took note but referred to the heavy programme / of ministerial

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5.

of ministerial meetings during June and to the possibility that the CSCE would be meeting in the last week of June.

UNITED STATES/EUROPE

11. Mr Amery said that we had received no indications that the Americans were intending to withdraw their support from Europe: indeed they had given us clear assurances that there would be no unreciprocated withdrawal of their forces. They did however want to talk about the costs of their European commitment.

12. Mr Bayülken said that Turkey had received similar assurances. The Americans had also undertaken, subject to Congressional approval, to maintain the flow of military aid to Turkey, though not at the level the Turkish Government wanted. The Turkish Parliament had approved the spending of \$1.6 billion over ten years for the modernisation of her armed forces. Her contribution to NATO, in terms of GNP, was the highest in the Alliance. The American position nevertheless needed close watching. Turkey was very concerned that there should be no weakness of NATO and was always worried when a new "evaluation" of Alliance strategy was proposed. Every such evaluation in the past had reduced NATO's effectiveness. Turkey's experience of the Russians convinced her that NATO had to realise that the Russians meant business and that force was needed to deter them. For balance of payments reasons, with which Turkey sympathised, the United States wanted a greater defence contribution from her European allies: she also wanted a fair share of the European market. Turkey also sympathised with the EEC's position and understood why the Nine had not been able to reach a common position. But what worried her was the implications for her, and for other European members of NATO who were outside the EEC, if these great issues of United States/European relations should be discussed outside NATO. Turkey was determined not to be left / on the side.

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on the side.

13. Mr Amery said that we also thought that it was of fundamental importance to keep NATO together. NATO was already weak in certain respects, especially the absence of France. We had to see what proposals the Americans would come forward with on burden-sharing. These would certainly be discussed in NATO. We should also maintain contact on defence questions in the Eurogroup. We hoped that one day the EEC would take an interest in defence but that day had not yet come. International financial questions would continue to be discussed in the Group of Twenty and trade in the GATT negotiations beginning in Tokyo in September. At these the EEC would be represented by Sir C Soames who would have a mandate from the Council of Ministers; but Mr Amery understood that he would also consult closely with the EEC's associate members. Although these issues would be discussed in their separate fora, there was a political connection between them and President Nixon's visit to Europe which would provide an opportunity for the threads to be drawn together.

14. Mr Bayülken asked whether we thought that Dr Kissinger's idea of a new Atlantic Charter was dead. Mr Amery said that he thought so and Mr Wiggin added that Dr Kissinger's aim (which was a praiseworthy one) had been to illustrate, if only to United States' public opinion, the need to reaffirm to a new generation the continuing validity of the Atlantic link.

MIDDLE EAST

15. Mr Bayülken said that as a result of her geographical position, Turkey was much concerned about the security of oil supplies. She and Iraq were about to build an oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Iskenderun; there was also the possibility of a natural gas pipeline. She was also interested in the idea of an oil pipeline through Iran to Turkey, which would bypass the unstable regions of the Middle East and give Western

/ Europe

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Europe a securer means of getting oil to the Mediterranean. The Iranians had said that they were ready to go ahead with this project if only the Western oil companies would satisfy them on the prices of Gulf and Mediterranean crudes. This project would also strengthen Turkey's defence capabilities. A strong Turkey would help stability in the Middle East because of the influence and respect she enjoyed in the Arab countries. Mr Amery said that the Turkey-Iran project was a most interesting concept, which he would like to study on his return to London. Sir H Phillips wondered whether proven reserves in Iran were large enough to justify the investment required. The Iranians had also recently spent a great deal on the Kharg Island terminal and on refurbishing the Abadan refinery.

16. Mr Amery said that we fully appreciated the importance of Turkey to the stability of the Middle East and therefore to the security of our oil supplies. Did Mr Bayülken think that Iraq and Syria would become Soviet satellites? Mr Bayülken said that there was an important flow of Soviet war material into Iraq. This was disturbing, especially after the Iraq/Soviet Friendship Treaty and the unhappy precedent of the India/Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Iraqi leaders, nevertheless, all gave the clear impression of being real Arab nationalists and not Communists. The people were as devout as ever; the Communists were kept out of the RCC; and the Baath had a firm grip on the country. Privately the Iraqis accepted that Israel existed, but in public they had to take an extreme line. They would not become Communist, but they were grateful to the Russians for providing them with military equipment. The present leaders of Iraq were people with whom the West could talk and do business provided we were patient and took sufficient account of the Iraqi's sensitivity. Turkey was showing them friendship and was getting a good response. (Mr Bayülken, when questioned subsequently at dinner, said that the above was perhaps a somewhat over-optimistic account of the prospects in Iraq. If President Bakr was in real control then there were grounds / for optimism:

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for optimism: but if he was only a front man for Saddam Husain then the situation could indeed be dangerous for the West.) As for Syria, President Assad was a practical man and knew that he could not settle the issue with Israel by force. Turkey had established very friendly relations with Syria also.

17. Mr Amery said that Mr Bayülken's account was very encouraging. We had been worried about Iraq, partly because of the Shah's known anxieties on this score and partly because of Iraq support for subversive movements in the Gulf. Did the Syrians help the subversive elements in Turkey? Mr Bayülken said that there were some twenty Turkish boys in guerilla camps in Syria and a good deal of arms and ammunition reached Turkey through Syria, much of it of Chinese origin.

18. Mr Bayulken went on to express his concern about the situation in the Sub-Continent. It was paradoxical that on the one hand the India/Soviet Friendship Treaty had enabled the Indians to give Pakistan the coup de grâce, yet on the other the West maintained good relations with India. Mr Amery said that he thought that the Indians had never in their hearts accepted the original partition and had always wanted to break up Pakistan. The Pakistanis had played the hand clumsily in East Pakistan and this had given the Indians their opportunity. He did not think that the Russians had any chance of taking control of India. The country was too big to absorb and its social and economic problems too complex. Iraq on the other hand was a much easier proposition for them; what Mr Bayülken had said led one to hope that the Russians might have to leave Iraq as they had left Egypt; but the Shah took a much less optimistic view.

19. Mr Bayülken said that on the contrary Iran's neighbours, especially Afghanistan, were disturbed at the extent of Iranian re-armament. Against whom did the Shah intend to use the massive quantities of arms he was acquiring? Sir H Phillips suggested that the possibility of disturbances on her frontier with
/ Iraq.

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Iraq, recent evidence of Iraqi irredentism in the direction of Kuwait and Soviet penetration of the Gulf all justified the Shah's policy. Mr Bayülken was not convinced. Turkey's policy was to achieve peace and stability. CENTO was a bulwark against Communism. Turkey's friendship with Iran was strong. But she would not condone any member of CENTO creating instability in the region. She would be very happy if Iran and Iraq could solve their problems. But meanwhile she had to ask herself what was the real reason for Iranian re-armament. Last year the Shah cited the Shatt el-Arab dispute; now he spoke of Soviet penetration of the Gulf. If there was a Soviet threat let Iran and Turkey face it together. But the Shah should not exaggerate it one year and forget it the next. The real motives of Iranian policy were still not clear to him.

MBFR

20. Mr Wiggin said that he had discussed this subject with Mr Bayulken's officials but that there was one further point he would like to make. Our main concern at the ministerial meeting in Copenhagen would be to persuade our European partners, especially those in the potential reductions area, that the aim of our policy should be to confine any reductions, in the first instance at least, to Soviet and American forces. This had been our view for a long time. When we were expressing concern about US reductions and calling for a better coordinated European effort, it would be paradoxical if we were to rush into reducing our own forces. Nor did we want to put the Russians in a position where they thought they could interfere with the future deployment of European forces. We hoped that this idea would appeal to the Turkish Government.

21. Mr Bayülken said that his Government had been considering it for some time. It had its merits and its demerits. There were advantages in helping the United States administration to meet the great pressures which were on them. But the Turks were
/ worried

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worried lest American reductions should become an annual feature. We should not whet American appetites for withdrawal. His Government had not yet reached a conclusion. Mr Amery said that we would have been much happier if the MBFR exercise had never started. We now had to choose between bad and worse. Mr Bayülken agreed and said that Turkey would not be unhappy if the Vienna talks reached no conclusion. Mr Amery said that we had wanted Hungary included as a full participant because the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary represented a threat to Yugoslavia and because we did not think it right that the West should appear to legitimise the presence of a Soviet army of occupation in Hungary. We were sorry that the Americans had felt it necessary to accept the Soviet demand for the exclusion of Hungary. But we had got it agreed in the Alliance that the whole issue of Hungary would be discussed in the MBFR talks proper, with particular reference to non-circumvention.

SOVIET UNION

22. Mr Amery said that Soviet policy was a puzzle. On the one hand the Russians were relentlessly increasing their strength in Europe and Messrs Gretchko and Andropov had been brought into the Politburo. On the other hand, there was the failure of Soviet agriculture, the moves towards détente and the invitation to United States capital to participate in the development of the Soviet Union's natural resources. What conclusions were we to draw? Mr Cankardes said that in the long term détente could produce centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet bloc. But the Turkish assessment was that in the short term the Russians would reap great benefit politically, economically and militarily, from their policy of détente. Mr Bayülken said that Turkish Ministers were even more worried than their experts. Détente had always worked against the interests of democratic countries because of its effects on public opinion and the consequent relaxation of defence effort. Nuclear weapons had so far protected us in Europe from the effects of détente. But what about the rest of the world? Could they be able to withstand the effects of Soviet / propaganda?

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propaganda? Presumably the Soviet Union reached the same conclusion as we did about the likely effects of their policy. Was there any reason to believe that they were ready to give up world domination or the dictates of their ideology? Their policy was to consolidate their acquisitions in Europe. Even if the satellites were to become disaffected, Western Europe would not make war to save them from the reimposition of Soviet control. Turkey's policy was to keep up her strength, maintain her defences, be tough where her interests were at stake and in all other cases be friendly and forthcoming to the Russians. He believed that Britain's policy was very similar.

23. Mr Amery said that he was glad to hear Mr Bayülken's analysis which corresponded almost exactly with our own.

CYPRUS

24. Mr Bayülken said that there had been a reasonable amount of Greco/Turkish cooperation in the intercommunal talks. But the Turkish Government were not sure how sincere this cooperation was, nor how far it would go. For their part they would cooperate as long as they could. Their aim was to see the two communities arrive at agreement on amendments to the constitution which would give more autonomy to the Turkish community. He thought that there was a slight hope that such a settlement could be reached. Archbishop Makarios was not on perfect terms with the Athens Government and Greece realised that Cyprus was for Turkey a national cause. He expressed some concern about renewed Greek harassment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. In answer to a question about UNFICYP, he said that it was playing a useful role but that the Turks would not beg that it should not be reduced if that was the general wish. Nevertheless it seemed foolish to harm the status quo at this delicate stage.

25. Mr Amery said that he could not guess what the chances of a settlement were. Archbishop Makarios perhaps hoped that one day, like Venizelos, he would be at the
/ head of

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head of affairs in Athens. But he did not like the present Athens regime and wanted to retain his independence. This meant that objectively speaking he was in a sense dependent on the Turkish community and indeed on Turkey. But whether this temporary dependence would lead to a formal intercommunal settlement was a very different matter. In answer to a question, Mr Amery said that he thought that Communist influence on the island was increasing because of the activities of Grivas which had weakened Makarios' authority and because of the lack of a settlement.

26. The conversation was adjourned at this point.

PAKISTAN

27. At dinner, Mr Bayülken raised with Mr Amery the question of Pakistan's debts to Britain. He said that most of these were attributable to Bangladesh and asked that we should accordingly waive that part of our claim against Pakistan. Mr Amery said that he was not familiar with the subject but that it probable that we should have to maintain our claim against Pakistan until there was a proper settlement in the Sub-Continent. Mr Bayülken ~~asked~~ that at least we should make it clear to the Pakistanis that our claim against them was only a pro-forma one.

TIMOTHY DAVEY

28. Also at dinner Mr Amery took advantage of a further reference by Mr Bayülken to Sir Fitzroy MacLean and the Council of Europe resolution to raise, with apologies, the case of Timothy Davey. He said that there would be parliamentary interest as a result of his visit and that he would have to say that he had raised the matter with Mr Bayülken. Mr Bayülken said that he quite understood. He hoped that under the Amnesty Law Davey would be released. In subsequent conversation the two Ministers agreed that Mr Amery should on no account say anything in public about the Amnesty but that his line should be that he had raised the matter of Davey with Mr Bayülken and that the latter had taken note.

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Mr Wright

IRAQ

Dr. M.

Pha
5/6

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NR 1/2

1. When Mr Amery was in Turkey at the end of May, he discussed the situation in Iraq at some length with the Turkish Foreign Minister. For ease of reference, I attach the record (see especially paragraphs 15 to 17).
2. Mr Amery wonders whether it would be appropriate, as a follow-up to that conversation, for Sir H Phillips to be instructed to seek the Turkish Foreign Ministry's views on the attempted coup d'etat. This would look like consultation with the Turks, even if it did not yield much.

M. I. Goulding

25/13/73

5 July 1973

M I Goulding

cc: Mr Goodison
Mr Coles

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Reference NR 1/2

(50)

Mr ~~Hunt~~

Mr ~~Wright~~


I hope we can attempt a memorandum,
in the light of these notes and
find what, before long?

IRAQ: COMPOSITION OF THE RCC

1 In the last sentence of an article on page 5 of today's Times, Paul Martin reported that two Baath Party leaders have been expelled and arrested in connection with the recent conspiracy. They are Mohammad Fadel, Head of the Party's military department, about whom we know nothing, and Abdul Khaliq Samarrai, who is a member of the RCC.


2 Abdul Khaliq was born in 1933 and is, by profession, a teacher. He is, or was, a member of the regional and national commands of the Baath Party and was appointed a member of the RCC in November 1969, when he assumed particular responsibility for Kurdish affairs. He is described as a hard-liner and one of the more extreme members of the Party who in 1968 was pressing hard for a popular front with the Communists. Although he is believed to have fallen somewhat from favour in 1970, he has remained a member of the RCC and has often served as a personal emissary for President Bakr.

3 If he has indeed been removed from the RCC, that body will now have been reduced to 7 in number - the death of General Shihab on 30 June had already reduced it to 8. It will be interesting to see who gets the defence portfolio and who, if anyone, replaces ~~Abdul~~ Samarrai.


G S Burton
Middle East Department

9 July 1973

Mr Samarrai is said in today's Times to be the third most important member of the party. Sentenced to life imprisonment.


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END OF PART A

NOW SEE PART B

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Folio No.	Reference	Date
18	CM(73) 35 th meeting	5.7.73

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Margaret Shatwell Date 24.10.2

Situation Of Saadoun Ghaidan Seeking To Come To England For Medical Treatment; Details Of Sentence Passed On Nadhim Kzar; Death Of General Shihab. Political Situation In Iraq. 12 Feb. 1973. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2090. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472054/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=7540bd2b&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.